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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
TtM •••rgiRC* of Arab NatlonalitB or al^ ^MJanalvYah 
ft^»^^fwh i s a vary iBy)ort«nt «v«nt in tho history 
of th« Arabs. I t i s dosoly asseeistod with tho dodino 
and fall of tha Ottoman eapiro, and with Arab aspirations 
to pol it ical indspondonea and unity. Tho Turks and tho 
Muslin Arabs livod si do by si do for about four hundrod 
yaars in a su^rs-national Ottonsn Saplro as ncnbors ttf 
ono groat cowaunity, unitoo by thoir faith and tboir 
alltt^^ncs to a Muslin soveraign wbo was sultan or Caliph 
at tho sano tiibs. But towards tho and of tho ninataonth 
coAtury anu tho boginning of tho twontloth contury, tho 
roign of dul t^ Abdul Hanid II jtfid subsoqu«itly ths 
*Vbuii9 Turks* lad to incraased discontant and robolli-
ousna&s in tho Arab provincos of tho Cttonan eaipiro. 
/•mong tho Ar^s, nationalisn did not onorgo until 
tho lator part of the ninotoenth eontury* Tho ssnsa of 
soliddxity and prido in tho Arab tradition had long 
oxistftdt but thay did not form tho basis of cohartnt 
novononi until tho vMst bogan to infrings upon tho 
Arab vnorld. In ny dissertation I have triad to \tai^^ 
doDfi th« situation «nd th« r«I«tlent w:deli cr«att « 
•ott iaportant background to aoao of ttio contooporary 
polit ical pxobltatt in tho Arab Eatt and to tho 
awakaning of tht Arab polit ical oonsclousnaas in watt 
Atiai and tha nisundorstandings vMch dovalopad 
botwoen tha Arabs and tha Turks, which rosultad in tho 
ganosis of Arab natlonalisn* 
C H A P T Is R 
I 
THE GENESIS OF AH/>3 NAHCNAUSM 
I t i s a knoMn fact thet n^tionalltn 1» cn« cf the most 
ioportant dynaede factors of niodern tir&at. In tha opinlc.n 
of Hans Kohnt * I t i s f i r s t and foranost a st^ta of ndd, an 
act of Gonsciousnats, which sinca tha Franeh Ravolution, has 
bacons and oaoxe oO'-^ raon ti. mankind • • • • • Tha n&dam period 
of iiistory, starting with tha French Ec-volutlon, i s character-
isad ts>Y the fact that in t h i s perioo, and in t^iis period 
alone, the nation detc^ds supxe«a loyalty of man, that all 
m«n, not only certain individuals or dasseSf sf dxa^rtn into 
t h i s coinmon loyal i ty , and that all c iv i l i za t ion , • . . are now 
c 
donin^tad moie and vaoi9 hy t h i s ^ne supreme group - cons&^s* 
nass, naticnalism*7 
No doubt i t i s buropa whexa nationalitfn f i r s t appeared 
3Ut i t did not leiaain confined to ajropa. AS Lotnrop Stoddard 
writesi 
*In tsurope vihere i t f i r s t attained self-conscicus metu-
r i ty , i t radically altared the face, of things during 
tha nineteenth century, so tnat century i s often c-^lled 
tha age of national i t ies* But naticnalisn i s not neraly 
a European phenomenon. I t han spread to tha rarrotest 
comers of the earth, and i s apparently s t i l l destined 
to effect rooraentous transforinations.* 
1. daTii K nn, Tne ^dea of Nationaliaia (Naw Ycrk, 1958), 
p.p. JLO-11. 
2. Lotrirop ^tcddard, Ihe New »»rld of Islam (Loncion, 19 22), 
p. 1.^ 2. 
-.2» 
Natlonclitii tnut a^ t^ b««fi « grt i t lore* in tn« xsth and 
aoth c«ntorl«»* y«t m i«t th«r« h«ft &«ofi no agrtMNrnt anting 
tetelArt •oout t ^ n«tiofi of natlon«llta* 
ttmy tti«ori«« h«v« b««n #JV4inc«4 •••king vavicutly to 
IdMitily fi«Uon«li8H with lan9U4»g«» eiiltur«» r«€9« polit ics , 
g«09jr«f)tiyi ttconoalGs* cs teligloiu Now i^»*« tfui wvn cth«r, 
tt#ti»r» ««y b« t actors pr<»a«apo«liKi or 60( txi^tioQ to th« 
for«»tiofi of national conftciou«n«»»* ^ t in trio l^st andlysis* 
nationaiiaa i t aoiMitilng ov»r and locva all i t s oonitituont, 
•iMt^t^y ,vhich i t vDorkft into a n«w and ^^ gbojr tynthoso^.^ 
Nttion«li«n i s • f>olitie«l or««a, tn«t unOorlios tn# 
ootMsion of «&<i«ni socist iss snu Isgitiiiixos tbdc cltito to 
•uthoiity* Kationslita e«ntr^^ tn« tupr*** ioy«liy cf ttM 
ovejrwt)«lfiing ««jejrity ol th« poo^l* upon ttM n«tlon*stat«, 
Strive s^'iisting or do^cri^od. I t «iipr«ss«s i t s s i f in th* acst 
varisd jnct oppo&ito l<i«oio^i«»» «s M^I as In th« s«,^ rc^ fox 
•n • itfsology* • 2 
As • M«ttor of f «ct, nstlcnalisa i« « stat« of »inat 
nationalisa i s • belief, hold by • fairly lsxy« nuiabor of 
in(tivi(Hi«lii« that th«y oonstitato a *^ationality*| i t i s a 
S6n&<^  of balonglng tog«tn«r as a*nation"« TKis <Ni0tlon% as 
visualized in the adnds of I t s bolisvors, i s a psopla or 
OOMBur^ ty cssoeiatsO to9«thar tuna organizad undor ontii 
2. ri^^s i<0]vi« ln%MPpHP§l Mft^9Wli^ikii 9l i lgrtil 
•aciaiicaa. (t«.acfisil; an ano fraa ^ros!*)» vol-il» p,63. 
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govcmment, and dwelling toi^ather in a d i s t inct tvrrltory. 
Thf A r 0 thlnk*r Sati*^  ' al<-Hutri d«fin«s Arab natiinalisnt 
in th« S0ns« ' Urubah. H* writatt 
Thara i t l a f t no xoon to doubt that tha division of tha 
Arab provineti into s«v«ral t ta t s s took plac« bacausa of 
ttia bargaining and an^itions of tha foraign states , and 
not according to tha viaws and in tar t s t s of tha ; aoplt 
of tha countrios. So, too «mra tha bordars of thasa sta-> 
ta s datarolnad by tha wishas and agrosmants of the foreign 
powers, and not accoralng to tha natural demands of tha 
situation or the requixeaents of indiginous interest . . . . 
Aft i t possible for us to consider, for example, the 
peoples of Syria af fonaing a true nation, different 
from the people of Iraq and Lebanon? Mever, gantelmen. 
All that X have explained indicates d e a r l y people of 
these s tates «re temporary jnd superficial*••• vVe must 
always assart that the Syrians, Iraqis , Lebanese, Joz^ 
diftians. Hajaris, and Yemenis al l belong to mne nation 
the Arab nation. 
On the question of Arab Unity al Husri i s very ea4>hdticT 
I bel ieve that in the present cireumstdnces, thft f i r s t 
action that nust be taken to rea l i ze Arab IMity i s to 
awaken the fee l ings of Arab nationalism and to spread 
fa i th in the unity of t h i s nation. Mhen these fee l ings 
Mxm co^>letely awakened and when t h i s fa i th i s thoroughly 
spread and firmly established in the people, taan the 
rath for Arab unity wil l become d e a r and the o b s t a d e s 
which oppose i t wil l vanish easily* 
Arabism i s the strongest and most is|>ortant of the t i e s 
which bind figyptians to each other* This i s because al l 
Egyptians, wether they af Muslim or Christitfi, from 
Upper to Lower 
1. Lothoeop Stoddard, p o . g i | . . p. 133* 
. ^ , 2" '^"^****^JX*- sl^Afabiyyah* in al>^ dMil^ Y„Yit^  drMfffl^^VYiih (Cairo, 1961) pp 57«58| cited bv Willi am L^aeveland. The 
U t t m^ J^\t9h^ 9t %aU AJ-Htfia (l^rtncgton, JL97iy p . l30 . 
3 . Alr;yfWfrlh jgi^^j^ (b wot i^ ''-> ) pp 9, 113-114. 
cited by Mllliam L.Cleveland, fiiLtfiii** PP IS/-140. 
^yp^t ^>««k AXdblc. . . . 'M cttt th«r«fore, b« certain 
that Egypt i s Arab and that i t $ futura vdll be bound 
by tha atrongast of t i e s of Atdblan. 
Froat tha Hamiat point cf viawi 
Nationalise i s a principle of bourgaois idailogy and 
p o l i t i e s axprassad in national i so la t ion . I t i s advocacy 
of, i i s trust of othar nations and annity among nations. 
Nationalism has i t s roots in capitalism's specif ic fea-
turat of davalopnent. Flaflacting tha character relations 
among nations under capitalism, nationalism appears in 
two format Great power chauvinism of a dominating nation, 
marked by contempt for other nations, and local Nationa-
lism of an oppress<^d nation stai^^ed by the striving for 
national sedislon and mistrust of other nations. Nations* 
lism developed in the process of formation of nation 
widch was accompanied by the emergence of national lang-
uagestf^d cultures tfid the mouldir^ of a iH>ecial national 
psycholcyy and national sentiments. Si>eeulating on the 
Logans of Nation side" in teres t s bourgeois and reforr 
mist ide loq i s t s ^6 revis iofdsvs u t i l i s e Nationalism as 
a refinei spjSans for s t i f l ing the c lass contiousness of 
the working' peoji^i sp l i t t ing the international working 
c lass movements £nd just l fyina colonial aim tjnd wars 
isatwoMi nciUons. Nationalism i s lnacciq)ti^>le in any form 
to the wording people, whose in teres t s gX9 ex, ressed only 
by proleterian internationalism. But at the def inite 
stage of the national l iberation movemMit, comoiunist con* 
s ider i t h i s tor ica l ly Just i f ied to support the Nationatfsm 
of the oppressed nation, w:4.ch has a general deoccratic 
content (an t i imperial ism, striving for pol i t ica l and 
economic indepwidence). This variety of Nationalism how 
ever, also has tfiother t ide, «Rpr«ssing the ideology and 
in teres t s of the veactionary expelitino top group, which 
leans towards coavromise with imperialism* 
Nationalism i s most wide spread and tenacious in a p i t ty 
bourgeois environiaant, under socialism which e s t ^ l l s h e s 
real equality of nations, the social roots of nationna* 
lism »Te removed and i t s manifestation af preserved 
only as service of ci4>italism in the minds and behaviour 
of people. 
1. M.n»senthal and P.YUdin (eda), A Dictionary of PhJloffO' 
phv (>>oscow^ 1967), pp. 306-7. 
.5« 
TtM m»rt«d of nat icn«l isa on a global seal* i s • r suit 
of tti* Euzop«aniz«tion ^ct laodittrnizatlon of viostom tfid pr«» 
nodorn soelotlos* As a ph«r)oiB«non of aodem lairopaan history 
tha basa of nationaliso i s elosaly linlcad iidth tha origin of 
popular tevaraignty; national!sa has from tha baginning baan 
a p o l i t i c a l l y ravolutienary Movasant, i t has triad to t r ^ t -
fora or ovar^hrow tha "lagitinata" govammant of that part, 
whosa e la ia to authority was based upon divina ordination 
or haridltary r ights . I t wishad to astablish t o t a l l y naw 
po l i t i ca l ant i t ia s . 
National! «• in tha saeoAd half of tha ninataanth century 
was ragardad as tha po l i t i ca l doctrine of tha upper c lasses 
of tha r i g h t i s t s in th« po l i t i ca l spactrtin of the age. I t 
stood in sharp and repressive opposition to aodalism, an 
international novemant that Included the industrial norkSt 
and landless peasants, wix> generally f e l t excluded fron the 
national society, and expressed tnair aspir,itions« 
The new development of national!sn *rac i^" was at 
f i r s t confi. ad to tha older centres of European c iv i l i za t ion , 
but with the spread of iMstem ideas i t presently appeared 
in tne m s t unexpected quarters* Meanwhile, by the dos ing 
1. Hans Kohn, op.t^t^. p. 63. 
d*cad«t of the nineteenth century, the f i r s t phase of natioe* 
l i s n had patiently passed into Asia. Tha *youn9 Turk* and 
•Young Egyptian* poveniants and nat ional is t st irrings in regions 
•0 far renote freosi ea€h other as Algeriat Porsia and India 
wart unodstakaola signs that Asia was gripped by the i n i t i a l 
theories of nat ional is t se l f consciousness. Furthernx^re, with 
tha opening years of the twentieth century, numerous syn^toas 
proclaimed the fact that in Asia, BB in the Salkans, the 
second or 'racial* stage cf nationalism h«d begun. These yea« 
xs saw def inite eraexg nee of f<ir flung * Pen*-movement st 
*Van«>Turkism, " 'Pan /jrabism* and "Pan Islas^e nationalism*? 
The f i r s t ma)or nat ional is t revolution th t put equal 
emphasis en th^ s i / c i s l i s t ^revolutionary a^'^cts was the Mexi* 
can r«dVolution of 1910-1917. I t set the pattern for the deve-
lopment of nationalism in n^y underdeveloped countries, and 
for their fight against foreign po l i t i ca l intervention and 
Economic penetration tftd exploitation. 
Nationalism, despite i t s re la t ive ly brief history, has 
undergone several transformations. I t was an e l i t e , a *bour-
geous* movement in the age of the ascent of the oddole classesj 
i t has become in i t s second century a mass mcvement in wtUch 
the people at large den^ and an ever-«d.d«iing participation in 
the po l i t i ca l social and cultur^l liist of Uw nation. 
1. Lothrop Stoddard, o p . c i t . p. 136. 
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Aftcr 18'8, naticnalism orlQlnally a movement of •m^n^ 
dpat i cn and i^nstitutlcnal rights . I t l a d i f f i cu l t tc forca 
tha futura of nationalsim* I t l a a dadaiva foxce ifi a V0OTI6 
QXO¥d.nq wore ^d isore intar-dapandant, a force capable of 
producing b l t t t r tansicna and ona*aidad, aalf rlgthaouanaaa 
judgaotants K,t\at thraatan the r,.tlcnal aclution of internatio-
nal conf l ic ts , Cn tha othar hand* naticnallaai l a an iiq;>ortant 
factor in prevdiling dny one or ttwc of tha strongest pcvvara 
froa astablishlng thair hagamony ovar tha vi^la globa, cvar 
a larga part of i t . 
Lat us now traca f^e ganaait and growth cf netionalisn 
(aX'-Qawadyya) in tha naar and mlddla East. At tha baginning 
of tha niaataanth cantury tha Ottcoafi aapira containad within 
i t s doninlona« Boat of tha tarri toriea coaprising the foraar 
ktab aopiraa tftd naarly al l thoaa paopla spaaking Arabic aa 
thair aothar tongua. Arab national ist tanoandas garminating 
obacuraly d^ d ccnfuaadly throughout the f i r s t half of tha 
1. P.J .Vatikiot ls wriiaa: Tha taris darivaa fzx>n »Ka«ai' 
a tarn of tr ibal province used uaad to danota a group'of people 
having or da ia ing a conmon ane ator. or a tribe daseandad 
fron a d n g l e ancestor. One* s *Kim*is siaply one* a paopla, 
either genealogically determined or mythologicdlly and folk-
lor i sh lv depicted. In thia century 'KaMadyvp*refers to the 
Movement of nationalisai aiaong the Arabs of the ottoman doai-
nationa in the 'Fer t i l e Crecent* tnat were conquered by tha 
a i l e s of the great war** se *KaMBtlyya* in £ ^ . 2 vol.IV p.781. 
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nin«t««nth century. Not unti l ttM second half of the century 
i t thexe any d e a r conception of 'nationalisa* in the ^ifestem 
tense. There f d i s t inc t nat ional ist tendencies in the teach-
ings of Jaael al-Din al-Afghani (who i s philosophically the 
eonnectiny link betv^e^n Pan->lslaBitai and JMkislin nationalism), 
ivhile the Turkish reforaers of the aid-nineteenth century were 
patiei it ly influenced by national i ty at they were by other Wet-
t e m ideat . I t wat infact , in Turkey th : t a true national ist 
eonciousness f i r s t appeared. 
John Marlowe detcribet Arab Mationalita at followtt 
The beginnin.s of Arab nationalism can be taken to 
date from tiie landing of Bonaparte in Egypt in iTM 
Thit event was th« starting point of a presets by 
wnich the lands of the Cttoaan £inpire becaae more 
and aore exposed lo Military, culture, economic and 
po l i t i ca l influencet fxoa ivtttern Europe. I t was the 
iofiact of those influence on a c u l t u r a l v dormant, 
p o l i t i c a l l y stagnant and eoonosdcally s t i r l l e society 
which set In train those diverse spiri tual , i n t e l l e c * 
tual , social ano po l i t i ca l foments which go to make 
up A r ^ nat.onalitn. 
In retrotpect the tvo seoiinal noveaents during the 
nineteenth century which shaped and determined the future 
developaent of Arab nat iona l iw werei (a) " the development 
of a spec i f ica l ly Arab consdousnets aaong the Arabic sjpeaking 
inhabitants of Syria and, ( b ) - *Urabi*s Military reoell ion in 
p. 7. 
1. Lothrop Stoddard, o o . c i t . . p. 138. 
2. Arab Nation^i«a »nd Brit ish laoerial is is (London, 196I) 
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Egypt. Th«r« w«r« of courso oth«r foraat iv* influenc • • , but 
th«sa two novttta^ntt, th« cn« providing nationalism with a 
thfloretical basit» the other with a practical vtan^^la. In 
i t s or ig in, AXiti nationalism in Syria was an af^eapt, inspirad 
•« in ly by scholars and intol lactuals to raalizCt f i r s t a cul* 
tural and than a po l i t ica l unity bassd on a common language 
with tha object of securing f i r s t Arab authonoMy witnin and 
la ter , Arab ind^endence wittx>ut the Cttoaan enpire, Starting 
as a l i t e r a r y rev iv . l arising from the act iv i ty of christian 
Missions in Ltba^on, i t develo^sd ever a year as a coherent 
po l i t i ca l novement, which included Arabic-speaking Muslins 
regarding theaselves as fellowaeabers of a noble but oppre-
ssed race, * r ight ly ttru^^qling to be free* , under the Hanldian 
despotisn, which was adadnistratively tyrannical but racia l ly 
l ibera l * freedom v>as seen as Arab autonomy vdthln a po l i t ica -
l l y reformed dttom^ entire. Confronted with the Pan-Turani«n 
procl iv i t ies and the centralizing tendencies of the Ycung 
TurkSt treedom became synonymous with national independence 
and as a necessary corollary, Arab nationalists began to 
think no longer in terms of reforms but of revolt* 
Arab army offic^^rs, and Arab c iv i l ian o f f i c ia ls in the 
bttoman service, as well as Arab stuoents i^d professioal men 
bonded themselves into secret societies dedicated to the 
course cf Arab nationalism and eagerly aw^ted some external 
- 1 0 -
•v«nt Mihlch idght prscipltate th« fa l l of th« Ottoman ai^plra 
and th« paxturitlon of A r ^ lnoapand«ne«» 
m aust now taka a brief look at tha idea* undarlayinq 
Arab nationalism in i t s fomativa sta0«. Thasa idaas appear 
to dariva equally from Europe^ l lberal ian and I si and c ncdem-
ism vsMich undoubtedly influenced by airopean librelisrrt, was 
a conscious, atteoipt to combat European influences on the 
Muslim world by reinterpratin9 the prindplik of Islam with 
the object of founding a speci f ica l ly Islamic way cf l i f e , 
wdch would be able to hold i t s own ajainst all the spiritual , 
tnotionali Intel leetualt social and econoBdc pressures from 
the virsst* Iha pioneer of the mcvenent was J anal al-Din a l -
Afghani (d,l897) whose ifaost influential disciple v.as the 
Egyptian reformer Shaykh Muhammad Abduh, (d,1909) *Abdal-
Rahman al Kawakibi* (d . l902) , wto was a Syrian from Aleppo 
and provided the principal nexus between Arab nationalism and 
Isl^Bie modirntism by presenting the one in terms of the other. 
Islamic modernism provided a theoretical b a ^ s fox Arab 
nationalism in terns of Islam which both supplemented and 
corrected the European l ioeral influence, While the kiuropetfi 
l iberal influ«nce was prii^cipally directed against the imme-
diate pressure of ottoman rule, the Islamic cmodemist in f lu -
ence was principally directed a ainst the ultimate threat 
i* IJBlflt^ P* 10. 
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of Huroptan ctoninatlcn, lalvnlc aodcmltn w«nt back to tht 
•arly AXdb caliphs to aoBphailza th« (kity of the ruler to 
conforn hLmself to the popular will . 
Arab nationallw took root aaong the intal legen^ of 
the Syrian d t l e t . The concm>t of racial unity based on a 
common desert ancestry strengthened and extended the concept 
of unity based on a coimion language, a ooamion religxon and 
ooMBon eviration, towards freedon, languabe, religion and 
race* these «veze the three basic concepts of Ar^ unity. 
Their effects were local in respect of language and race, 
llodted in respect of religion. In default of any fi? all sable 
tense of Syrian nationality, unity Itfiguage had been a neans 
of expressing a unity of aspiration for the various Arabic 
speaking sscts and tribes included within the geographical 
region known as Syria* 
The idea of nationalism had dominated the minds of Arabs 
to a greater extent than any other ideology. I t i s significant 
that this new concept, in contrast with other itoported id«as, 
has gained acceptance ^ t h but l i t t l e opposition, and had 
spread so rapidly, despite Islam's t a d t or expressed disapp-
roval* Moreover nationalism has cncfoached upon csrtain 
doain«Aice of l i f e witich Isltfs had one uncontested for 
centuries. Perhaps for tids very reason the early reformers 
1* IkJL^ ** P* 16< 
did not b»cane anthuslastic advoCr>t«s of the concept, fearing 
tti t i t (night wcrMch upon traditional l o y a l t i e s . Instead 
th«y sought to borrow only those ooncspts wnich would not 
enter into direct confl ict vdth Islam. Very soon however, these 
early i n ^ r t s brought notionalisa in the ir train, «v)leh pro* 
cssdsd to supersede the Islaadc loyalty in varying degrees, 
^ t h the exception of s t r i c t l y relgious concepts, all other 
concepts h ve been subjected to a whdbsale re-examination 
by Arab thinkers, in the hope of their recent peculat ions 
on the idea of nationalisiR. Many Arab thinkers have conscio-
usly sought to associate rel igion vdth national!sm in an 
effort to reintroduce Islam as an alement in th i s ideology 
dut rel igion i s bcund to take a sub«rdinate position such 
as blend, ana thus becane a coaaponent rather than ^ oppo-
nent of nationalisa. 
About the genesis of Arab national!sn Majid Khaoduri-
writest-*-
Turks and Arabs, the two najor etnno-eultural groups 
wnich aaintained C;ttc<nan ^^ c^ y«x, roiaain?d the l eas t 
effected by the forces disrupting Islamic unity, aut 
the decadence of Ottoman rule, arising froa internal 
as well as external forces oecame v i s i b l e by the later 
part of the eigtiteenth century, the Christian Arab 
thi ikers , were the f i r s t to advocate the idea of Mtti 
national!sot 2 vdtriout reference to Islam* Arab nation-
lism, AS they advocated i t , was inpl iCl t ly secular only 
a handful of Musliia Arabs of l loeral mXno accepted i t . 
1. Po l i t i ca l trencs in the Aray world (London. 19*70), p. 13. 
2. For the theme tnat the forerunners of Arab naticnalisn 
were Christian thinkers, se^ i George Antonius, The Arab i 
inf^  (London, 1958)., sea also Gati*; ' d-i iusrl •, Muhadarai 
Ny&>U>^rUKfa fll.QfllfBlaat^ • Lectures on the tvoluticn oi 
the Iffdta of Naticnali&in* (Cairo, 1951), pp. 165-75, Albert 
tlourani, Afajftg JW^^^^ ^^ ^^» U,Pff&l Afl* A75>g*-tf^ S?. (London, 
1962). pp. 237. ffQ 
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Muslim l ioeral tdntctrs wtio advocatttd the ioes cf 
natloritillsm old n»ithex oemand th, t Arab lands btt detachi^^ 
fxoa th« Cctoman aB^iire nor lnde«o that j^cligicn oe separrted 
fzorn th« Stat*. Ai>di/I) - ^hrnan al-K«waklbi, th« most racical 
of Muslim thinkers v,ho attacked Ottoman rule, called for 
the restoration of the caliphate from Turkish to Arab .ands* 
but not for the break in Ottoman Unity. 
The Chritiian Najio *A2uri, h^o advocated the l i oera-
t lon of the Arabs from ottoman rule, accepted on attachement 
to Ottoman unity In some form, iie proposed to divide the 
1. Al-Kawakibi* s a^ Q^Uia nt tHet the Turks usurped the 
caliphate from the Ar<^8 was based on the ooctrine that one 
of the qu^4ificotlcns of the caliph must be tds descent frop 
the Arub cf guraysh, according to authoritative legal t ex t s . 
ifVhile the content of t h i s srguRent was outwardly poletidcalt 
i t 8{abad among Muslim thinkers betrayed lack cf loyalty to 
Turkish leadership. See Albert HDurani, Arabic Thought in 
the l i b r a l Aoe (London, 1962), pp. 271-
2. Najib *Azuri was a fomter o f f i c ia l under the ottoman 
ddministration and served as a deputy governor Jerusaltm before 
he resigned and sett led in Paris . He published his proposals 
;^ n im Lf PfYl ir^f l i T^i^yn Afifrft (PaKi»» 190&}.. defore 
*Asuri another Christian leader called for the separation of 
Arab land frocn the Ottoman empi?;*) YUn j^ Karin;; but his sugges-
t ion was inspired by the Hutso-Turklsh war of 1877 rather i 
than by nationalism Karim «rrote frcm : aris to Amir Abd a l -
wadir al Jasa*iri , the mtiled Algaxl^ leader in Damscus, urg-
ing him to ccme to 9f\ underst^ding with the European powers 
for a s^arate existence of Axab lands under his rule after 
that war (see iiaai'in Karim, YUsuf Bea Karaw f i« l Manfa (TlPl-
po l i , 1905), pp. , 33-36, 346-62). '^en the war was over and 
Blunt suggested a separate existence of Syria under Jaza*iri*s 
rule, Sritan was no longer interested in such an arrtfigement (sae W.S. Blunt, Secret History of the Snail ah Occupation of 
Egypt (London, 1907), pp. 118-119. 
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th« Arab lands into two parts, ttis nerth ( ths Farti ls cx^cant) 
and tha South (Ardbla)i each with a recognition all i t s owm. 
Ar^ia the seat of tha callphata, would baeona an I si ami e 
stata, and tha Fartila eroscant a aodem sacular stato. Al 
Kawakibl tfid *Azuri, to raantion but two distinguishad writars 
m969 i t d a a r that tha idaa of Arab national isa ranained vagua 
and tiabulous befora tha Turkish rairelution of 1906* 
Tha natura of Arab nationalisa vMch took root at tho 
beginning of the mudem period amon the Arabs of the * Ferti le 
Crescent* under the Ottonan domination* This area wcs occupieo 
by the Al l i e s of the f i r s t \ii(brld War inspi te of the fact that 
the Arabs supported the A l l i e s which lead to their victory. 
AS lUxime Hodinson during the inter-war period the disappoint-
ment of the Arabs led to the profound nodification of their 
ideology, ite writest 
I t was in Arab Asia that the development of a nationa-
l i s t ideology went forward. I t was there that hatred 
of iqp>eriallsa, especial ly of Brit ish imperialism, rea-
ched i t s peek* The big. medium and petty txourgeousit 
took up arms against the landowing aristocracy and 
seized control of the national ist movement which the 
aristorocracy had betrayed. The influence of worldwide 
ideologies began to make i t s e l f , m wil l return to 
Marxism's contribution la ter on. At the time, fascism's 
influence was more important. The nature of the enemy 
a l l i ^ c e between Anglo-French imperialism and Zionism 
was particularly significant in t n i s respect. 3ut ju^3% 
ideology, which i s so i l lusu l t ed tc the Arobs. was only 
s .«radically taken up, and thm only by a typical group 
as Antoun Sa* ad* s Syrian popular Party which created 
a Syrian racism implicity opposed to Arab unity. The 
1. Maximm Hodinson, Marxism and the Muslim ^ r l ^ . Enq.tr. 
(London, 1979), p. 81. 
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unifi»d Meto nat lcnal i s t 1 oology was clearly preck>nd-
nant, and gaining round. About 1936 i t gained a hold 
in £gypt, and tpra^d towards tha Magtir^ and tha Sudan. 
Ttdt idaology tr ied to •^uip i t s e l f vdth 3 rational basis; 
thaoret idans discussed the foundations of the MCcb na-
t ion, i t s l inks vdth the Muslim rel igion and the federal 
or unified ehara ter of the state i t would sot up. People 
tr ied to define nationhood and of course they did so in 
terns of chracterist ies ooapatible with the particular 
t rac t s of the Arab countries's ituation. German influences, 
in aduition, pushed people to think of the nation as «n 
objective ent i ty «»hich iR^Msod duties and oeatanded un-
conditional devt>tion fron i t s men^bers. 
About characteristic traats of Arao nationalism during 
t h i s perio^ he further MOT.test 
doth for the theoreticians tfid icr the mass s ^nose 
a^lr.itior.s Sind feelln^-js they expressed, the main con-
tradiction remained the strug 1* between the oppretsod 
oriental world and western ioper la l i sa . The contradic-
t ions w t h other oriental nationalisa. Turkish nationa-
lism, for exa«f>l«, teeeted quite secondary. Al%hough i t 
was hoped thot one twestern i n e r i a l i & t power night be 
playtd off against another, t h i s was purely • natter of 
t a c t i c s , except for the few genuine agents, of course. 
Brit ish efforts to make Frc^ nco omax the whole arunt of 
Arab nationalism wer doomed to fai l* 
I t was a nationalism wfdch for a long time continued 
to make some uso of re l ig ious fee l ing. T-ds was natural 
enough, seeing as X»l«m. which was created by an Arab 
and revsrcff. as tooek which God revealed in Arabic, at 
«n A r ^ cultural phenomenon, a foature of Arj^ culture 
despis#ci and threatened by non-Arabs, i^^en the Arabic 
s>«^aking rel ig ious minorities, the jews and Christians, 
think ot i t in theso terms. 
AS we have seen, i t was a nati ualism led oy the bour-
geousie; the landed aristocracy had be^i exposed as 
untrustworthy and had discredited i t s e l f . The national-
i s t movement minimized c lass «trugule in favour of 
national unity. I t was nonetheless accepted by the p«o-
pxolltarian masses with l i t t l e or no resistance. As 
long as national inoependenco ha4 not yet been achi^ed, 
c lass struggle (^uite eas i ly turned into national strugijle* 
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The ru l ing class which oppr«ts«cl and exploit•<} i t s 
cofl|>atriots dsnounchsd mainly as t r a i t o r s to ths na-
t i o n a l strugyls, as col laborates wi th ths i n p e r i a l i s t s * 
/ d l miscrias. d i f t l c u l t i a s and c o n f l i c t s ware explainad 
i n tarns of i i 4 } a r i a l i 8 t doadnetivn. 
I t was a un i f iad nat icnal ism, fo r t u * raason wa hafva 
Btnt iontd . Thax€ v\«re no faars tha t mambarship of a 
fadarat lon, or avan of a unitao Arab s ta te , would resul t 
i n the threa t of domination by one regional elenient over 
others, except perhaps ainongsi the governinQ elements 
tfid cer ta in buisiness c i rc les* The d iv is ions inaposed by 
the i o p e r i a l i s t powers hao manaaed to create r e l a t i v e l y 
speci f ic eoDnoBdc un i ts and p a r t i c u l a r in te res ts within 
f ront ie rs^ despite the gross a r t i f i c i a l i t y of the l a t t e r . 
But t h i s was qui te i n s i g n i f i c a n t cooapared to the great 
t t i M towards un i f i ed s o l i d a r i t y . ! 
A f te r the sdd - aoth century Qawcelyya became the expres-
sions of the purported economic p o l i t i c a l and social Ari l l -
revo lu t ion , bssent ia l ly , though ri^WtHlrfYYi aX 'hfMXM* i » 
the ters) wloely used for the acve^isnt of Arao nationaiisiB 
Arab i n t e l l e c t u a l s since the l a s i war nave t r i e d to formulate, 
theore t i ca l sno philosopnical foundations as well as l i s t o -
r i c d l anu i eoloyical pernisas for t t i i s nat ional ism. Most 
act ive a>'<K)ng them were Syridn,Lebanese and Irat^i p o l i t i c i ^ s , 
teachers Journa l is ts , wr i t e rs and p u b l i c i s t s . Prominent 
acaong the raore recent exponent ^nd aovccate. of Arab nat iona-
l i s m iidve been the Ba ' th Party fountied i n 1943, and i t s 
antecadents amon^ S'lialler rad ica l Arab youth movements i n 
I r a q and Syria in he nint?teent i t i i r t i ' s s . 
b r i e f l y the advocate^S of Arab national ism argue the 
! • Dst^'t PP» 81-82 . 
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•xlst t f i i* of an Arab nation (ufiaa^arablvva!> wnlch though 
actually dlvid«ci into saparata statas* ou9ht to ba unltad 
in a singla organlz aovaralgn po l i t i ca l entity, what binds 
th« members of tha A r ^ nation together in a con^ Ton fa i th , 
Xslara, a corr>fflon l^iguage, Arabic, a s ingle culture, Is lanic 
and a shared history, economic and other practical grounds 
for urdty have, until recently, rarely been forcaulated or 
proposed. Religious sentiment, con^ non i d « ) t i t y and an aspi-
ration to po l i t i ca l urdty, iMive been the fundanental ingre-
dients of the taovement of Arab nationalisoi, ATabism and 
Pan-Arabism-all aspects or variantes of Uaveaivva - in th i s 
country. 
1. F'.J.Vatikiotis, aa«J^»» P» TBI. 
C H A P r t it 
II 
THE ARABS UKDcH TH£ CTrCM^US 
THt OTiOMANSt 
Th« Turks established th« largest and strongest Muslin 
Enpire, known as tha Ottoman dapira, since the r i s e of I s l a n . 
At one t i iae, the Ottoman Empire stretched from the gates of 
Vienna to the s t r a i t s cf Bab al<*Mand^, and from the Caucasus 
to ali'iost, the A t l a n t i c Ccean across North Afr ica* A series 
of d i c i s i v e v i c t o r i e s i n a long chain of conqfuests led the 
Turks to the Zenith ot t h e i r s d l l t a r y power and g lory . An 
unbroken succession of the b r i l l i a n t and great sultans led 
the Ctionans to acquire i n the f o v r t e n t t i , f i f t e e n t h and 
sixteenth centuries a vast cmpix; 
I n the beginning of the i o t h century many Turanlar* t r i b e s 
were roaming into Asia M n o r , f ron t h e i r o ig lna l homeland, 
known as Turkistan i n Central Asia. Towards the middle of the 
t h i r t e v n t h century, a &i»all uand of nomad Turks belonging to 
the cghuz txlbes^Rigrated frotn Khurasan in to Asia Minor, the 
leader of the t r i b e was Sulaym^ who was acoimpanlsd ay his 
son crtoqural* Ahen he appeared on the scene, Sultan Ala « 1 * 
Din was r i i l ing at Konya, He was a sel juk. When urtogural and 
1 . Z.M.ZeinG. Jt^f ^m^^ttnc^ ftf Afa^ NiUgRAJlAaP ( l e l i t t , 
1966), p. 1 . 
2. Yahya An&aJ«ni, j^^f feiiVPi?^ HD^ PytBtpt (Kew 
Jersey, 1970), p. 137. 
- 1 9 -
hi & tr ib^ entarcd in t i i is courttry, they w«re n&n-Musliois. 
Ertogural hod four hundred and twifity-four norsemen tdth 
hlrfi. These new cosers in Anaolla decaiie Muslim in .h« th ir -
taenth century, only after sett l ing a cnq he seljuks, who 
were already lUislims. A favourable op, ortuulty arose when 
Aid al-Uin was threatened by powerful Mongol htrdes, and 
Ertogural, by coming tc his help, extriG||ted hic& frorr a 
different situation. In return for t h i s providential aid 
2 
Sultan ;da al-Din made a grant of territory to trtogural 
to be held as a fe i f under the Seljuks. 
1* Z.iNi*Zeiae, c ^ . c l t . . p. 5 Koprulu thinks i t i s wdse 
to conclude from legends th^t L&xan was converted to Islam. 
He dismiss^is the (^esticn of the Islaraixatlon of the Ottomans 
by saying: Tnes^ Turkish tr iues were in general Muslims but 
free frcra al fan^tidsfi)/ The precepts of rel igion were too 
con^licated ,^ io iiapcssiole for theoi to cuserve, so they remai-
ned faithful to their national traditions, covered with a 
l ight varnish of Islaoiism . . . . **UF.Koprulu, Les oraines de 1' 
§W?^ ffff Ct^ 9raaP IParls, 1935), p.58. 
2. Lord cvexsley. The Turkish fitapjret from 12Bb to 1^14.. (London, 192i) . p. 15. Also H.A.Qlabaons. The foundation of 
the Ottoman £iBoire (oxford, 1916), F.Koprulu c r i t i c i s e s K.A. 
Gibotons for accepting the leg«^dary history cf the Ottomans 
and beloives that i t i s a lo i s tke tc attribute the establ ish-
ment cf th i s ei^ire tc the Muslim zeal and enthusiasm sif a 
t '^^t of 400 tents wdch sett led in the tW rteenth century^ n the north west comer ot Anatolia. Hie i s the vpinbn that 
in the f i r s t half of the fourteenth century, the Seljukid 
empire had re.^ched i t s [<olitical and cultural climax, n^d 
had alruaoy one of the most advanced Economic and Social 
Organizations of the Midole ages* The ^ttom^ F^ire grew 
out of th« po l i t i ca l and social synthesis of al l the Turkish 
elements in AnatoHa during the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. .Vu F.Koprtilu, Op.c i t . . pp. 29, 33 and 7^. 
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Ertogural l iv«d as th« h«ad of nit dan cf Turks in 
th« C«d«d territory, t i l l his d««th in 1288. Osnan, his son, 
•n«X9«d as an olo Qazl* haro of the Faith, active in frontier 
warfare, He aoon coroa^ded a snuch more atabitlous career th«n 
that cf his father. He increased his dominion from i t s very 
narrow l i s d t s of Sugat and Eski-Sheir to a territory exten-
ding thence north ward to the So^ihDrus tf^d Black sea. 
At Giobons writest 
The nev; st^te thus created oy Otcoman did net consist 
purely of Turks. I t had very large fflixtur'-> of Greeks 
and Slaves, whc wer< welded vdth Turks Oy the rel iaion 
of Zslan. Tney were from an early period very dis t inct 
fron the peovle of other Turkish s tates , they called 
themselv€t Csffianlis". 
At the end of the century Csman reorganized his govem-
nent before he died in 1326, Ctman declared h i i se l f an amir, 
ind^endent of the oultan of Konya* His descendents were 
thirtyseven in nurB^er, who ruled for 622 years over one of 
the largest an^ixe of the world. They called themselves Csman-
l i s - hence Lt^ouans and each one upon ascending the throne 
was girded vidth the tword cf Ctman as a syi^ k>ol of Power. 
1. Lord tversley, o p . c i t . . p. 15. 
2. li2Li2*« P.f 17. 
3 . Yahye Axmajani, o . j . c i t . . pi 138. 
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Aftar the d«dth of Csnan, his third ton Crkan succ9«d«d 
In 1^26. H« was th« founder of Jcn i t sar i s s - * Yani-Chfiri*, 
( the na(Q« *Yani-Ch«ri* a««nxng *Mtw army*) was given to Cj^hans 
young corps by tha Dervish tiadia aaltarch. 
Tha ioomadiate oojacts of Orkhan* s aaiaition on nis accast-
ion, ware tha Graali c i t i a s of Nicaea and Nicoioedidt ^ith thair 
sur^-ouxoing d i s t r i c t s thalast in^^ortant possasiaion of tha 
Byzantine ha^ira in Asia* He enroll ad a consicierable body 
of infanity io i continuous service. X)>is ne.\ crganizstion of 
the aiBty coffiiuenced t>y Orkhan and extended and perfectec by 
his son Marad, ConveA^d the nascent Ctloiaan state Into a 
Mst powerful engine. 
Mur^ d I , ivhc ruled for a period of 30 ye^rs frooi 1399-
1369, was the f i r s t Ottoman ruler wi'io a s^ufoa the l i t t l e of 
Sultan • Mursd* s reign of thirty years i s reiaeciioered mainly 
becduseof the great Turkish conquest in Europe* tJuring Murad's 
reign the influence ot the empire was ccnsideraoly extended 
particularly tc the Danube. Thrace, Mecconia and aalgaria 
were fu l ly incorporated in the donlnion of the Sultan. Murad 
wh«n not engaged in war, devoted himself to perfecting the 
organization cf his army, en the l i n e s la id down by his father 
1. hdward S.Creasy, itistorv of the Cttoman Turks (London 
1878), p.14, 
2. Lord Eversley, o p . c i t . . p. 21. 
3 . H.J.Kissling, • The Ottoman topire to l77-^ « tr .by F.R.C. 
Bagley in Thf ^gj^m Wpyl<^ t A ^iWri-Cfll ^rm{h^i4fn^i969), 
Pt. I l l , p. 2. 
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(''rkhan. ^ ad* s successor was dsyazid I nicndm'. *yildlrim* 
His rul« lasted only fourteen years. He adopted a much bolder 
attitude towards the Christian poyvers of Europe, tn Europe 
his f i r s t objective was to cot^plete the suojugation of 
Bulgaria and Eastern Thrace (the older c i ty of Tirinavo t e l l 
in 1393). In 1391 and 1392 he annexed Alaschir, Aidin with 
Ayasolu, (iii^hesus) Saruhan, Tekkat ^^entisrie, aeys^hir and 
Kara hisar in the west and U;uth, ifj&fliaDJiiw jyusAifflglPAi end 
Anasya in the ncrtn. 
Another increment in Asia A^nor ca^ ite uhen the c i t i e s 
of Takat, sivas, Kaysiri sought the 3ultctn*s protection and 
ackncvdedged Ottoman suzerainty, liLs ettpire new started from 
Nish to Eastern Anatolia, and was interrupted only by the 
snail but v i ta l enclave of Constantinople* He continued his 
policy of expansion in Asia s^ >4inor defeating the prince of 
Karama and oth<»r rulers; but th is policy was to bring him 
intc cx>riflict vdtin the trdghty central Asian conqueror 
(Tiraur-i-Lang). 
rioNir was born in 1333, at :»«8iarkiind, he cucceeded in 
establisning an empire extending fron the great wall of 
1. H.J.Klssling, oi^-cit. p. 11. 
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China tc the frontie]; of A.:ia Minor, and from the 5e« of 
ATdl ^o tds r ivtr Ganges j^d Parsian Gulf. Ha had by triis 
tlufid conquared twenty s«ven s«p«rat« statas rrJid axtinguishe^ 
nlna dynasties* 
I t was oisvious ttiat n« would coma into conflict vdth 
tho Ottoman bn^lra. In 1400 ha attacked and invaded Asia 
Uinor from Armeniat he la id seige to sivas* the c i ty was 
c^tured. The Cttoxan i ^ i r e for the time oeiuq ccoipletely 
collapsed out the Tartars of Tlmux dispersed \NitrK>ut leaving 
any trace oenino then, Tiniur died in I40d. On the death of 
sultan dayezid, the cttoroan kmpire was doomed to extincton. 
The Turkish bmpire, ncv/ever shewed an unexpected v i t a l i t y . 
I t survived the Invesicn &f Tlc^ir end a c iv i l war between 
iayezid* s sens, Mahor.et wss. new in undisputed corau.end of the 
Empire as sultc.n. He reigned cS such for only el^ht years 
from 1413 to 1421« He was succeded by Murad I I , v.ho reigned 
for thirty years. Murad Ilnd deterndned to : ut to an end 
to the Great Einplre by the capture of Constantinople, 
In 1444 the Cttuinan Eoipirc was shaken 3y an un-expected 
event, ^^ urad Ilnd, abdicated ills thrcne in fafcur ot his 
eldest bcn ktitmet I I , wrx: at the f^ e^ cf fourteen vws pro-
claimed Sultan in nis place. Mahomet Ilnd •The conqueror", 
reigned at the age of fourteen, from the ear l ies t moment 
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of i^s accession, h« intandad to s igna l ize nis reign oy th* 
capture of Constantinopl*. In 1 4 ^ h* coII«cted an army infxvnt 
of th« wall of Constantinople which w&a capturtd s f t s r t«v«n 
weeks of saige. The capture of Constantinop* was infac t only 
tha f i r s t of a long l i s t of conquests, which earned for him 
from his coui trycoen the t i t l e « parindnence of the ccnqeror*. 
Mehooet IXnd i s also kncwn for his reforms. Sversley 
wri tes j 
Gxtat as '>eho!P«t t^as as ,i warxicr ^id c^^neial, he was 
not l e s s conspicuous as an adtn.nistr.jtor and stottesmen. 
. , , He was al ST th» sole source of l i g i s l a t ' c n for h is 
ea(pire,.,He founded Mosques, hc^spitals, col leges, and 
schools in Const ntino l e and other c i t i e s of ^ is enpire. 
He fu l ly raojgnized tH'i inportance of Sci^mce and edu-
cat ion. He cul t iva ted the society of learned nen and 
loved to converse vwith them. He had so ne reputat:on as 
a poet . 
He introduced many f inancia l and laf^d reforms. Among his 
reforms included new ««netary policy,fen-dng out of land to 
p r iva t e ind iv idua ls , uinfisciwicn of Waafs and p r iva te proper-
t y , rie skKiw«»d great zeal to make Is tanbul one of the world 's 
no i t Import ;^ nt p c l i t i c a l and econond c cent res . 
»^he«eCt, s e ldest ->cn Bryqzo-*- I I , succeeded him as Sulttfi 
at tny age of t h i r t y f ive, ie ruled ever the Cttont^n eoipire 
for s>out. 3-0 years frcT. 1481-J312- Jayeiid was net favourable 
to the e<par-";icR of ii s erei>lre. He did r e t support the amy 
I , Lord cvorsley, o p . c i t . . p . ^6 . 
wniciri, under db ^;r«d«c«8sor, had invscad I ta ly and captured 
Otr^nto. Tlie ivjost iapcrtant of f^ & acr\lev»n;eiits was the com-
ple te suo^uQdticn, in tae seccna year cl I s reign, of Her-
zegovina, wdch had been a trlbutory litdte underhls predece* 
teors, >ut was now again invaded. I t was f ina l ly incorporated 
as a province of the enipire. There were alsooiiny years of 
desultory wars vdth Hungary. 
In Asia there WCG ^ar for f ive yeors tAth the r.^ mluk 
government of tyypt r;nd byiia >tn\luks defc-t.ted the furkish 
ar(.des in thxtfr gre.it OijtLjes. Xnore ..iia also .r^ r v4th the 
Hepuolic oi Venice, ihe Turkish f l ee t defeated the v<3nitian 
f l ee t in X499 ano iLst en equal terns thu (^o^ined f l e e t s of 
Venice, Austria, uno the i^ ope in i ^ . , The la^t two years 
of dayezid* & f c ir ly px^ oiP*zt)Us reign were oL>served by a c iv i l 
wci, dt the mot .lice of iUts son <inti successor Jelim, 
The net result tc the Turkish eiivixe of ihe th l t ty one 
yoa^s ut tiayezid'& reign was .n tiie cne 'dno, the ...corpora-
tion ot tierzegovina, an^ .. ihkt ex.;iu&it.a.> of h^r Venitlans fron 
the i^x&a, on the otnei , t\iid Ic & ^J tnree f ro t i e r s in Asia 
rfdnot tc tae ft.etaluks cf c j^ypt ^id the i.itndrawdl vroti, the 
^ u t h cf Italy* 
Seliffl 1, surnaineo Vavi/ *th<^riK>' wag fouxcy seven ysars 
of ago wnen he detoroned uls father, t^  reigned only eigth 
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y«arst and in that oriet period ^h« i.«arly douoled the 
extent of tne Ottonitf^ tim.'lre. He was alinost wholly devoted 
to wax ag^nst the sHl*lte oaf avid Kinydom of Persia. He 
was a ruthless persecutor of al l Sfcfite movenents.^Hie 
conquexed and annexed the great provinces cf i^larbekir and 
Kl^turdistan frcn Persia and i^ypt, byria and a great part of 
Araoiat including the holy c i t i e s frotn the Mamluk govern-
fflent of Egypt. 
In January 1517 having cxx>ssed the Sinai desert on their 
way to Cairo the Ottoman troOj^s fought and won the decisive 
batt le of Koydaniyah. Cairo f e l l , and the l a s t tAainluk Sultan 
Tun^ oey was captured and executed, al l cf bgypt and i t s 
3 dependencies thus passed into Cttotaan hands. Sultan Selin 
carried the ther. Caliph al-^utawakkil with nim who was later 
on allowed to return to Cairo where he died in X543T The 
1. H.J. iassl ing, Qg^uSkl., p. 27. 
2* i^ypt (became a art of Ottoman Empire and that extra 
ordinary dynasty of «/.amluks or tlav kintjs which had ruled 
figy t and the Arab lands in the Near East fro;. 1250 came to 
an end. "Thus" wrote Ibn lyas , *The rule of al-Asraf al Ghaurl 
catDia to an end, in the ttdnkling of an tye, as thc^ugh he h^ d 
never been. Praise be to Him whose Kingdom nver wares, and 
who never ch«figes* Taus he and his Kingdom caa« to an end 
together; the kingdom of Egypt and the dominion of Syria 
over which he had reigned for f ifteen years, r.ine (OL,nths 
and twenty d a y s . . . . " Ibn lyas , Bade'ial - ZUhu^ f^i ^»a.^»*l»Ml 
Duhur vol . I l l , (Cairo, A.H. 1312} pp. 56 and 168. 
3 , H,J.J.Kis8ling, op. c i t . . p. aB. 
4 . P .K.mtt i , iiistory of the Ar;.bs (London , 1974) p.489. 
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^'•oiluks w«r« •ntrusted vAth th« adudnistr t icn of Hgypt; 
subject to the superior control of « Pasha iqppolnteci by 
the Turkish governor. Ghazali was appoit ted uovemor of 
Syria and Khair bey of tigypt. A garrison of f ive ttxusand 
Ctiom^ soldiers was l e f t at Cairo. Selim hereby acquired 
for his dynasty the t i t u l a r guardlkanship of the Muslin holy 
places in the Hejaz* He also assumed the t i t l e cf Caliph.^ 
In 1517, ^ault^ ;3elifi led back his victorious army 
froo) bgypt to Syria »nd holed i t tor soiae oonths, f i r s t at 
Damascus and afterwards ot Aleppo. 
After Selim's oeata the throne passed into his son 
Suleyraan (1520-1566), wixt i s regarded as the gr<^ctest of 
a l l the Ottoman Suit-ns. In western hurope he liecaste known 
as the'Magnificient'' to the Turks he app9aX<io as Uanuni 
*the lawgiver*. He gained a hiyh reputatitn for his deter-
oiindtlon to secure jus t i ce to his subjects. The extention 
of the Cttoman Empire eftected by Suleyman has been well 
described oy Eversley in the e v>ordsQ|l 
I . I t i s popularly oelieved that the caliph al-l>^tawakkil 
hod o f l i c i a l l y tr.nsfered to Sultan Salin and his all heirs 
rights to the Caliphate, at a cerenony neld in the lyk>sque cf 
Aya Sofya Istanbul", c f . P.M. ^ I t & Others, (eds) , The 
Carobridoe History of Islam (Cambridge, 197D) vo l .1 , p7320. 
2* QltJAX't PP* II6-117* 
During th* fourty six y««.rs of his reign Solyman 
ddd«ci «norroously to th* £n|>ir«. Sttlgrade F\hod«s» 
ntarly th« wbol« of Hungary, th« Crin'sa th« gr*at 
provinces of Mossul, Baghdad and Jas ornah, and 
•part of Amlnia takan from Parsia* Yemen ^ d Aden 
in Araoia* Algiers. idUtfUi and Tripoli, and in un-
defined extent of hinterland inhabited by Ar&bs in 
North Africa, and a vide extenticn of tsgypt in the 
direction of llubla* w>here the contriouticns which 
he tr^nsmitttK^ to his successois. 
The Ottoman e ^ i r e axose during the reign of Sulayman 
the Magnificent to i t s zenith.^ 
iiiolyaan*8 death in 1566, i s reckon<<»d by Modem histori* 
an to mark the conmencetnent of the Ottoman l^ mpire* s 
long decline. Although i t s external expansion did not 
yet come to a <alt, i t s internal condition beg^ n^ to shoA' 
dangerous sya^ptoms of decay* 
From th i s tleie onwards, the house of Cttooan ceased, 
on the whole to produce capable nt lers , the princes were 
^ i n e l e s s weaklings adcicted to the pleasure of their hams 
and of the pathologically degenerate. The fast signs of 
ch^ges ^ d corruption were seen in Suleynan*s reign i t s e l f . 
His reign marks the beginning of a long decline. Powerful 
as he was, Sulayn^ could not cope with the greed of his 
own rating on the aaAiitions of his own of t ic«rs the janissary 
corps had grovjn too large to be nanageable and increasingly 
was taking active part in the po l i t i ca l affairs of the state? 
1. H.J.Kissling, fiM^i^^-i PP* 32. 
2. Yahya Aramajani, o p . c i t . . p. 151, 
Thft f i r s t r«al diaord«r« v«*r« sioht«d in the reign of 
Mured 1X1 (1547*93). H« was an Inigniflcant ruler and en* 
trusted the o f f i cers of ttis state changed n^nds regularly. 
"The currency rapidly depreciated and prices rose*.*^ The 
Janissaries had be n weskened oy using allowed to marry, 
th i s c^sed the soldiers to give f i r s t loyalty to their 
faf&ilies rather then the sultan. Murad 111 slowed the 
mea^ers of the organization to en l i s t t e lr sons in the 
corps ctnd later on unei^>loyed Muslims were also employed. 
They becnse wo powerful that the sultan had no control over 
then, they increased in nutt^ i^ er ana became a great hurd«i 
to the economy of the country.^ 
This process cf degeneration continued an<^ultifl)ately 
the entire was so weak that i t s arsiies were forced to abandon 
the seige of Vienna in l683, tittdapest was los t to the Austri-
ans in 16B6 otiose advance was only checked by the treaty of 
Corlowitz in 1699. Heanwhile the Cossacks troubled them 
throughout the seventeenth century. The Husso«>Turkish war 
of 1168-1774 culninated in the humiliating tre ty of *Kucuk-
Kaynarca'. Later on the Hussians captured Crimed provoking 
another ruinous war. At th i s str?ge Selim 111 (17B9»1807) 
1. P.M..-^)lt & Others, o p . c i t . . p. 344. 
2. «;)en they were disbanded in the 1800* s of the I»D,000 
on the roll only 2,000 had odlitary t r^n ing . 
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iisc«nd«d the thron* and Mlth bis sue tss lcn tfqgn the era 
of xvfornation of th« Ottomj^i Kaplr*. Hit Hlg^a^l-'cxild 
followed an uprising whict) dsthronod him. Another reformer 
was Mehioud II (1808*i839} In whose reign the Janissaries 
were exterminated. He was followed by Abdul M«jid (1839-1861) 
who introduced tlie charter of 1839, the Haiti-i-^'ierif of 
viulh^i^ which i s coiaati nly regarded ss the starting .o int 
of the *T«nziniat*. This principle was reaffirmed by the 
charter of 1856, the Hatti-i-Huwavup. The culmination of 
t n i s process was the proaulgaticn of the constitution in 
1876.' 
OTiC^ MAN riULfc CV£R AhAfl L/^ DS« 
As std^ed above a period of about one hundred years 
almost al l of the Arab countries, e x c ^ t Morocco in the »vest 
.;nd inner Arabia and Oman on the Arabian Peninsula, were 
included in the Cttonan Ifmpiie tnti for some thre^ or four 
centuries suffered Turkish oppression, w-ich in the I9th 
gnd auth centur|r«s was replaced by the even harsher colonial 
yoke of the European Cd^italist powers*... 
1. P.M.Halt a e t h e r s , o p . c i t . . pp.363, 366 and 267. 
Th« d«9r«* of tti« tuberdin *ticn to the Ottoman £inpir« 
varitd froir. country to country Algtria* Tunisia and Tripoli 
Mrara considarad Ottoman pxovineoa* but by tha baginning of 
tha 17th contury thay Kad alraady gainad virtual indapandanca 
fxoRi the Porta. In tha addcla oi tha I7th cantury tha Turks 
l o s t xaal ponrar in Yanan. &v9n in Syria* Palostina, iegypt 
and Ira^t whara Turkish Pashas vit9X9 ins ta l led , tha doaination 
of tha porta was often only nooinal. Hithar tha Pashas orgs-
nissd p lo t s against tha Sultan, or tha local Ar^ faudal 
Lords ross against the Turkish Pashas, and from time to t lna 
fairca uprisings shook tha Ottonan Eoipixa. 
Tha conditions prevailing in tha ^^r^b Imds on tha ava 
of the (inquest h,tva oaen aptly described by G, t^F.Stripllngt 
*Tha Turks entered the Arab l^nos at s time whan a 
great economic change had taken place throughout the 
Middle East, a changed that was rm>idly rwdering 
those lands economically ins ignif icant and, infact , 
threatenina then with eoaplata ruin. In the f i r s t 
years of the sixteenth century the mainstay of tha 
Arab's economic structure riad been shattered, and 
the consequences of that disaster had bacosM evident 
long before the advent of tha Turks upon the scene. 
Until the early sixta<^nth century the foundation of 
Arab propperity was the trad* from India to i:urope 
««hich passed mostly through the ir htfids and yieldtd 
to the Mameluke Enpire* including Egypt, Syria and 
the Hejaz* much revenue from cu«>toms ckitiet alone. 
But by the early years of the sixtanth century the 
trade route to India had shifted away from the Axato 
lands to Portugal* via the cape of Good \M3p9$ snd 
the resulting decrease in revenue took i t s t o l l in 
more ways than in the llissening receipts from direct 
t.:ixes on the Indian and European wares. 
1. Jh V.Lutsky, Modern History of the Arab countriej|. 
(Moscow, 1909), PP.9-1G. 
2. The Ottoman Turks end the Af^bs. (Urbana, 19-2),p. 15. 
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Not only w«re the government• of the Arao lanes etobarrassed 
by the outright l o s s of a goodly portion of their revenue 
which had bewi derived from custons duties, tnit also they 
nlssed the iaxes of those wnose Income oepended direct ly 
on the trade betvyeen India and i;urope. Merchants ^ d their 
cl rks ^ d servents, sa i lors , ship builders, orokers, caael 
drivers, strikers al l these sufiered a partial or total loss 
of Iricooie. Qut t i l ls was n&t a l l , as the farmers, shopkeepers, 
c lothiers and men enga«3ed In the transport of food and clothes 
for tiioae in any way connected with the Indian t:uropesn trade, 
together vd.th trxsse who rented houses, becaiae unable to keep 
up their standard of l iv ing . Taxes, however, s t i l l had to 90 
on, and even aecome higher than ever, in as ouch as the l o s s 
of customs (ktties had to be met e l se whereofros the alreally 
diq)leted pockets of the Ar^bs* vdoows* and orphans* pensions 
were su^ended. Taxes were levied even on col lectors of a>w 
dung. 3ut all these measures wer^ insuff ic ient to meet expen-
ses. Finally, debaseaent of the cur ency was resorted tot 
ijone coins f e l l to seventy per cent of their crlglnal values 
and eventually s i lver coin was worth no moxe than a copper. 
I t i s evident that the lessened revenue must have created 
havoc almost every where in the Arab lands.'^ 
!• ISiiU P*l6* 
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Th« Turks did not oring th« F«rtil« crescent and Egypt 
under theif direct «(tolnlstratlon« The practice Adopted was 
that the local armies continued to rule and to pay tribute 
to the Sublime Portef The Ctoiaans were content to send a 
governor general just to k^ttp an eye on the affairs . Accord-
o 
Ing to G. tl, F. stripl ing: * 
The ATdb lands under the Ottomans vvere not administered 
troB Const^tlnople. Just as the whole aapixe was divided 
Into provinces, gcvemed by beylerbeyt, each of w'x)ni had 
s rved Sanjakbeys under hla varying nuniber. In his pro-
vince each province. Including a lik}ftl, a Rals effednl, 
ano a dlfterdar, ««ith a cousloerable bcuy oi cl&rks vA)o 
adviced hint, recorded his decisions, at .ended to the 
revenues from th^ estate which were assigned to the 
support of d s household, end kept ac<»unt of the SanJ^-
beys In >ils oondnon. each sanj«k-bey. in Turn, hold t^s 
group of assistant, with sluilldi outles on e l esser scale. 
Local governsicnt ^<i the coanand ot the ^ a h l s were 
assigned to c f f icexs ^pointed by the iaultan and called 
Subashies (Captlns), who in time of piece governed to«^s 
and were supplied with enough jonlssar les and Azab (re -
gular Infantry) to pol ice the l o c a l i t y . Over these were 
Alal oeys, or Colonels, who in turn were subordinate to 
the Sanjakbeys, the l a i t e r governed Isqportant d t l e t tf)d 
the surroun^ngs distr icts* Felfs were assigned to ;>ro-
vlde for iuccmes which were propertlonate to the off icers 
l^or tance . All these local o f f i cers had sufildent, Lieu-
tenents, treasureirs, ^ d bookkeepers, and clerks to 
perform their duties . In tlcie of t«ar each subasti had 
to furnish eight or ten hoxceaten, and each spahl was 
obl iges along a nuraoer of horseiaen pre; ortlonate to 
his income. 
1. The Turkish terat iabJAll (High Gate) was o i lg ina l ly 
^plittd to the house of the sulttfi*s Chief minister , the 
gzand v i z i r , whereever thr.t might oe situated. In the odd-
seventeenth century the name was t r ^ s f e r e d to the cf^itdal 
residence which was then assigned to hi a, adjacent to tH« 
palace, AS the administrative work of most riapartments of 
state was carried out at a dablAll under the grand vizir* s 
eye, the rather jprowptranslatlon 'Sublime Porte* came to be 
synonymous, for European, with the Ottoman aovemment. In 
the closing years of the Sultanate, the 3abiAll h&used. 
besides the Grand v lz lrate , the Ministers of the interior 
and of Foreign Affairs. 
2. §£iJEU«t P*6l. 
To understand th« nature of Ottoai«^ adaiinlstratlcn in 
the Arab l«nds» i t i s necessary to r^nenber that the prindL* 
p ies and the sp ir i t of Cttoman Government were typica l ly 
Muslim and, secondly, that i t was necessary to have a special 
category of laws to govern and regulate the affairs of the 
non-l£uslia subjects and of the foreign coaaunities l iv ing 
in the OttOB^ enpire.'*' 
The Ottonans «*ere Sunni Musli!r.s theretore, their govern-
ment was a kind of tneocracy* tn i s i&eant that the ^wer of 
the Sultan was litaitod by the law of All.ah. The Ottotm^ 
Esipire was dedicated tc the advancenent of Islaffi* I t was the 
land of Islam and soldiers fought for the cause cf Islam* Even 
the capital was sometimes called Istanbul, This naturally 
l i a i t e d the pcwer of the Sultan, He had to share i t with 
the Shaykh ftl-Islani the highest re l ig ious dignitary in the 
land. The balance between ^n absolute oaonarch and an absolute 
God was very del icate . I t always wavered. I t i s safe to say 
that all Qttonan ins t i tu t ions and laws were attea^ts to find 
a oalance oetween the two. 
Consequently the two ins t i tu t ions grew side by side. 
8 generally ca 
ruling ins t i tut ion . ' 
One i s lled the Muslin ins t i tut ion ^ d the other 
3 
1. Z.N. zeine, o o . d t . . p.18. 
2. Yahya Arnajani, op.cit .> p. 132. 
3. l|2iik» P*l^* 
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The ^cvernment was based on ths Sh«ri«h adsdnistsred by 
. a l i g ious courts undar tha aupraoM authority of Shaykh al* 
Is laa . Shaykh-ul-Jslan wa* a graat and vary poweiful parson-
al l ty naxt only to tha caliph hlnsalf. Tha l l g i s l a t l o n , tha 
courts, the madrasahs (callaglat{> noscpias) and huge acclasf 
i a s t i c a l estates ware concentrated in his honds. The Qadis 
f ludaas) the Qadi askari (Military judges) and tha Muftis 
(expounders of the re l ig ious law) were under his central. 
The iykiftis in each large centres of the eaipire headed the 
local elargy* I t as they who deddao wether l eg i s l a t i ve 
•nactment8/;era in a)nformity with the principles of Is laa . 
The f i r s t aufti in the Cttonan Eakiire was the Shaykh u l -
I si an* hi ...self. The theologians and scholars (Uloma) were 
also influentic£l strata cf the Musliffl tlargy. 
The Metaoers of the iiuislin ins t i tut ion ware drawn fcoai 
the medrasahs. I t was th i s rel ig ious inst i tu ion (Mtdrasah) 
which produced preachers, Muezzins, dtevishas and (nost import-
tant of all qadis and l iuft is . As Yahya Amajani writast 
or the above, these who come direct ly into contact and 
&o(betia«6 into C£<nflict with %he (naubers of the ruling 
inst i tuion ware lawyers, usually called (qadl or mufti). 
The Ottoioan courts fromtha lowns^to the highest ware run 
by these oeo l o . As in their administrativa Organiza-
t ion, tha CttocQans had two ehiaf judges, one for 
l.V.Lutaky, stiUS^-t P»22. 
2. AkaJSii.t pp. 1:>3-154. 
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An«tolla (Asia Minor), and on* for RuMlla (Europt). 
Trua to tha military natura of tha Ottoman inpira, 
a eh 01 tha Chief Judaas wat call ad Qi(a Ajkfg 
(Chi^llan of tha amy). At tha pinnacX* of t h i s vast 
raligloua organizatiun waa tha Shaykh ul<-Itl«s who 
was as closa to tha Sultan and ois chiaf advisor as 
to tha I n t r l c a d a s of tha Sharlah In tha history of 
tha Cttoaan Eo^ l^ra thasa laan wara somatlaas vary 
povv«rful Individuals. 
Ona of the respons lb l l l t las Inposad by tha ins t i tut ion 
was tha adoiinlstration &f tha waqf, ra l lg lcus andownment. 
I t iia& cofl|>lata charga of tha axpandlture of funds and 
managsnents of lands and othax propartla& which had baen 
given by the pious for eharltj^le ond rol lglcus purposas. 
Tha Chi at duty of tha Judges, ticwevcr, froie small town 
mufti to the Shaykhul-Xsla* was to study each case, v-a-
taradnad I t s relation to tha sharlah and give an opinion, 
fatva.The issuance of an opinion usually sett led the 
case. The fetva of the shftykh ul^ls laa of course, had 
national laportance, At least eleven Sultans ware daposad 
by fetva. On all natter the Shaykh u l - l s l j ^ representing 
the Sharlah, had veto power over the decisions of tha 
^ I t a n . .-ia usual l / said *obir* (can aa) or "olmaz* (ctf)-
not be), and the sult^^ nad to obey. In practice tha 
Ifflplefflantation of such an «r angei»ent a4H>«ridad u^ o^n tha 
f swer of tr>e Sultan and tha courage of the iihayiih ul» slaia. In some cases the rel ig ious leaders showed courage 
$nd good judgement as when tha shaykh ul»Isla» vitoad 
Sultan sellm tha *Glmi*s* decision to k i l l tha Christians 
N^ refused to learn ATaoic. At other t i s a s these leaders 
went along with i^ he wished of Sultan, such as giving 
re l ig ious siHicticn to tha ^^i^actice of fratricide whenever 
a new sultan ascendeJ the throne. All the awtabers of th i s 
Muslin ins t i tut ion were cal lsd tne jjijni,laam^nan. As 
a c lass they were extreu^ely reactionary, and w^xe almost 
always opposed to cliange. 
Parallel to the re l ig ious ins t i tut ion was the secular 
or ruling ins t i tu t ion . This ins t i tut ion consisted of the 
Sultan, the grand v i z i r ano o f f i cers of the s t^ding amy, 
tha decision making body of the adnlnlstrstion was the divan 
council, presided over by the Sultan the usual nearer were 
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th* g r ^ d v i z i r . Th« two Goimrtandtrs of Huiidia and Anatolia, 
the two uadi aftkars, the two daftardart (traasurars) and tha 
nithanji (Chancvlior). Each of thasa v iz ira had ^ s o««n appoi-
ntaaa on tha provincial coutitry, and c i ty 1 aval a* Later tha 
«dfRi«|A of tn« navy (q^undan Pasha) «nd tha Cott»andar of tha 
Janitsarias Cagha) were also manbars of tha Council. Tha whole 
c i v i l adadni St ration was created to support the arnry. In t iaa 
of war the provincial governors joined the standing army mdth 
the ir lavias.^The sultan knoti^ as Padishah, was the supren* 
head of the state, he controlled absolute st i l i taiy end c iv i l 
authoiity* In tha i6th century he be9an to use tha t i t l e of 
Caliph. He wiacted from tiiiie to t i n s Xrades and firnans, or 
rpyal Commgn^M, He also Issuad certain regulations and laws 
known es Qanun. Lyhyer describea tha "intaractions" of these 
i n s i t i t u t i o n s in these v«ordst 
"Tha tv« ins i tut ions contributed strongly to each 
other powars and pernanance. The Nuling Institution 
defended Mo slew Inst i tut ion by the sword, and carried 
out 9m>ng the people the decisions of i t s wise oan. 
I t also ;^rf.tect«d the l e t t e r ' s sourc s cf regular 
ravenue, and trtus enablad tha MLsSilb sscure of a 
l iv ing to devote themselves to the study and te^ch ng 
of the Sacred Law. The Mosleei Inst i tut ion, on the 
cthor hand, ki^t the Moslem population obadlent and 
subaasslve to th« sultan's authority as axpratssd in 
the ftillng InstitutAen. I t tought that the Sultan was 
divinely api^inted and therefore always to be obeyed, 
no matter what his charact^ r was or how oppressive 
his rule might become, so long as he did not transgress 
1. i^ij^, p. ldd» 
2. Albert Howe Lyi 
in the fiffle of aulavaian the M ^ n i f i ^ c i e n t (New York). 1966. p.233. 
,   byer, T{|f yBytfPpm ft \M i}}QmU\,jmUll 
Hal *^ «  , , .  
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%h9 S«cr«d Laws and that i t was for the ulema alone 
to decide vt^ en he had maoe such a transgression. 
Accordingly the tvo ins t i tu t ions , so long as they 
acted in harmony, were absolutely impregnable in their 
position aKK^ ng the Afloslens of the cnpire* 
The Ottoffians had long ^iven up the Gh«zi practice of 
Tlhad and instead adopted l iberal at'^itude towards the non-
tAuslica groups As Zeine writes:'' 
Tne Mord millet i s an Arabic wtord for ^nich there i s 
no equivalent in «yestern ^^clltical tertnonclcgy. The 
mil l e t s were actually the inembers of the ncn-Muslim 
re l ig ious cowatunities l iv ing in the Lttoaian bniplre, 
who had already been granted a wide scope ci cultu-
ral and c iv i l autonc^ my by Mohama>ad the conqueror, out 
in taodern Turkish, loi^^t i s used tc mean "nation", 
out the ,*ii'i n^d not yet los t i t s older sense, fl*,^t 
in importance «nong these s d l l e t s M'as the millet-e-f^im 
wiich comprised all the Greek orthodox christian sub-j o c t s of the Sultan. The next, in importance, were 
t^» Arinenian- ndllet and the jev4fhjmill_et. The*nation-
ality* ot :v«ry *riyyah» in these tBillets was the 
1, ItJcuoh scsric of tne adrrini strat i ve d e t a i l s , ( ^ d 
possiuixV^ ' <il ^  ^be special significance of the term) were 
innovations of the Cttoroans, the (Millet) system i t s e l f was 
not« I t s roots lay in the Universal practice of the Roman 
and nedieval empires tc allow subject communites to istain 
their own lands ano to apply thea asiongst themseleves under 
the general jurisdicaticn of some re«>gnlzed authority who 
was responslQle tc the ruling power. Under the Sassanian 
Kings of Prk:>-IsltfRic Persia, the cetholicos of the Nestorian 
chuich was fornially Invested with the neadship of all Chris-
t ians in the ea^ire, and that his succ^'ssors preserved the 
lame legal powers unoer the caliphs i s atte4ted by an aouan-
dance of secondary evidence, by the surviving documents of 
appolnteinent of a Nei>tcHan catholicos in 1138 and by the 
existance of nuffiexvus law-books of the various chri t ian 
cotui.Ainities. Tim Jev«lsh conu.iunity or rather coootRunite^ for 
the Hao^ianites and Karaites were separate, were similarly 
administered oy Crdef HAJIS at daghdad and later at Cairo. 
In the Vysentine Eii^ixe also the Armenians at Constantinople 
h#d a paral le l orjani^ation as vvell as the lews". H.A.R.Cdbb 
&H .3owen, I si a. Ac Society and the i/vest 1. (Ciford, 1950-57), 
pp. 212, 213. 
2* ftp.cjLt.f p. 31 & 33 
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par t i cu lax r e l i g ious d«nomination to woicti n is fcilltt 
be longad , . , . Tnus th« tim* of dtmarcaticn was net along jTdcial but along rftligious l i n t s . Tti« p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y 
of the sul tans suojects was Ottomans (Qsmanli) and his 
* na t ional i ty* was the r e l ig ion of the comrr.unity to wnich 
he aelonged his m i l l e t . The ioea cf na t i ona l i t y tn the 
»4est bjropean nineteenth century sense was almost non-
ex i s t an t in the Cttomtfi Bspixe. 
tne r i s ing eoonotdc s ta tus of the new ffilddle dbsses 
challanged the t i :adi t lunal r@I>gion oassd pu\r.ex s t ruc ture 
of the comisuidty, the i i i i ^e t s Into which the subjects of 
tne sultan wer org^jniied. Demands for .ay pa*'t icipat.on 
and impatience vdtn the exclusive control of cot^trunity l i f e 
by the xeli.,]ious and n^^le dzi&tocrats led to increased 
seculcjrizati-on of Lttoaan socie ty . In the &.uslim i«iiiXi.l 
the rnove a ay irccQ the doinin^^ncd of the r e l ig ious i n s t i t u -
t ions ac ^he d i rec t ^ re duct of the Tanzinat r forres, which 
una«rj:n5i'^ ed trw Ul fame's scnopol y of j u s t i c e sno education 
anci rej./! ficeo t u i r lour.Uoticn revenues with dir ct s t a t e 
s 1 c r i e s . 
i . Stanford J , ^hav. 6. Ezel Kaurai ohaw. Hisorv of the 
Ottoman Eaplre ^nd Modern Turkey, v o l . 1 1 , (Cambridge, 1977). 
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A third catdgcry of law was •abodl«d in the capitiia-
ti&ns.'*^ Tha impact of the wastarn thought and the po l i t i ca l 
praftsuraa of tiuropa^ powars in tha ninataenth century 
rasultad in various attampts to rafora Ottootn ins t i tu t ions . 
A systc j^B of saculdx Juxisdication was introduced throughout 
tha bffipira. Tha only axceptlon was the personal law whtth 
s t i l l remainad to oe guided oy tha Shail'a* 
In 1840 a nev. penal code was adopter oasad on the French 
penal code. In the ^ataa year a speci dl Tribunal called fc'allif-
i-i^hkaiii-i-actliVf was inst i tuted tc deal with tha cases of 
high state function„x:i&s. A ccmme.cidl coje ua'i prcnulgatad 
in 1650, ana in 1861, spocial tri.^un^d, of ccntierce was 
astaMisned to adiB:>^ ni«>tor that oode. Cn^ mcrp c iv i l law to 
da addao to tue for«igcing i i&t| ^as th« Cttom^ law of na-
t iona l i ty , issueu on Jar.Ufcry IV, 1865, ^nd specif>'inc the 
conoiticns uncer n^ Mch Cttoran nst iondl i ty cculo he aAMra^ l^ 
I . In ib3'jt a treaty was ccncladed between suJ a^ inan I 
and FXcincis 1 cf France. Ttde >as a treaty L.f frionilship ^ d 
collaboration, directeo against the riabsourcjs, in which the 
French were granted raany f ar^i^aching rights ^6 privi leges . 
These privi leges . Culled thereafter capitulations (froa 
f aoitulfl or chipters cf the tre^ity), estended to the French xeedom cf trade and n v i g a t i c n in Ottoman pi^ts, reduced 
the customs duty to 5 , er c^nt in the ir favour only, executed 
French traders frcrn Cttortian ^urisdicatiun and placed then under 
French consular jurisdict ion in matters both c iv i l and crlsdnal 
guaranteed to French se t t l e r s ful l rol igious i iaerty a-t w^ll 
as be custody of the Christian holy places ( th i s , in turn, 
luvplied a quasiprotectorate cf the French Kings cvar Christ i-
ans cf la t in r i t e in Gttom^ possessions), and extended to 
Flench subjects ether valueat>le property and navigation 
privi} <xges . . . . Turkey suftereo frona isf>ortant l i sd ta t i cns 
of wveri^nty Uue to the existing system cf capitulations 
and special r ights accoroed to Foreign pcwers. For exao^le, 
the OttoBtfi goveminent was not allowed to raise the custons 
tar i f t above a level determined by international agreenenttt 
contd. n<-xt page. 
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galn«d or l o s t . Tti« natlunallty law* altriou^h, was a signnl-
fleant Chang• in th« Turkish concept of naticnal ity, navsr-
thai ess , ^^^ individual was net a c i t izan of the eopirt but 
a aubjtct of the Sultan. 
In principle the christian was not allowad to ride a 
o horsa. or to carry arm*^ or oould ba join tha Ottoaan army 
or ba admittad into tha c iv i l service. Ha y«as also outwardly 
distinguished by the colour of his d^ass, his heai wear and 
his shoes. Altnough the inadqualitias ware foraalty *on 
paper* aoolished by tne rUtti f^aglayun of 1856, but in prac-
t i c e the olu millet systen in tue t^sipire continued throughout 
3 
bhe nineteentn c«»ntjry. 
The Arab lac»i3 which were conquered by the Ottomans 
were not direct ly administered froru Constantinople. The 
OttoBdns not only ret.Dte but strength'snd the feiidal social 
system Ardcn iney aad innerited trotn the Ktemluks, the loc^d 
feudal ciddf^ wexij l iv ing in freedoia reta i l their social 
certain soaxc^^s of Puolic revenue were practical ly sequaa«> 
tared uy foreign powers to assure i.n9 payment of the public 
debt, tile ;:>orte wss forced to observe cert<iin inipcsed rules 
with regard to tue tre tnient of national and religi<:us ndno* 
r i t i e s ; am, Turk«-y* s dovereignty ovor the s tra i t s was liial* 
ted.(u;ecra- Lenizotvski, The M i o l e uast in jorld At airs . (New Yorfc, 1956), pp.5, 45. 
1. ii.N. zelne, o p . c i t . , ^ .30. 
2. Uiriny tnft tiarly nincte«)lit(ik century these old rules 
were disregarded and soys cevdet Pasha, even soue cf the non-
Muslim subjects, vdt(X>ut autiiorizatlon, could be seen in Public 
places, on Ci^pariacncd horse. Such unauthorisea horse, riding 
by infaedls , being unseenly in tha eyas of the people, was 
oanned... se^ Bernard levels, Th^ hinerqeng^ yf j-lp^^pi TvrtUX 
(Oxford University Press, 1961) pp.389-390. 
3 . £.N. zeine, o p . d t . p. 31. 
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ordM. Tnit was special ly ck>no in Lebanon, I t has rightly 
oten pointed out that * The land and power remained in the 
hanos of the local feudel ist*. The ent i i e land was divided 
into three main categories)State land (jUMLlkflDt ^^^ supreme 
of wnich was trie :^ltan{ land belonQlng to re l ig ious est^lK 
l ishnents (waqf) and privat i ly CMfted land (|^|ij(.). 
Land owned by individuals was re la t ive ly scarce. I t s 
ot^ners could despose of i t ai they sa^ vv fitrlDis state co l l ec -
ted only a land tax from the privately ov^ed land.^ ueople 
had to pay either to ''i^ shr ex the K.h«jraj *^n Muslin<s also 
paio a pall-tax (JJaxJiil)* 
Religious establishments ovoned large tracts of land. 
Hccl is iast ical es tates (jsififjl) were formed by *enocwments* 
and were exen^t from taxation. The Muslin clergy was the 
mainstay of the feudal systea^, ^ d in order to consolidate 
i t , big feudal lord., presented large estate to Muslim r e l i -
gious establishments. 
At the tin.® of the Turkish conquest in suice Arab count* 
r le s there s t i l l consisted coRminal ov^iersWp of land. \<sfhile 
abtli't'Shing cotutiunal ldndov>ff)ership, the Turkish conquerers 
often preserved the fal^aheen conanunity as an appendagQ to 
thfi system of exploitation. The whole oonraunity was held 
co l l ec t ive ly responsible for the profl^t payment of taxes. 
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rh« f»o ;t Mld« sp«ad category of land in th« Ottoman 
Bnplre wes the stata lend, which was aividcd into two ^roupa. 
Khas end military f e i f s . The iChaa was a larga astate vdth a 
revenue axcaedlng XQO thousands ||l;hfl^. - on a prince or on* 
on-a-i<*M^^ vc« or on a nigh dignitoxy as long as he held hi r 
post, Niilita^y f e i f s war-,- granted to the sipahi for l i f e . 
Tne siparii woro exenpt irom state taxation. In ^^turn they 
ware col igec tc provide f i r s t c lass (sl l ltary service, regu-
lar ly turn up at reviews ^ d take part in ccniaii^ns vdth their 
Cavalry. 
In cjypt on the whcle, the system of feudal land owner* 
ship vhlch hrd existed under the enluk sultans was preserve. 
As V.Lutsky} writes! 
fiXl the land belonged tc the feudal lords:^*>ulta^lus» 
the Turkish Pasna ano the b^slim eleruy. Formally the 
land was ocnsicered stc^te property bui cculd be acqui-
red by the Multazims. They were picked out from antong 
the Turkish functionaries ond of f i cers as wall as fron 
the Iccal Arab Shaikh. The Turkish rulers of cc^ ypt i n -
heritec from the Menluk t i t a n s th«r cu&tos>s oi torming 
private guards frcm among the ^leaduks, wiio had o r i g i -
nally been slavs and '^ere apecially trained for o d l i -
t%ry service. The Turkish beys ^pointed the Memluks 
tc ispcrtcint government pests and gxanted them larga 
tracts of land. M.ultarims were exei^pt from military 
service but cculd be taxed, which was entered in a 
special re(;ister kept by a Sfiecial clerk. Land eerier-
ship ds usually hereditary. In the Meialuk c irc le , the 
Ir-snc Vv'as not ^^ioscc en frosn father tc son but from the 
rriastcr tu lus ta cuxitc "Slave*. 
!• SiUJlX'f P*13. 
H« furth«r writftsil 
In 0Mct\ I l t l z a n (tha • s ta te of Multazla) the land was 
edvid«d Inco two partti Tn« lord's Itfid or uslf . and 
allot«d Idnd or atar. The lords land was t i l l e d by the 
co|Q(«e system or by hired I j ^ u r , Alloted land was given 
to the peasants for l i f e . If a peasent in nerited a plot 
of land h& had to pay a large r^deinption sum tc the IMJI* 
tazia« The laoney rent, which was known as Mal-el-hurr, 
w<-'8 collected from the peasent by the Multazlm and divi -
ded into three equal parts. One part was paid as tribute 
tc the Porte. Another part was used for the up keep of 
the urovincial ddminlstration. These t><!0 atncunts wero 
fixed by law ^ d subject to unconditional payment the 
rtjyaining paxt of the Mai-el-auri givon tc the rnuitazirns. 
ilvery v i l lage had tc pay local taxes Bnd duties. These 
v^ ery cclJ ftc'-od by tUt- v i l lage adfniniatraticn headed by 
a qa'in iiaq'am. 
kvery ^heia in the ikxdb countries, big f eudal land 
ownership went hand in hand with small scale farirdng in 
the forac cf huge twees anci requisit ions, the lend owners 
appr&paridited proouct as well as and did not air 9 to increase 
prcducticn. Tne economy wa& stagnant and at l i e best was 
only aole tc ensure i t s ov^ n r€^productJon, 53ifiiple reproduc-
t ion did net cri:ate any reserves in evf^ nt cf 'racial or 
natural wuldUtilities. Frec^eSt mTs, fevdol discard and 
draughts ruineU the peaSigntry and brought abc ut the decline 
cf th« • fr icul ture , wtiole v i l l a g e s died out. 
I , l o i a . , PH. i j - l 4 » 
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Thc process of tne ruin of th« pftasantzy th« dyin^ out 
and dtpopulation of v i l l a g e s '^Mit In all parts of the Ottoman 
i^irfe . rh* Sultans etldsavoursd to stop i t by tyin^ tha paat-
ant tc th« land* As far back a& tha l6th century, under sulay-
man the law giver, laws were passed to prevent the fjright of 
peasants. The code of laws worked out by the Turks for cgypt 
(Kanun-nasne Misy^ orderec the K.ashit*s. The nultazims and 
Shaykhs to see tc i t that net one plot of irrigated iand 
reuai-neu uncultivaied« to prevent th« f l ight cf the peasants 
an«i to populate the ruined and eapty v i l l ages with fellaheen. 
If a H«asai<t ran away fronhls plot , the Shaykh wash held 
raateilally responslole, the usi^ coulo be sold cnly togethnr 
with the faliahecn who cultivated i t . 
C H A P T c ft 
I II 
Tri« Aiaoi were fu l ly conscious and awak«ned as to 
theix fat« and futuxe destiny during th« second half of 
the nin«t«KbTith century. The Ottoman Empire was speadlng 
towards dislntegraticn unless sc»e so l io changeb were i n -
troduced tn strengthen i t s internal organizaticn add admini*-
trat icn . Fro® the f i r s t quarter of the nineteenth century, 
onwards, a yroup of enlightened Turlift, which included *UleBa* 
and a developinq clafcs of educated young Turkish adirdnistrar' 
tors ano diplmotSf were oecociir.g ihcxeasingXy a^sre of the 
necessi ty of rejuvenattino tUe old cind out ncced i n s t i t u -
t ions ano aoniinistrative u<eactiinery of the empire. This 
1 2 
group vvas c.illec the •f4e;v Cttoniaris* or tne • Youjig Ottomans*; 
This pcricc cl a>cut half a century camt? to be xncwn as 
the period of »Tanrifl>t^ *^ cr TanyimBt-JHChalriyv^h* (bene-
f l c ient l e o l s l o ' i c n ) . Ht^ rcld Tenoerly v/rcte|3 
The h^'alth ot the Turkish Etnpire < epended en there 
factors! \^i\ the abi l i ty of the Turks to reiorm; on 
the willingness of the c h r i s t i ^ subjects to acquiesce 
in the process} ano on ^Ae readiness of the Great 
Powers to help or .linder* t i s evolution, i\o ono of 
tnes<! fac'oors sufficed oy i f tS€^f , , . iiut the creat 
Powers cculd ret S£V3 Turkey, arte alone ccoid horsalf, 
ariu r€^onciK> !*«i Ciiri&iti<in Subjects to her by reform. 
1. Z.i'^. ^e in« , Q i ^ . c i t . . p . j 3 . 
2.P.ttansfield, The Ara .^y aondcn,l976), p, i57, 
a.Teiflperely, Harold, bnoJAnd and the Near hast, tne 
Cxi»eA. (London, 1 9 ^ ) , "ForfeM«rdsd", p.Vll . 
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A6 wil l o« $««n, th« Turks in fact waxad wtahsr and 
w«aK«i, and th« Chxlstidns stronger siyd s t r c n g e r . . . « 
W»aW«id 11 (I80S-J9) iiaci « csdre cf rtforms o f f i c i a l s 
t h a t ti(flp«d shape ills p l a " s , Mustafa Rast^d Pasha the foreign 
nlnlstAz prepared ra4Form fjroyr-rarrijs and convinced trie Sultan 
to carry thrcuvjh r.s^iy of these i^l^ns. These retcrm rc^raat'nes 
ktiOMn j s the T^;^iwat-'i-ij^rjwa (Auspicious reorderAngs), 
noderiii xed the &tti^ Ui<jri st,itQ .vnd society anc <^ or*j ine prcvo-
ca tors of thiv ,.ain Tanzlrfat w.Uch uvere carr ied otit in Sultan 
Abdul . ijjid*«j periuo (1839-61). Tha raforws tha t followed 
ware often iden t i ca l vid.ch any cf l^ahmud II* s procraisn-es. 
They v*ere csrr iad through ainly by Mustafa na&hid ?asii%, 
once An-ijassador of the Cttomans in F a r i s . He v^antad to save 
the Cttoaians from the doom tiiat u%d J9 fall-an on the Fiench 
nonarchy. 
t n ?vovy.^ar 3, 18 i i , j u l t an A'JOUI .^ajiti ga'-hered the 
dignatoxi83 oi tha «i<4iixe #t the square ot Gulh^ma "the rose 
garden of tae Palace**, Vne foxeign tolnister read a stctement 
wdch Has c.nw u ije known as che i-Uttf.i-^^.^^y^f ( the n tb le 
rescr i t j t / of uulnana. Tha decree uf Gulh.ma was tict in any 
way 4>n i^Lto^an a i n t i t u t i o n th^ t i iwl ted the pc ,t«rs of the 
sata«'t» uecau.e ue issued i t and could abrogate i t .^ t^ ^ 1 1 . 
1. Stanford, J.Shaw C Erel Kurai i»naMv^ pp» cj.J^«. p .61 , 
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That Hatti»Sharif recognaizcd the soverignty of law, 
the e^U4llty of all subjects jn .^ the unlv-^^rsal application 
of Just ic«. In 'he enthusiasfi) cf the pex>cd, the Turks sh«ved 
theix oeards, wo-o uurc, ean Ur<»ss, l i s tened to western "niusic 
and excn^'-geo the turoan tor the Fex*. 
Seventeen years after the promulgation cf .- |^atti'-S arif. 
on February IB, 1856, the r.uitan issueo anctaer statement 
knoAn c:S iia^ti .^ayi.!! trte imperial rescript*. This concisted 
of t.-i€ ^arts, xhe ..rutocal ox tne text i t s e l f , prepared under 
Mustafa F*a3ui{i*5 guidcnce at t.'ie porte oy i t s consultative 
council, ^nd, the sultari's statement of autr^ rizaticn inclu-
ding riis as sunt tc tn.^  c-eciticn cf new i r s t i t u t i o n s that .-.ould 
(1} gua antee his subjects' security of l i f e , iionour and pflo-
perty (2) establish a regular system to assess and levy taxes 
and (3) develop new aethcds to assure a fa ir system of cont-
criptintj, training and raintaining the soldiers of riis arned 
forceft,* 
Tne rtatti-l-Uunayun «radic.-.ted the 11f:er'?nces vhlch 
existed bet^^en the ^Hislims .^d the Christians, r^ nd exten-
ded to tne Christians all the rights and previleges which 
•jyere enjcyod oy the Mudli.is, This meant equality in taxa-
t ion, tAllita-y scr^icCf ^no eaucacion. I t also envisa-isd 
the founuing of .;«inks, aiid f i sca l and agricultural reforns. 
i . Ib id . , p.60, 
Xn accordance with tn« old Cttofoan tradition, tha 
tha sulttfi prodHJlgated stata law Qanufn tha refcrmaxt 
intxoducad isordem criolnal , eotatnarcialt land, nation-
a l i t y and other laws of waatem typa, Dasad on tha 
principla of t a r r i t o r | i l Instead of parsonal va l id i ty . 
:!ut f i ^ l y m6 inharetenca law ramainad ral igicus , and 
tha naw law of contract!, obllQationt «;nd c iv i l . ro*-
cadura (jyiajell ah) prepared by a corordttae under tha 
Uiairmanship ot Ahtnad Javdat Pasna* was a -ouerrt ccdi-
f lc . tlc-n of shari»i lew. 
The Hatti-tt~3hjirif and tho datti-l-> iiwavun. "both*, 
writes Yahys rxin«»jard, werg issuod under Ptassuta and v^rf 
Navarthaleaa. thav old inauc^urflta f^d endorse an era raform 
i n tha CttCKfj. fcmnixa. whlcft i s called the lanzimat. The 
Tan^imat -vas . s touch the result uf uulaavals in the tfiohtaanth 
^enturv as i t was the cau.^ e of chanuea In tne tafifteenth aqd 
twentfcath centuriraf. ^ 
uvaluetlng in overall e f fects of tha r^ ng^ .nat^ . urial 
3 
liyed writer. 
Tha iefotffls of tae langj^ iaatf parioo fai lao to prevent 
the di 5waf!*>ar»ent of th«am,>ira, and did not sclve i t t 
H-ajor internal prooiea.!. The leader* oid nut rea l ize , 
cr realized too lattf, th. t econortiic and financial sub-
juajti-jn t. thtj poA«rs wa^  not lesb • wiueui to p o l i t t -
cal independence than defeat on the aat i l e front. Their 
reforms did act spring iron tne people, ano v^ «re not 
sii^icrted ijy ,)uolic opanion,. . Ifata Tanzia^^ liO-U the 
f •\m6i:ti.n fox 5 -«. •id^ rn Turkish state af«u society. 
1. Uriel He yd, *The later Ottoman catpira in hnmali a K 
Anatola, " in p.M.Hoit & others (ads) . 0 0 . e f t . , p.367. 
2* o u - c i t . . p. 232. 
3. P.^.-'tolt & CtherSt on.cit^.. p. 36^', 
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Ttth Ci CM^ IMIS AND THE WAJALLAHI-
In the 19th contury a numbar of huropean codvs w«r« 
lalci oov»n, the ottonan state f e l t th^t the n^ e^ds ot the 
age nece8sit£i.ed the isfruing appropri<ate laws* Ottoman ccdl* 
f icat ion was xrifluenced oy Foreign laws and niost i t was dxi-
ved tzom Forciijn codes In text , In sp ir i t and in arrangement, 
the Otton«n state was uotivated in t h i s endeavor by the euT7> 
ent n&sd^ ai coiauiorce and social svoluticn, ticnQ of tiie&e 
codes A«r' in coufcraraty vjith tha Islaadc sh - i ih , 
Ine ottoman stata aJ so decided to pre^ez^ a c i f i i code* 
A seven .Ti»n com-.tettee of Jur i s t s called the comiiit'-eo cf the 
«^a,ial,j.r-th was a.u ointaci und«r the .«iairffian3hip cf Ahmad Javedit 
Pasrid. Iho coiKodttee aegain i t s Mork in xa69. I t suondtted 
the Incrooiuctiun in f i r s t book of K.rfjallah to c^ha/kh-ul-
islair, ,iino otnwr aignatoxies u no Inctrporateu certain modi-
f icat ion ano xefinefnents, the coo^ilaticn as completed in 
1376. 
Tm , the tttomsn c iv i l cocJc Cc^e Into existenca. I t was 
enactecl oy an *iracidh* a royal dicree, uy tlie s u l t ^ under 
tne t l t : o ; "Mfllejlgh .9;j;A>»^ atBa; g^UYa,^ * "( "J-'^ e carpus of jurfc 
dicial ruloK"),^ oy a 3:-i*ici=ii c»Rrrtittea of ularoas dnd non-
ulsoio;, .crc or'pcinted foi t;ie.t purpose and called the 
1. S^Mahinassani, Fals^fat a l - l a s h r i ' f i ^ - I s l * » . £ng. 
t r« . Farhat J. / iaden. rthe IJLstoiv of Philoshouv JnTslaff; 
(Leiden, 1961), p,39. 
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MdJallah J«mi ( l y a t i . f inal ly In 187^, tt>ere was a wholt 
raorganlzation of the judic ia l syatea by a creation of a 
ninis try of jus t i ce and of "regulatad tribunals", or Mahaki«ai» 
QLN^TITuIlth tF 1876i 
Ai>duX Azii (1861-76) proved to ba an unvds* and axtra-
vagant gular and brought his country to tha verge of disastar. 
His naphaw Murad V xalgnad in his s^d for a short spall of 
thrsa laonths, bafore ha was succeadad by his younger brother 
Aodul Hamid 11 (1876-1908). 
Abdul i^anid was helped in securing the throne by the 
l iberal minced stataman Midhat Pasha on tha expresr, ccncti.-* 
t ion that ha would establ ish a ccnstitutional administrationr 
On his accession to tha throne Abdul Hataid ap. ointed Midhat 
Pasha as grand v i z i r . The constitution, drafted by Midhat 
Pasha, Naroik Kemal and Ziya Pasha, was proclaimed on Decem-
ber 10, 1876. 
Midhat Pasha was .^ainly responsible for the inunediate 
proasilgation of the constitution. He argued that i t s pro-
clamation Mould dissuade the powers froa intervening in 
Ottoman affairs under the protext of enforcing reforms. 
On the othex hand, once on the throne Abdul Hamid vdshed 
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to x«9aln po«v«r for the Palacc» and he was in no hurry 
to issue such a ck>cument. 
Midhat continuously requested Abc^l Hamid who, con-
sequently, ordered the establistunent of acccnstituticnal 
comdssi n tc draft the constitution. Midhat was the 
chairman of the oomodssion which ha' inaal l 2B menbers 
consisting of I6 iieaurocrates, 10 uleme, and 2 fBilitary 
personnel. The final draft of the constitution was prepared 
on December 1st and the next fev. days iwere spent in ditcuss-
in9 i t . The cabinet f ina l ly approved the CosKidssion work on 
Decemoer 6, Out the sultan held up i t s pxoaulga^den. 
Tha coRnission*s Mork had now come tc an end so Midhat 
was, for a second tin;e, ^pointed as the Grand Vizir. Finally 
the constitution was proclaimed on Oeces^er 23, 1816. I t 
had 119 ar t i c l e s wiUch were distributed in to 12 sections. 
The f i r s t section (ar t i c l e , 1-7} was tioaded *the 
OttoB^ satire**, . I t defines the empire, nataed i t s capital , 
and layed dcvM% the riyhts and previleges of the sultan and 
the ii^)erial dynasty. 
1. ;>tanford J.Shaw & iizel Kural shew, ou.c i^ . . p . i74 . 
2. It>i<^.. p. 174. 
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Th« t'Cond tttctlon (3-26) dttlt with th« public rl^ht 
of Cttonan subjects. I t dsflned Ottoman nationality, and 
affiriMd tha ai|uality of al l Ottomans irraspactiva of rala-
gion, bafora tha law. 
Tha ramaining sections dalt vdth tha ninlstars (27-58) 
o f f i c i a l s (39-41) parllaH«nt (42-S9) tha sanata (60-64) tha 
chaiBbar of daputias (65-60), tha judiciary (61-91) the high 
courts (92-95), financa (96-107), and provincial adisl i s t r a -
tion (108-112). 
A final secticn cf "mlsc«ll«ncious provis on* included 
ar t i c l e 113, giving the ii^parial government the rlcjht to J ro-
elaim martial law n^d tha occurancs cf axpection of disorders, 
and giving the sultan the exclusive f ight after rel iable 
pol ice invest igations, to deport persons haJimful tc the 
state from Cttofflan territory.'*' 
The constitution of 1876 remained enforced for a very 
short period. The parliament met for the f i r s t time in March 
1677 vdth a s«iate of 25 ^ d a chainoer of 120 deputies. The 
l a s t meeting of the parliament, woich was i t s f i f t y - s i x t h 
meeting, was neld on June 28,1877. A second parliament was 
electee and ..at on Decemoer 13, 1877 and showed unexpected 
vigour. The very next year on February 13, 1878 the di^utie^s 
1. a.Lewis, 'Dustur* in fincvdopaedia of Islam (II ed) . , 
vo l . 11 , p.642. 
n«t and on specif ic charges d^n.afiCwG hut thrse ednistars 
stx>uld defined themselves and appe,<r in the chaa&ers. The 
sultan, consequently, dessolved the chdRd>er and ordered the 
deputies to return to their constituencies. 
The proclanation issued wast 
Since present circuinastances ilM unf avourai}le to the 
fu l l discharge of the duties of the parliaenent, and 
since, according to the constitution, the l imitation 
and curtailment of the period cf session of the said 
parliament in accordance with the needs of time from 
part of Lhe secred in.perial prerogatives, therefoie, 
in accordance with the said law, a high iispcrial or-
der has been issued •—* that the ^resent sessions of 
the senate and cnaintier, due to end at the beginning 
of March ->-* be closed as from today. 
The l i f e of the parliai^^nt .as tor only two session last ing 
for abcut f ive months in a l l . Xt did not meet ag@in for tiM 
next thirty years. 
On Abdul Hamid* s accession to the throne on 3 i s t August 
1876, the future of the Ct-onan Enpire wsh bleak. Tfiere wa§ 
thre i t of war from Hussia, Europe was tiostile and in a posi-
tion of dictating terms. Ttiis was the time ripe <mough for 
the uc'Vecnent of new ioeas to (tiake a decisive advance Arab 
National consciousness wiich had already rooted i t s e l f in 
Syria be^ jan spreading spea^ily to the other Araoic speaking 
i* li2^*t p.643. 
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countritts. ii«forns in the provincial adndnistrdtion w«r« 
pr«t§«d hard* Mlcihat- pasha-^ known for tils rafcreiiat vlaws 
was Leading a strong fncv«ment i^rassln^ fox a const!tutiona^' 
govarnmant. 
A&dul He(idd granted a constitution in IHT6, and Mitihat 
wa% fflada tha grand v i z i r , shortly i t bacaflta avidant that tha 
grant of the constitution oy Abdul Hamid .as net aacauaa ha 
dasirad or oaliavad in that form of govarnioafit, but bacausa 
circumstances had maua soma such gesture necessary* tx>th as 
a sop to his subjects and as a torpedo to f i r e at the tiurop-
aan cccfertince. 3oth these aims had new been actiievedt tha 
SulttfD had becema the idol of riis peo, l e , and the conferencei 
badly winoeb» had broken up. He sat out to destroy the consti* 
tution* The or<ly serious obstacle that remained ..as Midhat. 
Early in Februdry, * Abdul - Haoid abruptly dismissed him 
and sent him to Europe in ex i l e . Then, having early in March 
inaugurated the Parlianent v^th a gr^diloMuent speech irom 
the t.ircne, he s^-ized the ^z'otexw of Russia's oeclardtion 
of v.ar to decree the suspension of the constitution. 
1. On Midhat Pasha see Sir. ^ l l i a m Miller, The Cttpaan 
Eiaoire and i t s succes&ars (rev. and enlarged ed.{ Camoridae, 
1936) chap.XVi 
, a i Hayder Midhat, The Life of Midhat Pasha. (London, 1903) 
uambier, James 3dl}iam. "Tha Liia of Midhat Pasha nineteenth 
century, (11 Jan., 187B), p. 71-96. 
Mahtued :^aki Pakalini, Midhat Pasha (Istanoul} 1940) 
2. G,Antoniu8, The Arab AwiekeninQ (Lonoon, 195b), p.64. 
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During the f i r s t year of his r^lyn /^dul riatnid was mcra 
l iberal and open alndad towards new ideas than any of hit 
iflimadiate predic«t^ors — "graying Idth the eoamon people 
(luring the friday services, talking with Ottomans «nd forel* 
gners about the problen of the state , Stfononing bureaucratas, 
scribes, i n t e l l e c t u a l s and even the young Ottonan leader 
Nasdk Keaal to w >on he said « L^t us works together Kamal 
bey, l e t us raise th i s stat^ :^  and sultanate to a higaer con-
dition then be fore ." ! 
Abdul Hatidd did not confide in the integri ty or abi l i ty 
of statesman itsociated with tne Porte, and the internal and 
external c t l s e s that convulsed the eo^^ire lad him to adopt 
^ increasingly personal, autocratic, and absolutist policy 
of admii.istration.^ T tese circumstances forced him to believe 
that he could acnieved effect ive adminlstratioti only through 
centralized rule, net by difiusioft of power. He was infect 
a reformer but unlike the nten of Tanziinat he f e l t tnat the 
parliaflwnt led only to delays, ineft ic iency, frustration, 
internal weakness, and furtiier defeats and dislntigratlon, 
therefore he resolved that the empire was not ready for 
democracy and th,.t otutocracy was the only way for i t to 
survive in troubled times." 
1. S.J. Shaw & c.K. Shaw^ o a . c i t . . p. 212. 
2* I,bid., pp. 211-2D. 
3 . Isisi*, PP» 212, 213 
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In Aodul H«aid*s tirn* th« Ottoman* s Arab possasslons 
indudad Syria and Iraq» tf^ * Ara^i^n panlnsula and lunitla* 
Libyat ^ y p t and Sudan in Africa. In X8I}X Tunisia was occu-
pied by Franca and the following yaar tqypt and Sudan war* 
taken oy the Brit ish. Tha Husso-Turkish war of i8T7-7B daalt 
a savers blow to the Ottonan. The trc ty of S ir l in ended the 
Ottoman liaplre as a significant i:£uropedn power. A number of 
petty dalkan states ..ere cxaated - Greece, Bulgarin, Ftomtfiia 
Slroia* ^ d Montonegro were independent or so autonomous 
that they were independent in every thing out name. Bosnia 
and Herzigovina were under an Austrian occupation that was 
considereo temperary only by the Ottomans. All that the 
Sultan had l e f t in burope was a strip of territory South of 
the Balkan mountains extending froi« x.he Black Sea tc the Ad-
r i a t i c . These were the remains of the once «i hty hm..)ire that 
at cne time stretched all the way to the gates of Vienna. 
lamediately afterwards some very rspid changes were affected 
in the administration of the Empire. Albania was divided into 
four v i layets whereas the league and i t s stjqaportars sought 
to unite them into a single province, tuus in i t ia t ing a move-
ment towards Albanian Solidcrity. The Albanian nation al Con-
sciousness began to develop. Albanian rebel bands rose in the 
ocuntains attackiing Ottoman • f f i c i a l s and troops, v i l l ages 
res isted tax col lectors , and the railroads were attacked-
Thay were somehcw suppressed ^ d a general control was r&aintained. 
1. UakSi* P* i95. 
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Although •xpexi«ncing m n^y d l f f lo«I t l«s , la te in rdt 
r«lgn as the terroris t thrt»ats . nd foreign attacks mounted, 
his fears of personal assassination or d t uronMsent lad hin 
to subordinate riis concentration on rrfcrn to lUs desire to 
destroy treason ^ d revolt with in the empire.'^ 
THE )Lom TUrtCSt 
The diint ^grating e f fects of the external pressure exer-
ted Oy the Great Powers and fearing of internal rebell ions 
made Abdul Haadd*s reign tnore tyrannical. There caae into 
being increased suspicion betuve^ the Arabs and tae Turks. 
The ; ^ l t ^ was greatly disturbed by the tfiti-Turklsh agi* 
tat lcn in Lebanon «nd the appsarance of revolutionary Pla-
cards in Seirut.^He made seve.al attmspts to vdn the hearts 
of the ^rab by expensive g i f t s .x exclusively generous hospi-
t a l i t y to Axdb leaders vi itng Constantinople or by appointing 
the Arabs to high administrative or military posts in the 
government anc j ^ v e all by posing as a ch^opion of Pan* 
I si ami sm. 
Aodul-Hamid, distined to influence even in cne of the 
most cr i t i ca l perioo in Ottoman history, was ful l of contra* 
dictory charact^rstics. The European were so attracted to him. 
1. 1 M . . I p. 221. 
2. Z.N. Zeine, o.^.cit. . p. 54. 
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«t f i r s t thst t4M pr«cjllct«d that tM fdl^ht i>ee«o« « second 
SulaytsdH th* MAcjnlflciant.^ 
A n«t work/tils' ftp!•• wer* ^rtaci all cv«r tii« enpirt, 
th«r« w«ro Bpl«& to ^aXctt th« actlvlt lftt of otntx aplat. 
Ai^tntt in th<i lor<^9n Capitals w«r« also postsd, not to9«th«r 
v i td l secr«ts out to say on tualx ovti) suojacts. Ins^it* of 
sll titasa ii^aasuitts ti^is autocratic sultan was una^la to pra-
vant thff rising nat io i ia l l s t ie sspir^ticns cf ncn^ruricish 
suojact® vdthin tha ca^^ira, tha caost^rouUlasoma baing tha 
AXBtinlans and tha Kurds. 
rha y~ung Turk revolution of 1908 was tha ra u l t of tha 
influanca ct .^astarn idasSt ^o tha a c t i v i t i a s cf a group of 
l ibara l s wtto undar .^astarn If^^act coHcludao tn t nha Cttoa«n 
l;flpira was docmad to axtinctlon if drastic s t ^ s wars not 
takan t^  chack tha d cay wt)ich hao sat i n l T ^ ^ spraad of 
wastam idaa^ . t i rrad tha Turkish intal login s i •• 
Tha ycung Turks njOva»ant i>agan around 1S60 and i t s f i r s t 
Journal t^inJat (Libarty) MSS fcundad in ia64 in Londcn with 
i%if«}t bay as i t s aditor, Hi» was assisted oy Kaoial .>«y,(Nar^k 
Kaeal) and U a Pashe, and such othars as Mustafa taz i l Pashst 
Nuri aay, Hishat b^y and All S^^ovi. 
1. Yahya Arm^Jani, o p . c i t . . p. 238. 
2. He«saurs H. h. Tha Youn^ i Tuykf> (haw Jarsay,lV57>, p.3 
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Sultan Abdul Handd l o s t his r«putati&n abz«dti towards 
tha final phase cf >is raign . articularly in engl<^d and 
Affl«rica. Hi chard Ogvay wrote in his book, "Tht Sultan and 
his suDlacts*. in mi^ 
• •• Sultan Audul Ha i d a ,.eared to be earnestly 
against cruel odv^ s to do what was best for ftis 
people. But recent events demand a change of cpi» 
niofi. The good he las done i s drovwned «— droMned 
in the blocd of cour>tless oidered men, vtomen, and 
children and in the lurid l iaht of these scenes of 
herror, he t .kes on the senblance cf seme loothsone 
spider, caught in the silken iiieb of his o««n oarees, 
and conder.<ned there to reincarnate the cicst evi l 
of his ancestors, w^Kise very naiaes Conjure up dread 
meoKtries of nurder and rapine. 
The sp ir i t ot the f i r s t younq Turks movement was * i l l 
a l ive , out in the uegining of d s reign /\odul»Ktfnld was not 
trouoled by ^ y organized niovement a^dinst hi self and his 
p o l i c i e s . In the oe ining Abdul Hamid made i t f e l t that he 
was using his absolute powers for the »^lf are of the country 
and the l i acra l s , to snow that they are mere natxcnallst ic , 
did riot agitate a ainst the abondonment of the eon5tituion« 
But soon they had to re«l iz that Abdul Hasaid was se l f i sh 
and the darkest days of the etnpire were ahead. A new r e s i s t -
ance roovetnent developed and the seeds of the youn. Turk 
Revolution yyerc iOMfi* 
i . (New ycrit, 1897), v o l . 1 , p. 197. 
^ 1 -
Th« young Turk! h c r i t i c s who -ccuscd tn« o»aurocrat«t 
of l)eing a^re int*rtsted n eraildting th« wstt than creating 
th« naw Cttoffian society war a mora iaporttfit than any of tha 
othar op onants on Tanzimat. Thaso consistad cf c iv i l sar-
vants, army ofticax^, and a numbar of *ulana*, )ut very faw 
buainttSbnan. Tnay forraed s sacret society in 1B65 called the 
«^atrioctic Allianca*. Thay inaoa extansive use of the ,.ress 
an4 disirioutad l i terature to muuid the public open en and 
c r i t i c i z e the governruent, Thay were not sat is f ied with laoda-
rnizin^ the raac-'iinery of the state, tnit wanted to establish 
a contitutional monarchy and rev i ta l i ze I si as* The/ developed 
a kino of musliffl Ct 101114^  nationalisa and l«=adlng uleaa belong-
ing to a narrow c irc le of ^z'^^vileged ^ a l l i e s * They oeiBa^ tded 
a restr ict ion on the aosolutistn of the sulttfi*s rule. Their 
belief was in a l i is ited form of Pan Islamistn joined together 
by the pcwer of the Cttoiaan Einpire* 
In a short time the Young Ottoman gainad sup. ort froai 
anong the non-Turkish Muslim subjects cf tha hmpire, Ara-^ic 
speaking subjects of the Ottoraan Bnpire were attracted to then 
and Cttomanism was oagining to be written and discussed in 
Arabic l i t erature . Tae Arabs had also tested nationalisra and 
did not went to throw in tneir lot with the Turks. Tney aet 
in secret soc ie t i e s and worked together forming their ideas 
alBcst entirely on the basis of the ^ur*an. 
i . Y.Ar n\jani, OD.cit.> p. 236. 
^ 2 -
Naedk Kaoijl i>«cane th« most important ini.«llectual writer 
of the Yourig Ottomans, writing axtentively in the newspaper, 
tha organ ct the Vbung Ottomans and wtiich approached the 
probleas from the 1 s i a l i c point of view. The Ditter quar el 
Mith the ruling forced i <ep at a staye to f l ee from Istanbul 
and caJt y on their propaqanoa frosQ abroad. In the mean tiise 
S&idhat Pasha got the apportunity to dithruna isultan Aodul 
Adz and then :il8 successor Murad V, If. favour of Aodul 
Haald I I . The new sultcin prcmulgated the ccr.stituticn and 
i^dnat was niade the grand v i z i r . The very next year Midhat was 
disndsseo ano >anlshed from the isnplre. The arliai^ent was 
prorogued sj^ f^ e dly and the oonstit ^tlon waft su&penoed. 
A nunuer of *uleint' were attracted to the Young Ottoieans 
Islamic learriings, even them the young Ottoman resaaineo suspect 
in he eyes of reactionaries l ike /^  tiuul .iaodd II» Their head 
quarters were raided by the o l l c e . By 187B the Young Ottomtft 
anvenent had cone to tfi end. hven though the Young Ottomans 
failedud to graft Avstern ideologies to the body p o l i t i c of 
Islaat, tiiey were successful in introoucing new values to the 
Turks. Uuring t h i s *p*^ c^*d of despotism," the place of the 
defunct Ycui.g Ottofsan society was taken by a new revolutionary 
organization, found in I8d9 by students of ndlitary college 
in Isttinbul, th i s organization later took the name of the 
Gttoaan *Cow»ettee of Unicn and prggress" i t s meotoers b s c ^ e 
comoonly knoMn as tn« /OUHS^  Turks.''^  
Th«ir express purpose wss cvertiiroMing Sultan Abdul Handd 
I I , The driving force beiUnd t n l s ^roup, wlUcti marked the real 
t>e9lnning of the Young Turk ffioveaent against Abcjkil i^ amld, was 
an Albtfiian naooed Ibra^ai leno, ox Edhea Pasha. 
In May 1889 Teeao ^prqiache^i three fellovv students hose 
views wer already wv«ll known to hin, v4th the suggestion 
that they forn a sec-et Patr iot ic Society. These four students 
bectfse the nucleus of sn crgardzationwhich iscon beQtf) to 
attract other students. In a short tic.e the original quadru-
ovirate was joined by oiany more. 
i^thin the military Medical 3chocl he nK v^enent spread 
ra^ioly and soon overflowed into the other govement higher 
schools in constantincple. All of the young revolutioniries 
ware steeped in the works of the prosdribed Nationalist 
poets, Namik Kemal Shinasi, and Zia Pasha. In 1892, the 
existence of the society becanc known to Abdul Hainid who 
reacted v io lent ly . A nji^er of students were t r i l l e d , but 
only a tew were f ina l ly ta^en into custody, including Abdu-
l lah Jeiidit, Gir i t l i Shefiq, and sherefeddin MagaRini sut>s-
equently sonie fourteen mora were arrested when they protested 
against the confinenent of their fellow students.^ 
1. Yahya Arafl\jani., aisuSAX** p*237. 
2. b. £. Aansaur, o u . c i t . . p. 20. 
Th« society nftanwhila went on growing and i t s mombsrship 
had now crossed the l imi t s of the schools. I t t^ ecame popular 
that in 1696 a number of prominent personal i t ies joined i t 
and they now oeyan to direct i t s a c t i v i t i e s . Haji Ahmad Efendi, 
a c i v i l servent, was one of then ^ d he, along with (nakkali-
sebri of the Military Medical School began to spread the 
ideas of the orQanization. 
Outside the l imi ts of the Ottom^ £npire the young 
conspirators had already assembled in Paris and they also 
indudeu Ahnad Hiza wtK was destinvicd to viecame the best 
known oi the turope^ young Turks. He also oecame the direc* 
tor of "Mecheveret(consolation or deliaeration) a Turkish 
forthi-^htly, the oftiCi.dl orgart of the coiniiittee of union 
and progress. I t s f i r s t number wat brought out on Oecenber 
3 , 18V3 setting forth the aimB of the society for i t s readers. 
Meanwhile at Constantinople the s^ icvement kept on spread^ 
ing. The government being suqsicious enough made a few arrests 
but for the ticne beln^ the leaders were at large t i l l la te 
in 18V5 several of then were arrested and exiled, s t i l l 
otiHtrs were able to escape and continue tht-ir a c t i v i t i e s 
in Europe. Three rrsain factors are said to have caused these 
• s s e t s " f i r s t l y , the appearance cf Me<; leveyet in Turkey 
1. Mecheyeret was tne o f t i c i a l organ of tne C.U.P, i t was 
frcBB the 5tart~^c a greet ^pointed by Anmud Reza a& his own 
personal property. 
throuQo thft fo dgn ^/ost of)Ice, oecondly, the Oieinbershlp 
of thd org..nizdticn had swelled to such on extent that *ali 
Ist...nbul tiius oecame AIMATB of the axistence of a socioty*, 
and f inal ly i ona Murat day, (a taachar of dstory of the 
Mulklya or c iv i l co l lege) , had chalked out a l i s t of reforms 
he thought necessary ( f i^ ^the eapire and presented i t , although 
his su^x^esfcicns were ins ignif icant , mv for tn is tie had 
to leave the country determined to undermine AOdul .iafiiid. 
The arrests iOdde by the govern:lent only increased the 
detertitination of the rpvolut'onaries ot the tvo public t ions 
of the society wach were new trickling into Turkey from 
2 
abroad through the foreign post offices* Ulzati was by f^r the 
mere popular. Ahmad Hiza ond Mechveret were held in i l l repite. 
Both cf these chc.r^ctersties of Ahmad Hizat 'is pos i t i v l s t 
learning and tiis overbecjriny ways, kept in /oung Turks in 
ex i l e in a constant uproar. Arif bey Ciolu, one of the Young 
Turks ^i Geneva, wrote to Ibrahim Temo on 9uly 27, 1896 to 
express his concern about the use of the pos t i v i s t calender 
on Machevert* s (Aosthead. He wrotest 
What I am afraid of i s tn^t i f Ist .nbul publishes t h i s 
among the already uneducsteo puolic, the l i t t l e sympathy 
w>-ich ex i s t s in our favour will be ruind, and we will 
not be aole to accouipllsh any thing sfter tt i is , more-
uver he marked, "If he h.d enjoyed TOfiflrsdng to the 
1. E. H.Kamsaur, o^. c i t . . p. 27. 
2. Another anti-riamidia Journal founded by .urad. 
3« ii2lti2** PP* 29-30. 
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Mdll of one p«ison, tnan ^9 Mould ^ave Confonued to 
the w-11 of a 600 years old dynesty. Jlnce we hav« 
refused to accept tnelr rule, why shoulo we conform 
to the udli of Ahaad ^za7". 
The plot to cverthrow Addul Hamid had gained fnomentum 
in Constantinople ctnd possibly the Paris and beneva tranches 
of the ycung Turks had no knovded^e of i t . Haji /\hinad cfendi 
appears to have become president of the central committee of 
the society in Constantinople in 1896. Under his general 
guioence wer^  various other groups, including cne unuer 
Sheikh N||ilni:' w^dch, was ccoucsed ciivLefly of ul^ma, the 
learned (sen cf Islam, and magistrates and one at the war 
off icer under lieutenant colonel shefek oey, Pxasutnoly by 
t tds time the Vcri<.us stu ents a>inuiitte«s hr::d also accepted 
Ha i Ahmed's l»aderstiip. 
The coup de*tat was planted for August 1396 as the 
organization had oe n in existence for quite some tiiae, and 
wanted to strike sooner as possi~>le« Although many arrests 
had i>ev.'n afiecteu, s t i l l the memberss^p oi the society was 
l . rger enough in Constantinople to ac^^deve i t s soal. !3y an 
aC'-ident the plot was revealed inient ional ly by Naidr bey, 
a meaner cf the society resulting in the ex i le of the Cons-
pi rat6«s to reffiote parts of the empire. The exi les included 
all the singleaders. They bounded on a ship c^ nd sent to tne 
places ui their respective ex i l e . The incst danaerous ones 
were ,>ut down in Libya* 
X. Il22j|., p*t 3o. 
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All th« consp rators w '^r* gui l ty uf trea^^n and Abdul 
Haffiid's policy of exil ing c^iK>t oe put up against Icgic . 
Many of the axi las rnada good their e s c ^ « . The society vtas 
of cour»« badly hit in Constantinople out the ^^ur^ose nad 
s t i l l nut o9&n given up. Nevertheless the society was net 
dead, the young lurk Puolicaticns, Mizan in warticuler, were 
s t i l l flowing into the country c^ nd being passed from >and 
to hand. Hevolutionaiy notices ^peareo on the main s treets 
and the doors of the Mosques. 
The f a l l of 18^6 saw ost cf uhe reraai'^ »-ng Vc-ng Turk 
leaders in burope, where they concentrated chiefly in Paris 
and in Geneva. Hiza had commenced d s barrage* the Sultan 
had persuaded the French govern.aent *.hen headed by Leon 
Bourgeois to suppress Wecheveret and expel i t^ diii^ctor from 
France. Ahmad Hize countered by bringing the paper out in 
the litt^iographed edition sno then OK ved to Belgium. Mean-
while he brought great Joy tc the memoers of the society in 
the em, i re by pnolishing ano eight page supp^ OKint (April 15, 
1896) contain n<; nothing out art ic les iroo tne French press 
supporting the Young Turks in their f ignt a-sainst the Sultan."*" 
The next y(>ar tne tulton counter attacked Ahmad Riza 
and Ills colleagues oy ordering the Turkish vjnbassy in Paris 
to bring suit cf ciefaffiaticn cf character against the editors 
1* i^liU** P*i ^ * 
of &4ech«veret. After the ?i arirtg the court's juo ement though 
in favour of ihe pla int i f f , was l i l i* a 9>XM> ^^ ^^^ ^^c* ^ 
tn« ai l tan. Late in 1896 the cgyptlan govemroent f e l t uneasy 
aocut the a c t i v i t i e s of the Ybung Turks, dnd Murad bey was 
ordered to transfer his operations to buro e oy the directing 
comifiittee of the society. There he imsnidiately oecane the 
leader of the Anti Hizs faction within the society and att -
racted uKist of the memoei s to iiis side. In coinpax^sion to 
Ahmed Hiza, Murod &ey was eatrenely popular. His l i terary 
efforts re&ulted in giving "ici a consideraole following in 
the society. The fact tliuw he was a Pan-Islandst, was an 
additional advantage, r&s highest aodiition was to free the 
MuslifflS from foreiyn dominatlcn through the Caliphate and 
the establishment of a great Islamic tuipire. 
All these factors l e t to Murad being electee the pre-
sident of the Geneva branch of the Ccmtidttee of Union and 
Progress. Mizan <?nc Mei;:he.eret continued to be the org<ins 
of the society, in Geneva '^ nd Paris iespect ively. 
The same yeaz the society* s headquarter was transferred 
trom Constantinople to oeneva* The saf&e time mvm quarrels 
between tu«o f acticns in the organization coiidng tc aheaci. 
Cn May 1^, Mach»veyfti carried the followlny ncticej^ 
*XiVi Coofitdttee of Jnicn and Progress h,3S the honour 
of inforjr.ing th: r<t'ader8 of the toecheverat that i t s 
i 'resideit , Vi.S/iurat oey and i t s director, i»>,Ahnet bey 
de Tehuruksou a>^ e going to Geneve to pas^ the Summer 
;>cason« •• j 
1, Ib id . , p . , 40, 
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Tht naxt l&:4je anncunctd th« r^signaticn of Murad and 
that Ahmad i^za h^ d iaeon •xcluded from th« Coimnlttce of Jnion 
Proqx»h%» r d a , however, wes tc ccntinu* tc edit thfc Turkish 
o i t lcn cf Mechevrat. ->ut yi.th a council of Eurveillenc« of 
act rs a tJcaxd of ccnscrsnip, 
Ahffldd Hiza ktpt on vdth his Mork,i.a. the strugula 
against Abdul Hamid. loirad.bsy publis»v»d a oocklet containing 
a u&eful sutniuary of Young Turk thouvji^ts <st t i s . exi .d . Thay 
tiicught thac Abdul Hamio i s siHvjlao out as the source of nest 
of the ev i l s xa ispant in the entire, .and the remedy proposed 
i s sic^plicity itself;remove the jultan (but nocthe dynesty}* 
^ d restore the shcrt l ived constitiitiun of iVddhat Pasha, 
I si 3'" iii j t i l l to be the cornerstone of the state, ^nd the 
dynesty i s needed to i.aif.t.. n the unity of the fc;Bi,.ire« The 
suu^oct naticiialiti-^s ere told that tiiey 9^0 betrayiov^ their 
"Comnion father land** by striving to ac^ i^icve a national identity 
of tneir OMH, anc they axe offered the bleek dl:i:cm t ive 
of 3ecx>i<u.n>^  **Qttoman8* an alternative which implies nothing 
but a cotinuaticn of the system in foxcc> und^ sr Abdul Hamid. 
These thouvjhts are .escriDed jy *naine of author* as a^curious 
iBi<ture of incipient nationalists, io^^erialism, ^ d what may 
2 
be descrioed as re l ig ious iraperialism". 
This was the condition of the soci ty in siurope and 
in the C'ttonian liiopire, i t was recovering from the blow i t 
i« l a i d . , pp. 4 i - 4 3 r 
2. Jh2li2*t ?• 44 
.ecelved by the fai lure of the coup, o t l l l many ycung n«n 
M«re dstcriained to f i jht the government of Abdul Haniid. 
They jeionged to the military schools as well a^ the other 
schccls including the mi l i t s iy medical school and the 
ar t i l l ery school. 
The man responsiole tor the collapse cf the Ycun; Turks 
flooveuient of 1897 was Ahmad Jaleledoin P.sha, w:ic was the 
CJiief spy of y^ Jdul rla.nid. The sult<:%n had also triod to di»-
oanc the turcpean organization, and his spi(?« tiad penetrated 
inside the organi^aticn. 3ut all these efforts were of no 
avail and a definite result was ci^tained only v«h«n Jalaleddin 
Pasha was sent to Europe, Only on the as£>uxance of Jalaleddin 
^ash.^ that the oultan would make conces:>icns and introduce 
reforiBs did the society lay down i t s arms and i t s publications. 
He ha*, else as ured oi a general gmrmsty for all po l i t i ca l 
prieoners ar»d ex i l e s . Mur^ d bey had r ^ l i z e d th t the Mi gap 
was mainly responsible for the arrest and exi le of many of 
his countrymen outhhe was not prepared to give way although 
Jalaleddin Pasha nas wcie than anxious to supi^ly his wants 
but Murat refused to accept money trom hiot* 
"The main result of thr truce of 1897 was to destroy 
almost entirely the organizaticn cf the society v^th* 
in the envir dad to set back the Yuunc) Turk cause for 
a num>er of years . . • • The break was t^njs com l e t e , both 
with xii aiid <<dtaout the era,^lre, and Abdul Haodd could 
breath eas i ly onco Bcre*.i 
1. Ib id . , p . , 5CKbl. 
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*vdth tht almost c nvl^te o o l l ^ s e of thi? youn Turk 
muvsnent in the sumsner of 1897, Ahmad Hiza and his 
associatas found themselves v ir tual ly alone in main-
taining the struggle a<j#inftt the Sultan, through cut 
the negotiaticna Mdth AJtmtA Jelalodoin Pashat feycheveyet 
had b i t t er ly res isted the more to con^rofnise vdth 
Abdul Haroid and lis publisheorjhad consec^ently been ^ 
branded as Intr^^vhsigent by lnurad and AM colleagti«s*. 
A new Young Turk organ ent i t led Csmenli (Ottoman) was 
founded in Geneva in 1892« by Ishak aikuti and Abdul ah Javdet. 
I t soon gained roaanence anc xelecjateil ..iecUeveret to i t s old 
position as an organ of the op: os i t ion within the iovement 
with many prominent throwing their l e t .»ltu the new journal. 
The puolicaticn of ti i is Journal «as la ter trt<nsferfto to 
kn<^ l and. 
An event diuaiatically focus&ed the attention of europe 
on the Young Turks (novenient. Oamat Mahntut Pasba, the oultan*s 
brother in la'A' fled the country alongvdth his two sons Saba-
heddir^ and Lutfullaii. Abdul riaxiid was no.v in search of a way 
to force to return h^  n<e and anticipating that Danat Mahnut 
would go to France, the a i l t ^ directed his representative 
in France to declare that Da(»at Mehiout had fled to escap« 
the uubishment of a Tories of crime he had coourdtted, and 
als»o that jefcxe fldeing the country he had shown some signs 
of aiental di :^rder. 
1. 1. Ib id . . p.52. 
2. Ib id . , pp., 54-5t, 
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On January 1,19CX; ^ech«verat reported the ar i l va l of 
D«nat .Vithsjut Pasha afi6 h i s sons in France In the follcA-ing 
words; ^ 
On tha arrival of th« staant*! in ^ta•i:scille8 tha 
repr sent a l i v e of ttia Preas ascertained, not vdth 
out astonisraent, that OaiMt Mahmut Pasha* repreaen-
ta ted as deri^ged oy the o f f i c i a l dispatch iron 
y i l d i i , i s a gentlemen of ports , net only sane dut 
but even very enl ightened and very l i b e r a l . They 
were able to perveive with no l e s s s tupefec t icn 
that the t^o ninor c-^iildren menti ned in the sane 
d lspatc i^re two gall&nt man, of hero tho y ungeat 
i s t/.enty-tjvo years of aqs, compietelv |rs!ancipated 
not only Irom tfie i l l - o n e n e d tu t i l i geAunc le Abdul-
ila^dd, jut also fxoai al l s-i?ntifr.ent of i . insticissn 
ana from react ionar / j . re judicts . 
The f i r s t tvjc ytaxs of the tA«ntieth ceniury saw a 
new impetus in the Young Turk movement snd i t was aola 
to vdn back some gxound l o s t in 1897. But t h i s only 
concerned the movement out s ide the otcomtfi bropire and 
no attempt was made i n Constantino-de to r e c o n s t i t u t e 
2 
the f i r s t s o c i e t y . 
The Aloardans, wer ac t ive in Birope, had founoed the 
Jcurr.al »Al'^a ia* ( i n April , 1897) to push throuj ' t h e i r 
demand for the auconoiay of Albania within the fr me i^ ork 
of tne Ottoiaaf^ .japire. For the Kurd*, Al>dur Rahman iedirhan, 
puolisned t,ae jourp.al "Kurdistan" in Londcn, ^ d aided i n 
the p u o l i c a t i c n of t smanl l . 
i« ijyL^«» PP»t 54-56, 
2. Xt)io.. p . , b6«57. 
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For ttm /ixa^s th«r« was an oxganizat i .n kno^^ an tn« 
"Tuicc-syriari Hetorci Comnittee" v^ich was headed by As)ir 
Amin r\rs»lan. The f i r s t "Con^r^/Ss of Cttoman l i o o i d l s , p r e s i -
ded uy Sdbahedoin, t a t in Pa r i s from the fourth to the n: nath 
of Feazuaiy 1902* Some fcurty saven de l iga tas prasanted thorn-
selves at the CongrastTurks, AXdOS» Oraeks, Kuids, Albanians, 
Arminlans Ci re asbi tns Jaws, fAany vf the delegates came from 
organiza t icns ..sdch vutuld far uicre than the replacement of 
Aboul Hainia by anc^.her mcrnboi cf ihe same familyt al thiugh 
most were vdll ing tc ccn-dder such a mo/e as a step in the 
r i gh t d i rec t ion . Actuallyt only a ccnfermad opt indst could 
have expected the cciigress to accoinplish any tlvLng ccncreta; 
yet the i n t e r e s t i ng triin., was tha t the main cleavage develop-
td oet.veen d i i icxent furkish groups ra tnor than ;^etweM) 
wrcups cf d i f i s re i i t n a t i c n a l i t y , 
fhe actual r e su l t cf the congress w<^ s a negative on«-
r i i t Detwten Saoaheddin and A^ad Riza* A new crgt^n carrying 
the name ct th« society of Union and Progress was ioundad 
under tne dir»ct^cn of Mehmet Ali Fazil Pash*, Ahmet Hiza, 
iiclani-ki K'azim tfendi , Csezayi oey, and Anmet ijaip bey, 
Tnis new paper . as cal led Chour^-ummet (Council -vi the 
people) . 
i* iPl^»» P* 6^* 
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I»i«=» follovtfing years »«w the development of : i« Youn*j 
Turks mcv ment on two f ronts - cne led bv -jabahed in dnd 
the oth»r by Ahmad Rlzat S«^ahtddin*6 main aim was to 
cor iec t .hat he considtred the ma.-n defects of the tttoman 
Bir^iro. Ac cioing to Sjibaheddin the Sultan tr^ as resj'onsi:}) e 
for tne i.i.se.aole cor\jitiuns ci the iinpirc and so too were 
the pecpXe utK submitted tc hiir< apati^ieticdli y. 
In time with t lese vle.vs ^auahedcin x:han l a id down the 
following fcui point plan cf act ion: 
X* To propaqate arnongst th« Turkish ^e&ple the t.^,ste for 
social s tua ie s , ^^ith the aim of s t i r i inQ up yr lva te i n i t i a -
t i v e and ot leading the way to administrativfe i jo^entralination, 
2, To seek fii^^ns of er-iv-ng t 5»"« entente a»wngst tne diverse 
races wi^ch con^^titut-^ the Cttoman cm^^ire. 
3 , fc uf htilu ^ he rii^nts cf the Cttonanfe In cour.cries with 
a iOLta cxcjern c i v i l i z a t i o n an J to prcnct& tiidxe a current 
of opi-nion in t h e i r favour* 
4 , Tc create in tne i n t e r i o r of th& country leagues and 
comndttees . i t h a viu*, to woiking for the r ea l i za t ion of 
the '^rc xamue and to oppo%iin<u tnetaselves to t ae oncroac^l-
umntc ci on op^rssiva •^ower, ' 
i» JULS'* KP» bS-86. 
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Ahm«t Alza b*y, on th« oth«r ha d, had continued to 
wage wax on the Sultan at he nad been ck- ng unremittingly, 
sincd nis f l ight iiom Turkey, Mecheveret a}ntinci(rd to seep 
into the tm Ire, and there can oe l i t t l e dou^t that i t wa« 
inst i tut ional in keeping the spark of the Ycung Turk snovement 
al ive a ainst the t l ae when i t could de f^ned into flame 
once mere. I t vvas also liaportant that Ahmet Kiza and nis 
asscci^^es vmxe: preserving the naiuv of the cricf^nal ioc ie ty 
of Union and Progress wdch wai: to oe xebcrn irynot too* 
distant future. 
Thus Saba:^edoin and Ahiuet niza were the ..ost in^ort^t 
leaderti of the rrsc vement in exi le , ^ut S£behedcin did net 
represent, s did Ahmet Idza, the tnost cowerful force which 
was qerminiting vdtnin the en^ i^re - "Turkish Nationalism". 
Aodul-iiaraid's school* were producing an i:.crc.:S ng 
numoer of bureaucrats, o f f icers and in e l l ec tu las who, unlike 
most of tuQ OttCBioin^ and Ycung Turks who preceded thetn, came 
fro-fi to lo^wr classes, wei^ notxelated to the existing ruling 
classes and «.ere vdlling to change the sy tern by force i f 
necessary tc acdeve their nds. in the amy, especially* 
the lo v€r off icer r^nks caine to be f i l l e d by educated and 
p o l i t i c a l winded c f i i cors irofli the suoject c lass , who were 
frustr4(.<:u by the lung years of unsuccessful struggles 
again t the taecedoni^ and Artalnians t err i tor i e s . Though 
Aodul la^id had lirr.teu his military expenditures Decause 
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of flridnclal roaleb.s, fflost of these c f t i cer s i.<er« convinced 
with sume jus t i ce , that the sultan kept the aztny froa develo-
ping b cause he i^ a^s afraid of thea* 
Mustafa Kemal, who had Just graduated from the war 
academy in Ja- j^ary 19 '~>, organized a secret group, knovtn as 
the frjther land (Vatan 1 society, drenches were estcblished 
an^ ong brother of f ice s in Jerusalem, Jaffa and ma: i f e s t o s 
were drav^ up deraa ding that the Sultan fu l ly observe the 
constitution and established a governmental re ime that cculd 
deal e f f i c i en t ly with the ne(>ds of the army and other organs 
of the state . The name of the group soon was c itfiged to 
father land and l iberty (vatan va ^ r r i v t cemiveti) and 
numb cf pre vine! al bureaucrates also were included. 
tAustafd Kenal wa i^elcomed when he cacne to spread the 
word of fatnerland anJlioerty early in iV06. rie formed a 
number of icinderea spir i t in the third army, including Jemal 
bey and Talat aey. He foj^ meo tnere into a blanch of the 
Uamascus ^society >ut , i t h a citiereMt n.^ ixie, the ^Cttoman 
l iber ty Society* (Usroar.ii riirivet Cetrlvet). had expenoed 
rm>ic(ly afficng of f icers ano bureaucrates in tae Mecedonist 
provinc< s, organized in small c e l l s en the mouel of those 
of the aulgarian texror i t s . The new orgdnination held i t s 
msr^tings in the IcUges of the masonic order and received 
financial anu o h^. assistancf^ from 'donmes* who hoped 
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that I t s trii^ph sniiht a lavic^te cheir situation in Ottoman 
Society. Towards the jsqiwiinq of 1907 i t also estaolished 
relations with the Young Turks in Paris snainly with those of 
the Atwtet Bize facticn. The two groups were after seme itnths 
e^algaiBated unOer the name of the ^arii» organization. The 
CoBunittee of Union and i'rogress with the prltsary ala of 
restoring the constitution. 
The second Young Turks C&ngress ui&t in Haris tcwarr s 
the closti of 1907 in a new efiort to secure cooperation 
against the coioi.on enemy. I t was chair«:^ d j c i n t l y by Ahmet 
Hizai Saoeheddin afi<i K.Malourvlan os the Mitnenian xevolutionary 
Feoeraticn, ..no .o,jed to use the Young Turks to gain tneir 
own national objectives. I t was the /urmenitfis who carried the 
cays as the Young Turks wer«. convinced to accept a far more 
v io lent pro^raaiffle of action than they had been willing to 
espause in the past. Taa final declaration stated that the 
Sultan had to be deposed and the exi'^ting regime replaced 
by a constituticnal and representative government, and any 
flit ans, including revolutionary violence i f necessary, would 
be used to acndeve the goal, iiilthin the eo-ixe, a-iaeu r e s i t -
tcioce to opress: had to be organized along /dth peaceful 
resi tancc in the fo r^a of strikes, refusal to pay taxes 
circulation of propagandai and arrangement for a f u l l - s c a l e 
revolt if al . e lse fa i l cu . To keop the orgacization intact 
Ahmet Hiza at f i r s t reluctantly agreeidi^te ^ii^ stateracn^, but 
V-. 
\ 
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soon react a to th« ooc sting of tha Arm^tlns ttiat th« Turks 
had infant accepted th« m thcds that ttiey had in aastazn 
Anatolia. :iplit with Prince Sabeh«ddin cnce ayain, and retur-
ned to nis orginal posit ion. The reconsi l iat ion of the d i f fe -
rent groups in Europe, thus proved i l lusory , ano in the end, 
they layed no active role in the YOUIKJ Turk revolution when 
i t came. 
«nen i t f ina l ly did take place, the ycung Turk revolu-
t ion was one of the strongest events of i t s kind over seen 
in history. I t was not planned, at l eas t in the manner and 
at the t ine i t f ina l ly broke out, i t real ly did not even 
happeHi 9^6 i t certainly did not depose Abdul-Hanud. Yet 
i t forced him to recall the parliament and lor all practical 
purposes, to give up most of ds powers. 
In fact i t was the l o s t of the many snail uprisings 
w'ich took place through out ttw entire since 1007. Th« 
reasons oeing nore financial then ideoloyical . A bad harvest 
in Anatolia resulted in slow payaent of further resulting in 
sa lar ies being in arrears and, above al l nost proirctions had 
been suspended. Viamy soldiers and of f icers as well as bureau-
crates showed their displeasure by leavintj their jobs. Ther« 
had been some C.U.P propa ^oa in Anatolia and Homalia, but 
with l i t t l e e f i ec t . The troops in Meccdonia were t spec ia l ly 
unhj^ ^py because of a recent upsurge of Cnrist.ian terrorism. 
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now support«d by the Grtek cNjrches in the ar«a. The CU.P 
leaders in salonica at f i r s t att-eiB^teU to use the situation 
simply to ififorn the powers of the Conmlttee* s existance and 
ab i l i ty to bring order to Meccodonia i f only i t was uiven 
proper sanction. Starting thrt all the people of Mecedonia 
were sufter.ng fron tiie oultan*s op^JteSbion, they concluded 
that the recall Paxlidi»ent viould solve the Kecedordan firobken 
All the elenents of the enpire would be able to work for the 
COKK-on good. There would be equality under the law, and 
the powers vioulo no longer need to intervene to protect 
the Sultan* 5 subjects.*^ The manner in which the events 
t&ck place ax^ well descrioed in the following wordst 
In 1907 the n itT4>er of mutinies increasad s t i l l tnore, 
ano durma the course of the y««rs, c iv i l ians began 
to participate in Anatoli a, uprisings against currupt 
o f f i c i a l s took place in B i t l i s , van, Erzurum. and 
• i k t o cftties «Jovem«rs were deposed and now I3.WS reject-
ed oy popular novements wh ch the amy made no attempt 
to suppress. And the axny mutinies now oonmenced to 
spread. In cctooer 1907 there Wt>s trouble in Constan-
tinople i t s e l f , and at the beginning of X90B the 
ferment S¥>read to smyxna n^d even dovvn into Syr a. 
In July 1906 all of a sudoen a military revolution took 
place which shock /JtJdul-Hatiiid so much that in a pesic he 
granted a constitution the next day censorship v.as abol is-
hed, all po l i t i ca l prisoners released and that whole army 
of 30,000 spies was disbanded. 
i« l^lsi-t p. 266 
2* £. &• tiamsaur, o ^ . c i t . . p . , 130. 
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The new c&nstltutlcn was ncne other than Midhat*s 
pxojacts of 1676, resutiatad Atn all i t s inpexfectlcns 
ranoered raoie incongroous oy ttie passage of tiiaa and tha 
^rov^h ot naticnal sentinoent. The resolution ot the cons-
t i t u t t i o n renaasad the people happy and rejoicing in the 
oe l ie f that the const i t j t ion would f u l f i l everyoocy* s wants* 
At tn i s t me the f i r s t Axab society named *al-Ikhfl a^  
^r-oi al-Uth«ani» was founded. I t s main objectives oeing 
the ^rotecticn of the constitution, uniting all the r«ces 
in loyalty to the sultan promoting the welfare of the Mxalo 
provinces on the footing of real equality vdth the other 
races of the Espire, spreading aduc^ticn in the A^^ abic 
language and fastering the oaservances of Arab customs. 
The membership of th i s society was open to Ar^s of all creeds 
ano i t was intended to find i t s branches throughout the A r ^ 
and also a ne^>sp^er wa<^  actually started to prosx>te the 
defusion of i t s iueas w i c h according to ^ t o n i u s 'rested 
on a ccnfusiv^n of thought.^ 
In the follovdng April another revolution broke out at 
the inst igat ion of Abdul-Hamid who was trying to ever throw 
the C.U.P. AS the news ot t d s out break Jieached Saloniktt 
MuhG»id ohaulcat Pasha* an Arab Commi^ der of the Turkish 
1. Antonius Gearge, o, . c i t . . p*, 102. 
2. ijaisi*, p. 103. 
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artny corps stationed in ;jalonika, ••rclwd on tha capital and 
after e s t i f f "fight entered Constantinople ^ d re tored the 
authority of the C.U.p. and after three days the senate md 
the ch«cBdex net together and decided to oepose Abdul Hamid 
and instead proclaimed his brother Hasnid as the new sultan. 
The CU.P. was now in absolute cosiaand and the next five 
years of their rule saw the establishment of a tyranny which 
although different from that of /4>dyl Hamid* was in no way 
l e s s Despotic and, so far as the Arabs soc ie t i e s , founoed 
by non-Turkish rtc ia l froups and with thera the *al~Ikhi al 
A iBovament of Purely Turkish nationalism was oeginning 
to assert i t s e l f . I t has I t s roots in a new assertion of 
the Turanian origins of the Turkish people, w:iich had given 
birtii to the creed that the path t f the regeneration of the 
Turkish race lay towards reunion with the kindered popula-
t ions of Turanian cescent of whom the majority were under 
Hussian rule. 
The forces generated by the national awakening were 
at a work in directions pai'^tltng away from the centres diff-
erences of languaije, customs and culture were s t i l l the main 
apirings of these forces, the diversity of races within 
the eispire called for the centralized from of government. 
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woich shcudl nave given th« Arab and ether non-Turkish 
provinces a I erg* measure cf home rule and tnt fretdoa 
to purwitt their po l i t i ca l and cultural develo,;nient as 
autonomus atemoers of t^ ie empire. The policy followid by 
tha CU.P* was the very appostile. They actopted tha 
centralized form of government v^ ch they found in 
existence w <en they cane Into povier. 
The propagation of Arab national id«as was hanct 
forth conducted on two planes. th.,t of the open pldtaform, 
functioning through the agency of recogniied clubs ano 
associations, and that of the sub-Turani^ channel, f led 
by secret coni^iratoral organizations. 
C ri A P T fc R 
IV 
Axai> naticnalisffl made i t s jippcarance in th« Levant in 
th« Hdddl* of th« nineteenth century. The f i r s t society wdch 
was founded in Beirut in 1847, through the efforts oi the 
American Protestant missionaries with learned tes tes , for 
the purpose raising the level of culture, was al-J ami w e a^ ." 
Sur^iavva.'^Its members were all christ ians, and included 
the faiaous writer Nasif al*yaziji (d . l87 l ) and auturus al 
3u8ta i (d.Ida3} as v^ rell as a {aenbers of misslneries tfid the 
English writer of the Lebanon, colonel charles Churchill,, 
l iv ing near Beirut. The society iMt regularly until 1852, 
in 1857 i t was succeeded by 4*JflBiYYfl^ al-U^YYth a i ' 
aurivva. a larger society on the stfse mooel, but including 
Muslims ond i t has coxresponding members in Cairo and IstaDbul 
induoing the reforming Prime-Minister Fuwad Pasha. 
An organized effort , the f i r s t of i t s kino, for the Arab 
national movement i s traceable in the year 1875. Five ycung 
man, educated at the Syrian Protestant college in Beirut, 
forued a secret society. Their aim was xevoluticnary and 
tneir .^rccedure was, in the begim ing, conf/77ercito secret 
1. This term commonly used in modern Araisic to mean a 
'Society or * association* m aning to co l l ec t or join tooether, 
in i t s mcdem sense i t appears to have dome into use Muite 
recently, anc was pern^s f i r s t used to refer to the orga-
nized monastic comiuunities or congrigations, which ap^^eared 
in the easi^ern uniate churches in syria and Lebanon at the 
end of the seventeenth and t>eginning of the eighteenth cen-
tur ies . In the midule of the nineteenth century the term 
ctfBe into mere general use, f i r s t in the Lebanon and them 
in otner Araoic speaking countries to refer to voluntry 
association for s c i en t i f i c l i t erary benevolent cr (political 
purposes. Encvdopeedia of Islam, vol, 11, p.42B. 
a«etlngt. Aft«r « ptricu oi a^cut four yaars secret a e t i v l t i t s 
they decided to uroaden their a c t i v i t i e s under a vigi lant 
Turkish deauzccracy th«y had nc other option to choose fron 
than to post anonyacus placarders in the s treets . They did 
that udth the ag i l i t y of ycuthful conspiratioV»« 
G<tor,e Antonius writest^ 
The ycung man vvho had been e^cated at the Syrian pro* 
tettant college in aeirut^a^Hcret society. They were 
all chir i s t ians , i>ut they saw the importance of getting jiir«8lims and Drusz to joinon^aanage after sooetisMi to 
en l i s t the ttsmoership of ^ » e twenty two persons belong* 
in^ to the c'ifferent creed ano represen Ing tht enlignt* 
ineo e l i t e of th« couritry. Fr(>«tnasonary en the airopean 
i^attem haci just fcund i t s way into 6yria and the .roao« 
ter& ci th« secret society were ahle. through one of 
their ffiemoer, to interest the recently-founded lodge 
in i t s a c t i v i t i e s . 
The centre of their org nitat lcn was ie ixut , and they 
established branches' in Damascus, Tripoli, and ;jidon. 
Their aim being frankly revolutionary, they could scare«» 
cely Indulge IM^  any of the pleasures of the ir procedure 
was at f i r s t Mitlrely confined to secret publicity, and 
@eetln<^s 3t whicrt t.i«ry VJOUIJ sxchange views tfid discuss 
plans, ano to th« dis^iisination of their po l i t i ca l ideas 
tiirouyh personnal cnanneit. At l a s t after threo cr four 
years of whi sperei otiispiracy, they t«^/j5r.ee: t*^* tc 
oor>tinue pre<^ching to thenaelves would serve only to 
increase their otO) ordour, and they decided to kroadin 
their appeal* The t^t^od they chose^the only one ot«n 
to then under a vigilaf^t Turkish bureaoicracy v<as that 
of ,0st ing antfiysKJus placards in the s treets , 
A yout.g* enligiit«ned e l i te* ucst of wtxt» were christians, 
tfid soiao of whom had studies at the byrian protestant 
college in Beirut, ^^anteo f i r s t and form^st to em.^ci* 
pate the Lebancn from the Turkish yoke. They formed a 
* secret revolutionary society* so»ietii:.ne around 1876, 
» .^iich used to neet during certain evenings en the rock* 
ey seashore, near the Mgeon hock, south of Jeirut, to 
1. tieorge jntonius, o p . c i t . . p.TV 
-65 -
•xciiange view and discuss ways and taegns cf achieving 
thair ot>jactiva what was uppax iRost in tha minds of 
thase y^ u^n^  laan wat thair baif><j huml}iatad and mada 
to faal Hnfarior* oy tha Burks. I t soon jecaioe ev i -
dant to thasa young man that tha suecass of thair 
goalf tha Co-oparation and support of tha ibjslins 
wa« nacassaxy. Thay reacted tha conclusion that tha 
only way to gat rid of Turkish domination in tha Laba-
non and to ba txeated on tha footing of ac^ality i t h 
tha Arab Muslims was through a succassful Arab muva-
isant diractad against tha Turks and bas»6 on Axabism. 
Tha laading menioars cf tha sacrat society had already 
Joi>ad t h i s ledge. A few Musliois did Join the lodga 
and did laarn abcut the axisttfica of tha sacxat sociaty. 
Muslims and christians ayraad on coffibattino Turkish 
in jus t i ces anu dispotism. on assarting their .vr^bian 
and ins i s t ing on equal rights fox tha -rabs and tha 
Turks; but they disagreed on the ultimata goal of the 
society* 
According to Paris Nimr Pasha, scmetitne between 18(^ 2 
and 1883 th i s particular secret revolutionary society, 
the existance of vMch was one of the best kept secret 
of the tittie, suspended i t s a c t i v i t i e s , baxned i t s recor-
ds and dissolved i t s e l f ether secret soc ie t ies ware 
f&rnad a few years l a t er .1 
The anonyiaous placards in Arabic, v>/hich ^peared in 
iSoO tf)d wnich dincunced the e v i l s of Turkish uiisgcveminent 
and exhorted the pcpul stion to overthrew i t . They appealed 
to the Arabs to tae ir patr lot isn W4iyani^vah and their 
*gloriouspast*, to r i se and expel the Turks from the Arab 
lafiiis and, T^us, emancipate themselves from the ev i l s of 
Turkish dispotism. 
On June, 26,1880, the Brit ish acting consul General 
John Uiekson in ueixut, considered i t important enough 
to inform, telegraphically, the Brit ish Atnbassador G.T. 
1. Z.N.Zeine, c p . c i t . , pp. 60-62. 
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Gosch«n in Constc^ntincpe, that *r&volutlcnary placards* 
had appeared in da^irut. The telegramn^* was followed by 
his dispatch of July 3 , 1860 in wdch he wrote that * such 
placards had recently, apr^ ear a several -imes in ie lrut , 
calling u,Jon the pecple to revolt against the Turks*, 
adding, *There i s no do < jt that for the l^st f ve years 
a secret society has existed in yria, havin., branches 
at Baghdad tfid conttarktlnope... These placards may have 
etnanated from trd s society.* According tc Dickson these 
revolutionary papers .vere posted up In the streets cf 
Beirut for the f i r s t t ic ie . l 
More placards cf a r. volutin nary nature co tinued to 
appear towards the end of i6oO in Syria. The language rrore-
over i[> v/iich some of these placards are cached, vjculd shi w 
that tiiey uXb the com^ositicn ot educ. ted persons. Several 
of hese placards undoubtedly, put out by the secret society, 
fcrmec in 3eirut. 
In an ag^ when representative ins t i tu t ions did not 
ex i s t s , and newspapers were s t i l l ne , such soc ie t i e s provi-
ded an opr^oxtuidty i c i eoucaied men to form po l i t i co l ideas 
and exert a certain pressure opinion on the gov'. rnment. 
The placards contained vitftknt denunciations of the 
e v i l s of Turkish rule and urged the Arab population to r i t e 
in rebell ion and overthrough i t . The autiKirities, both in 
Constantinople as well as in Syria* were puzzled ^ d perterbed. 
!• Jht^at p. 63. 
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Th« ftfftct was that secrtt •mlssarles wer* sent by th« Sult«n 
to ilcirut, to invostigato. I t was ganerally understood that 
Mldhat Pasha know about th« axistance of the society, aether 
he had actually created i t or net, i t i s a fact that he was 
sheilding i t . I t was oelieved that by fomenting trouole in 
Syria be wanted to wrest i t from the ^ I t a n . Talcing th i s as 
granted the ^iultan recalled hin from Syria. I t became pretty 
certain that Mldhat had no connection with the society as i t 
remained in existance hven three or four years aftex his rec-
a l l . Then Abdul Hanid step, ed down on i t so heavily that t ie 
a c t i v i t i e s of the society were suspwnded. I t s records were 
destroyed and most of i t s active mee6ers emi rateo to Hgypt, 
their identy being never known to the govemiMnt or to the 
Public. AS George Antonuis writess 
There followed several dispatches sot&e from Beirut tfid 
others from Uamascus wtiich to ld the story as i t became 
knott^ to the Brit ish consular agents at the ticiie, with 
their conjuctures as to the oriain of the placards. The 
council general in Beirut h«d thought i t «ffli»hj»hil4 to 
transmit as enclosures to his despatches the text of the 
three diffrent placards in the A r ^ i c in which they 
were wri t ten — 
The f i r s t , which accompanies a despatch dated July 3, 
X860, i s the shortest and l eas t interest ing. Although 
i t i s the f i r s t to have been noticed by the (British 
Consulate, i t was obviously not the f i r s t placard issued 
ay the society, for i t refers to a previous appeal and 
seeks to assert the s incerity and the ^atrict lsa of i t s 
author's in con;>ectiun with tome former pronounj^cement• 
I t rebukes the ecple of yria for their lethargy under 
the tyranny of the Turks and for laeir habits of dls en-
sion, wiich make the a prey to European ambitions. I t 
s tresses the io^ortance of unity and i n c i t e s to sink 
t h ^ r 
1* Oi^.cit.. pp. 82-64. 
tii0lr dlff«r«nc«s and write against thair tyrants undar tha 
i n ^ i r a t i o n of their Arab prida. 
The sec&nu wtiich i s eneloaad in tha Sana dispatch i s 
mora specif ic in i t s Condennation of tha Turks. I t 
ind ic t s thafl) for thair fai lure to carry cut the rcfom 
^nich for twenty yaars-thet i s to say since X860| they 
had promised to introduce and brands then in incarrig i -
ble and hopeless. 
1. The tiiird wr>. ch i s described in a covering despatch 
ss hdve been posted up on the night of Oaceoaber 3i,1880t 
in the most ugni f i cant of the three, since i t s contains 
the f i r s t recorded statenant of an Arab po l i t i ca l pro ra-
mu; The aainpoints of that progranne waret 
i . The urant of independence of :>yria in unicn with 
the Lebanon. 
2. The recognition of Arabic as an o f t i c i a l language 
in the country. 
3. The rencval cf the censorship and other res tr ic t ions 
on the freedom of expression anc the diffusion of 
knowledge. 
4. The en^loyment of l oca l l y recruitment units en local 
n i l i t s r y service only. 
2 
To quote Antonius agains* 
t l i a . . . the soc ie ty ' s ^ c-als war&' the f i r s t trumpet call 
enittar: oy the infant Arab novenent. I t wa$ the ear l i e s t 
organization to be founded with a primarily po l i t i ca l 
object. I t i s the f i r s t statanent of pr l i t l ca l aims 
wnich thert^ i s any recors in the h is tc iy wf h^A rxvenent, 
and i t s merits attention as the only document of the 
peic^d that provides us with an authentic pictures of 
the nature ana the trends of Arab naticnalisn in i t s 
ear l i e s t days. 
. . . the Rx>vea«nt had kept within the narrow l i inits of 
i t s environnient. Tha novetnent had drivad i t s ideas fron 
the fani l iBl success of i t s environment, lono before i t 
took to borrowing the vestern nations cf po l i t i ca l evo-
lut ion. 
1. George Antonius, oa.cit^.. pp. 82-84. 
2. l a ^ . i p.85. 
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I t should t>9 noted th t the concept of a nation ^ d not 
penetrated to any depth In the Arab , rovlnces of the Cttonan 
aapite. I t was only during the l a s t quarter of the nineteen-
th century that the concept of nation made i t s inrocd Into 
the MO rid of ideas in Syria, to graft i f self on the indege-
nous tree of Axat> nationalism. Until t lan ihe moveenent ..hich 
had ^rung in a sa i l of i t s Q*f\ had derived i t s main susten-
ence from the earth in wdch i t had i t s roots. /Jid the pro* 
gr^ Rme placarded by the deirut society in 1880 has t h i s added 
historical value. 
The f i r s t plank in that prcgraimne aimed at the achieve-
ment of independence based upon the unity of Syria and the 
Lebanon. In the Beirut prograome the eaphasis put upon the 
con.iUnity of intere t s and the po l i t i ca l iuentity of the 
Lebanon with the rest of Syria* was only the natui^l re f lec-
t ion cf that revu£lsi&n a (^inst the aiftre ioea of partition 
and separatism, iiere, too i s the root of ttie idea of Arab 
unity wiuch, spreadin9 outward from Syria« has embraced the 
whole of the Arab nat ional is t vvurld and taken a place of the 
forefront of Arab aspirations. 
The ss ono point in the urogram<'tte i s the direct re f lec -
tion of the e. r l i e s t phases of the revival, nei-ely the reha-
b i l l^t ion of Axauic as a .nedium of l l t rary expression and 
the com.>aign against ignorance and fanaticism. From 1864, 
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onw rds, as th« policy of grec^ter central lzat i . n i s th« Ctton^an 
Hnplre developect, th« use of Turkish as the language cf govern* 
ment become niore widely itspcsed in Syi:ia« The higher o f f ic ia l 
vvere all Turks, snd the niajority of then to ta l l y unacquain-
ted with Ara->ic* The bussiness adednistration, in tine law 
courts and the principal nrabic services were cci.ducted in 
Turkish, and akncvdedge cf that l^guaae which had remained 
a foreign language espite centuries of Cttomao sovet^nty 
was new becomrn n.^  an indispensiu] e mecliufR for o f f i c ia l tra-
nsaction. 
The third point iu the programme was a protest a ainst 
the newly introduced practice of Retailing the Arab troops 
recruited in oyria tc fight the Arabs of the Yara^. The 
publicvtion of the prcgxamnrie wa£> the outwaid climax of 
the soc ie ty ' s a c t i v i t i e s . I t co^.tinoec to exis t over the 
riaxt thrae or four years. l!ie revoiutiunary ef lorts of the 
Jeirut secret society was the f i x t t of the ser ies of waves 
which were to follow each ether at irrigular intervals; anu 
tt^ te progratnme cf 18&0, i t s achievement remained tddoen in 
the secret recasses cf the national ccnciousnesb whose sign 
post i t became. 
,\ French writer who v i s i t e d Syria in 1880 has jiven a 
vivid discription of tne Syrian taovement and i t s po l i t i ca l 
firtasnt in tne folio^lng wordsi 
A spir i t of independence i s abroad. During oiy stay in 
Jeirut, yourg Moslicas were busy organizing soc ie t ies 
I . Gabriel Gharros, \/avaaQ en Svria. pp. 171-2, cited by 
George Antoniusiop. d t . . pp. 89-90. 
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to promote tho • s t jb l i shment ci s choo l s and ixsspitalt 
and to Mork for the reaetacration of the country. An 
intarflst ing feauture ox t>iis a c t i v i t y i s i t s freedom 
from a l l 4*d in t s of sectairlanism. The s o c i e t i e s which 
are b^Jing formed are designed to admit chr i s t i ans and 
e n l i s t t h e i r co'-operation in the national task. The 
Turks -/.«re l e f t out of account . . . 
In the interval* the Arab movem t^nt stood s t i l l sc far 
as i t s v i s i o l Q manifestat ions went, not only were the censor-
sliip, the sp ie s ^ d the unsoon t errors of the rlamidian regime 
during of i t s ardent s p i r i t s into vcur.tary; e x i l e I t was 
also de l imitated by a var laty ^f inf luence - »3nd no re p a r t i -
cu lar ly by three - of which AbckJl-Ha»nid's .xeb p o l i c y was 
the tnc st i n s i d i o u s . The Lther tvxo //ere cff sheets i>f the 
prc'.jxess of western eou(ration ana the growing powers of the 
c lergy . 
Yne ^rt. .xesd oi t«fest-rn educavloit iiad also a s t u l t i f y -
ing e f f o r t s - I t s develop.cnt in oyxia uuring the il&r.a.dian 
lei^n ..c,3 on a ...ucii longer SCCIQ than in tiie preceding 
generat ion, one 1 o to the esteol ishment of a r!et-yx;rk of 
schools and c o l l e g e s spread over the whule country. These 
we. e no longer s o l e l y dependent on French M i e r i c ^ and 
a r i t i s h enterprise of Russian I t a l i a n and Cierman (nissions 
had ccrne to adc t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s tv those of these forerunners. 
The prOv^ress of Western education was not an unmi>5od b l e s s i n g . 
Although i t l a i s e d the culturc^l st.>no«red to a l eL^t ive ly 
high lave l ^nd made y^^ i^ a in to the rtiost advanced portion of 
the Arab v>A)rlG, in c tner ways i t did haxm. I t bee. me an 
in.-txrunent of p o l i t i c e l penetrat ion as well as a v e n i c l e 
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of culture, end i t f a c i l i t a t ed and soma times deliberately 
encouraqed the ac iMslt ion of po l i t i ca l power by the clergy. 
One of the lasting c ntriouticns, which the development 
of \Mstem education in Syria made to the Arab national laove-
ment was that i t helped to transfer the leadership from chris-
t ian tc Muslim nands. So i t caiae to pass that the ideas which 
had or ig inal ly been sown by the Syrian cnris t i^ is were now 
roughly at tne term oi tiie century-finding en increasingly 
receptive sole ainong tbe MusliiJ-s. The unrest was nc longer 
confined to Syria* i t nad spread tc otner parts of the eastern 
KTab provinces. Although i t s inxiiediat-e causes were not every-
.here ident ical , i t s outward maJiifestations tended to -ne 
and-lioeration from Turkish rule. At a sliyrttly iatotf date, 
there arose other soc ie t i e s v\dth laoie clear pi^ctical aims, 
Xeine writesi 
Hence, also th^ r i se cf secret soc ie t i e s .vith the object 
cf /.orkinij for the introduction cf reforms in Arab coun-
t r i e s ano, in some extreme cases, for the .ntire liDera-
tion of t')e -'iraos from Turkish or any other alien domi-
nation. ^ , 
sanjok 
After MXabia, in the nineteenth century, i y as in Egypt 
and in tne vi layat of ^yria (including the4.cbanon) that 
anti Turkish ac,it„tlon developed and gatlmrtd strength. 
During the second half ol thdt century the strongest 
reaction to ocul Hamids ci-spotism and Turkish mis-govern-
ment came ii froo) the Syrian province of rds en. i r e . TwQ 
asserttions are, however, unauppcxted jy any soricut 
historical evidencei nar"ely{(a)that a small group of 
»eniii^ntfeped e l i t e* , thifough their secret sccisty in 
lieirut, spreau the seeds of AJ^ ab nationalism, and 
i , Z,N,Zeine, S3JJ^'I P«59 . 
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(b) t i idt th« f i r s t crgdOizad ttffcrts i n th« Arab n a t i o -
nal mo ement' can b« traced back tc the a c t i v i t i e s of 
tha t group. Unfcrtunataly tha whole tory has baen axa-
gijratao as for a t tha a)ncapt cf 'naticnalisiri* i s ccn-
cernad. 
I n tha 1&70* 6 tha davelopmant oi tha nat ional corcicus-
nets ano the cofsparative freedom of eapratsicn i n Egypt, lad 
to tha grovith cf s p e c i f i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l associations, at tha 
oagining of the ralgri of the Taufia* I t included «^dul.ah al 
Nadioi and cthar t^sl i in n a t i o n a l i s t s and a '-^oatoez cf iebanasa 
Chr is t ian j o u r n a l i s t s working i n tgypt* one of tham, Adib 
Ishaqt published tha Journal of society i i n t i l i t was supp-
ressed. I t had a programme of reforms ndnis ter ia l rcsponsi-
o i i i t y , ev^uality oafci.e the law* l i b e r t y of the px^ns etc*-* 
out cculd do notiiing e f f e c t i v e to carry i t out, and only 
retr i^aiHtid .in existance tor & yat or so. 
I n fcgypt tha e a r l i st p o l i t i c a l group with cal led i t s e l f 
was the Youmj fcuj^t l i k e tha Mtsra l -Fa ta t t As group al-t-azDal' 
Watafti. was also oppos<)d to the Khedive and lis n ln is te r 
Mustafa Hiyad but &ee:»s tc have had no connection v i t h the 
former. I t s Goembers were ex-mil i lsters, l i k e Mohammad Sharif 
Pasha, tr i is group becante connected with the o f f i c e r s who, 
unoer ur<^oi*s leadership and tooved by u i l i t a r y grievences, 
c a i - i e d cut a ccup d*etat ^gainst Taufiq and Jiis government. 
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on 9 Septsr^er 168X«^ Th« os tans ib le ai • s of t n i s hizb w«r« 
« con t i t a t i cna l and i^ar lanientary regiiio for tgjfpt and th« 
cessat ion of foreign Interferanc** 
These ainb wars tak^n over by 'Urabl , and >iis followers, 
when the coup-d 'e ta t having derrxinstrated t h e i r lOwer, they 
supli^entad sharif Pnsha and the other notables in p o l i t i c a l 
l eadersh ip , the^e o f f i ce r s Infact became a l -h izb al iVatan;^  
and vdth t h e i r defeat by the 3 r i t i » h axray in ld62, the par ty 
ceased to ex i s t . At a s l i j i t ly l a t e r uate there arose socie-
t i e s vith ore p r a c t i c . l aifiis: tor exaiaple the i i r s t feminist 
society dch ;i. s otcn founded in Beirut in Ifaci, or e d r l i e r , 
was Jatttmivvah bgkora smivvg ainc a number of aenevclunt as^o-
c id t i ons . Perhaps the l i t s t ot these was J and vv ah al Kharivva 
§X lalaii«iyya , founded in Alextndris in 187G ys an expression 
of the new public ccfisiousnes^ hich was appearing in Ec^ ypt 
in t h a t t i sp. I t s iam was to found n a i c n e l schools for boys 
tf^d y i r l s . A l a t e r organizat ion of t h i s society s-r;tted in 
1892, had nKjre success, the gre,it reformer of Egypt, Shai h 
Mohanunad ' /^duh*, wa^  the act ive member of i t . 
After tne J r i t i s h occupation ci cgy,it in ib^Z, Arab and 
Turkish na t iona l ! t s flocked to Cairo and Alexandria when they 
1. cncydcpeadia of Isia^^ (New ed->vol.lIl}, p . 5 l 3 . 
2. Hlzb moans promarily a *qroup, faction ot group of 
suppi.rters a man who share itis idess and are ready to deoendo^ 
him ^o t n i s in why the tetm h^s been odopted in n>od(-m A-t-a^ic 
wo laean ' p o l i t i c a l party*, the use of the word * higb* in the 
sense of a p o l i t i c a l par ty i s a rec nt one, dealiog from the 
begin ing of the twent ie th century and the re About, ;>ut t h i s 
modem usage was in a way a natural anu l i g i t i m a t e extention 
of the t r a o i t l v nal e^d classic-^l one. 
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enjoyeo great freedom for tiielr po l i t i ca l a c t i v i t i e s , oroetim*, 
soon after 1897, a po l i t i ca l sodevy founded by A^ab leaders 
in Egypt appeared under the naow of Jam'lyvah al-Snura a). 
y-^ hwani *t^ M CttoBitfi consultative society, * two cf it*" founders 
were Mchai^ a^ci Hasidd Heda and Hafiq al«-Azam. But ether natio-
nal ii' the Gt.onan era; i re took part in i t s orcjaidzetion end 
i t s a c t i v i t i e s such a!> lurkb, Arnini ans and circassi ns. The 
purpose of the organization was to oppose Abuul-riamid* s tyra-
nny ano unjust administration ano to try to cnanye the fom 
of ovc n ent into a repr< sentetiv* pari iemtntary systea, 
Aocul Haodd was n^^turally g^e^tely ptoturned by i t . He hiatlf 
confessed to one of his entourage that hen he f i r s t heaxed 
about that society, he could net s l e ^ for three nights until 
he ! famed, through scn-s cf his spin's i "> iigypt , who i t s 
founders were. He colled i t the »corruptin. society." 
T*^ * JiP'tyya ai-»h?yi? 9l V^hPtf^ ^^d several branches 
through out the et^ire. I t s oropaganda aaterial was printed 
in Araoic and Turkish. Some of i t used to be sent .dth passen-
gers and members cf the crew of Hussian ships to Turkish ports 
on the Black See, From there, seexet messengers would take 
chem and distribute them through out Antolia* 
The society dissolved its^elf soon after the ycung Turks 
came tc power in 1908. Zeine writes about the secret society, 
that according to Fa i s Nomar Pasha, the f i r s t revvluticnary 
ide..s which he ano a group cf l i s friend got while at the 
1. Z.N. Zeine., OD.cit.> .F.N-3, p.38. 
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Syrlan i r o t ^ s t a n t coll*g«, ware of French or ig in «nd Cdia« to 
them secre t ly tUxough 611 «8 H^.>«Iin.^ 
More faiocus although scarcely nic ^e sfxectlve was tha 
Jam'ivvah al*Uri*ah *1 »ithc|^a a secre t socie ty of .V.usilos 
pled'^e to wcrk. for the uni ty and xeioxm cf the Muslim Morldf 
through the r s to ra t i cn of a t rue I s l a r d c gcvr^rnment, end 
no^e spec i f i ca l l y fortha Xioeration cf cgypt from ^ r i t i s h 
c o n t r c l l . Ine i» ving s p i r i t s in t d s society were ^he fuStout 
p u b l i c i s t Jamal->alLdn al**Af9hard, anc ni^ . . isciple hx^ harmuad 
Abduh. I t was es tabl ished in the ^.eiiou axter the J r i t i s h 
occupation of ugypt; a»»a dpt-e-^rs to h^ve had brafiches in 
several ivuslim wcuntrics c^ rtd an uath i n i t i a t i o n . L i t t l e 
i s kncvvn i t s a c t i v i t i e s , ^nu ^.^ih^js in fac t i t did i.«^thing 
except to sponsor the ,-ablication cf -lie fat'sous per icdicnl f 
"flj^  urwah al Mith^^^" i s u:0 i a f a n s L>y Afqhrirl zur 'Abduh 
in lo.. • /vltlKugn tlii » 1 asteu for a few .xnths , nly i t had 
a fox-reacniny i ' .fluencc en e.du^ teo .Viuslir.s, ,.nd the leading 
a r t c ies .^re s t i l i lepxesented frci- tirrie t& ti.iie and widkly 
reaa. 
The e a r l i e s t p a i t i e s in the Araoic speaKing areas of the 
Cttoaan J^,^ire were in the i r or ig in anc chr.racter, somewhat 
i m i l . r tctrie e a r l i e s t Egy^pti «n ^ a r t l e s . They were group of 
yourg aen tcucned by European Influencee and iscontet vdlth 
1. Q i a o leb^elin was burn on htov, J, 1839 in tne v i l l age 
of iuq in Lebanon and died on Cc t .8 , 1889 in Egypt. He t^ jght 
French at the Syrian Pro ies tcn t college in Beirut frora 1871» 
1874. He Mas a •Varonite than he jo ined the freemasons. He 
had read Vcltai-K-!? and was very p r tg ress ive and r volut icnary 
in his i deas . 
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what tn«y considcroci t c b* th« construct ing and stagnant 
conol t lcns of th« anplrtt under Abdul iianid 11, In those 
years the re was l i t t l e scope for overet p o l i t i c a l action 
ncr vwere the genera l i ty of the subject, ouch inc l ined to 
question in es tabl ished and t r<d i t lond l order , juch groups 
were small cl ndest lne and ephemerrd* 
n group v»<icU -.orae in to oelng at I^atnascu^ in the ear ly 
y^dirs cf whe tv^u-ntietn ct^nvuxy. I I wao coavw^ad of young 
K'.usliias wix< w«X0 deci, l6i> cf uiiykh Idn i r al<-Ja2a*iri, t h i s 
group i s kuan ai» n«irak.aa-L>in.a.»hral i>^uliirA> and i t included 
^haykl) Jamal al iAn al <o,oSir.d, AJU al .ia>iio al .:o irdVi, Shuk-
r i a l MGali, j>ii<i al neainau al Shahbandar, i''ohc!!n..30 .Mjrd * ^ l i , 
Fdiis a3. Btujri ..nd Solim al J a z a ' i r l , S me ot tho yo nger 
meiriaors of tho c i rc l " //on* tc Is tanbul in about 19'^ 5^ and in 
1006 fe'uhibudin al Khatib end iv^  s fri="d Arlf ?1 islkaoi founded 
t jeu: o zecic't s t c i s t y , .i,i..T^YY h^ ^} MaH d^j|y and i t consisted 
e n t i r e l y of a small group cf ycuncj educated Uamascuse «id 
i n s p i t e of i t s founuavlon &t I s tanbul , Damascus was i t s centre . 
•ifter the ycung Turk r^vc lu t i n, the ,)arty ^ p l i a d for persd-
ssion tc functicn cpenly, md i n t e r e s t e d its 'r ' lf for a few 
years tnere af ter spreading kncwdedge of Arao his tory and 
iHXdoic l i tk^ra t . re anc in providing a loc^^l forum for d i scuss -
ing such p o l i t i c a l I s iue as i t .as saf" to r a i se publ ic ly . 
1. -He was inspoctox of uciucatic.n in Damascus v i l ayat 
and win l i v e in Damascus from I8d0 tc 1905. 
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.^ncth•r group, wnich came .nto existence it the b«ginlng 
of twent ie th century, I t I s the ^eaauc de La i;3arte£ Arabf. 
founded by Najid Azuri, who apart from the French r e t i r e d 
o f f i c i a l E. Jung, cc l labcra ted with hiin, and whether he was 
the agent of one of more feuropean power, i s •bscuxe, 
Tne pxoq£air>.ue of rAs league wcS che creat ion of an Arab 
emjiii.^ exts idlnc] ov-rr Mesopotamia, Araoia an--^  zhe 3 event, and 
the cxeaticn cf 3. i r i t a l Hcpui^lic. iiut the ler?guo seems to 
ha/e )i.-.n cf l i t le con e.u ncc SHI. ~C h^ve 3unk into oosec-
u r i t y .v:.en nis p o l i t i c 1, L*independence Axabfec. cf f^  ch 
eiqht^on'inenjoers c n.e cut in lf,0:>--if ij6 erased puoli Cdtion, 
9 
Jreck; «?ir;c-n. c i x t e s : " 
in l(>0# the oyrian N^^ib Auzuri, hao fouiiued ^n Arab 
p a t r i o t i c society with the object cf Qsiniu Fiance 's 
as3«6tui>c^ the (.ewtcfii'iij < t <hi' Mdi provinces from 
the Lit 0(R«n empire, with the in t rcouct ion of ti'^ e cons-
t i t u t i o n , t)ousvcr, le regarued h is goal as a t ta ined 
end c«aSc^d publ ica t icn of nis news paper* L'lncj^eoend^^e 
/ .^ip-je £ou..d*d by aiiH together vdth the forwtsr French 
o lonkl o f f i c i a l 5.Jung, 
I t was only af ter the res to ra t ion of the Ottoman 
cons t i tu t ion in 19O8, th^it laany AXdh p a r t i e s w&ro fcrtaed, and 
i , A Syrian Chr is t ian , who had studied in Pa r i s and than 
bee.! e an o f t i c i a l in the Jertjsalefr. v l l ' r . y i t ; th ib ^cst he l e f t 
i n apparently suspedous circumstances and he was condemned 
to dtv'th in Absentia by an Cttonan c u r t Ir. I9t'4 fcr t reason-
able^ a c t i v i t i e s in Pa r i s • 
2. H i ^ ^ r v wi tne Xsla- ic i^eoule. (sngland, 1949), p .481. 
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t^ ecaffie qui te ac t ive for a t i ^ e otcause of the v i c i s sa l t ude t 
of the Qttcaian parliaoientry regime of 1908-14, these p a r t i e s 
could not function as normal parliani«ntry p a r t i e s , nor cculd 
they ovdng to the s t a t e of society than obtainirig espire to 
e n l i s t mats support. Taey were small ephemeral act ions and 
such e the r s as ^ao access tc buropean ideas , i t i s comtoonly 
agreea, th,.t the f i r s t of these groupings was jaa*|vyi||l^ j ] , -
I k h a ' a l ATAbl. foutjded jy xhe be-.^aacsne ohafl^ ali..uayyed and 
o ther mainly syilait «^fticials ^nu nctaules in Is tanbul in 
IS 03.^ 
Jiene gives a brief uescri{^tion aucut the soc i e t i e s 
wucn wa:. xcuitoec ottot ihe revolut icn of 190&* He wrltest 
As a r e s u l t of young Turks Turklfying programr'te, the 
,rob 1' cdt?rij c-jjcctive of j a inmg fu l l nat ional inder 
pendence received a grea t s t iwu l s t wnich consolidated 
i t . AS far as Arao p o l i t i c a l nat ionalism i s concerned 
i t Can safely be asser ted t h t i t was the natiunal and 
r ac i a l . o l i c i - s uf --le y.,.arK> lurict. w.ii cf* ldii..co i - s 
flaa^es. Natiuna i bt ft<£nti>:i^nts a-i-e dc^igercus to play 
with in a KAilti-nat-ionai crnpi e. A l i d i ^ n a i i i t .evival 
i s bouno to ijen^rate sc rouch r i v c l l y ^lo aittdgot I sm 
as tc led enevitaoly tu ta^j break up o^ &ucti an era|.)ire. 
ii'^nce, when the young Turks u.a69 thit n a t i c n a l i s t ideal 
. nd tiieij: Xocial super io r i ty the bas is oi a r.ew Turkey, 
c u l t u r a l l y an6 i o l i t i c a l l y united anc strong, the Arab 
leauars react ion was ti^ tnfenk .)r*^cisely ir. ihe san^e 
terms atn-u'i' the future of the /\ ab lancs . As a r e s u l t , 
a nui.Der uf A: a^ scci<-ties and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ««ere 
f.rmed oy enli ^ntjiened and educ. ted young vrebs to 
extend tne Arab cause ana protec t the Arab r i g h t s , 
asron,^  wi^ch weia the follcvdng, es tabl ished a i t e r 1908. 
1. A r«», c r t in tne Ar«b dul e t in (24 May, It 18) records 
t h a t the group catna into J«ring as a consequence tha t 1908, 
par l ia . .3nt rafualng to accent. Yusuf Sliittan a rrsen^er of 
Sangliaai tfid Sh'afiq f\l K'Suayyed as meB»b*r of Qamascus. the QTO(/I 
seems to hav* been cdssolved in 1909. 
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Ja««lvviih al-Xkha » ^ Axabi» al»Uthn.iml. (Tne society 
of Arab Ottoman brotherhood) was founded «^th great fanfate 
. t a bic. meeting cf the Arab cowounity in Constantinople 
at.ended by the uU.i-. l e .ders . As a gesture cf good vdll, 
the CU.P. decided to end the f i f teen years exi le of ^^us«in 
Ion All and S<KI6 him to Arabia* to take u the post of grant 
srtarif of Mecca which had Just fal len vacant. They disregarded 
the advice of Abdul Haraid I I . who watned against to move,^ 
2. Al-f^Ptas^fl tl'MiHilk (the Arab l i t w a r y club). The 
Arab o f f i c i a l s deputies and l i terary in Istanbul formed an 
estansioly purely l i t erary d u j estdblishec it. the summer 
of 1909* widch was soon able to set up braOShet in bgypt and 
Syria ano in particular endiavored to arouse Arab national 
feeling in the youth, the society dessolved in March 1915. 
3. Ai, rii^vyah al Uahtanivvah (the Qahtani society) led 
by Major Ariz Al Misri, ( la ter inspector general of tsgyptian 
amy and a ncted Egypti^ nat iona l i s t ) . I t s aim unite the 
Ottoman Arab provinces in a single Kingdom idthin the entire, 
which Mould than bec^e a Tu:tco-Arab cfeial monarchy along the 
l i n e s of the Austrv fiingarian empire. 
In February 1914, anti-Turkish feel ing among the Arabs 
hardened with the arrest and t r a i l of the founder of 
al-Uahtaniyya» M^jor Aziz al-Masxi. He had replaced 
al uahtaniya with a new society, al Ahd ( the convenant) 
1, Peter Mansfield, smx^Jk** P- ISO* 
2. drockleman, c , i t f i j j ^ . , p. 481. 
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wnich o?nsis ted «lfflost e n t i r « l y of army ofiicers, ydth 
a prepandarence of I r a k i s who were the most nui.exous 
Arab element in the Ottoman amy. when i t becdoie Icnown 
that al-*Ad$ri h«6 t»een socre t ly condemned tc death on 
a trunped-up charge of having planned to s e l l cyren,:ica 
tc the I t a l i a n s , the e was a publ ic out cry, which wat 
reinforced by a strung B r i t i s h p r e t e s t , eventual ly a l -
.^^ asri was r&l eased anc allowed t c return tc Egypt. ^ 
Apart frci< tkese t^roups i^tilch functioned publ ic ly , a 
nuia;jex ct secret (roupin^ in Is tanbul , a secret group composed 
cf o f f i c e r s anc univwrsity students ir.ainly fror Syria, (al-Ja»* 
iyvah al uahtanivvah). the roup was oedicatec l^ tiie encour* 
egemeiit vf A cb nat icnel is i f , and a^ c^ng i t s ,-ro'iinent ine8A)er8 
vjerc the tv* cf i ic'^rc, 'Aialn L i t f i* AoAz and ->alin« al J a i e * i r i , 
nephev vf Shaykh Ta'ur, *Abdal-Karim al Khalil one Arlf al 
c^hikabJ, all of vh*.;, vere .ix^cuted f cr treason oy the Ot-onans 
in 1915-16.^ 
4 . r^rtlm, ^.l-n^ntifif (-*i^ qi^-ri f U q ) . I t «as founded by 
stui.fei.ts xTi Istonoul ii >>.?!. tsnaer, 1912, but se-itis tc have 
uet»n ..wX^ e,,a«.aoxoi iiiui) IK,3W djio ti\£Z<j i .> no recc iJ of any 
a c t i v i t y fox ^ .ich i t «vds r e s o n s i b l e , 
b» A1-*Ahu ( viia cwvenent), th«i p^jric.; jet.veen t^ wo I t a l i a n 
ccnquobt of Tripol i , ai'id tlM outijr?ak oi the f i r s t v«rld war 
sa-. also tht> crcviticii of a secret s o c i e t y named *Jaai'iyvat 
ai-M(Jd, • wiicii was fcunued on 2B Cct. I'yl3 oy dinbashi *Azii 
al->. i iri ,* ii.-, i..di.'ijt.ro were army ofi ict^rs and inci uded ^alim 
dl J a z i r i , huxl al Said, Yasin al-^iashi^d, tiis urother Taha, 
Jamal al-^adfai TehJ.n Al l , kawhid Mukhlis , Amin Lut f i , 
1. Peter Mansfield, Qt>. c i t . . ,-p. i«3-lf>4, 
2. JEncvclopeadia of Islflfn. New e d i t i o n . , p. 51b. 
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All Jawdat al Ayyubl, and Abdul, an al Dulayu^i. I t s o f f i c i a l 
proqxam vias to p r o a c t e autonomy for t h e Axaolc speaking coun-
t r i e s cf t he Cttoman eap lxe , ano to t r a n s f o m t h e an I r a I n t o 
a dual tDcnarchy on t h e l i n o s of t h e Austro Hungarian sRonarchy 
bu t th« f a c t , i t wds a s e c r e t s o c i e t y ccnposed of army o f f l c r s 
r aady to t a k e a c t i o n i n support of t h a i r ^>ol i t ical vi . ivs ano 
t h a t rneny of the memoers d e s e r t e u from t h e Lttoman ar»y before 
and dur ing t h e l i r s t ivo.ld war a t l e a s t ?s impor tan t as t h e 
t imes of t le o f i i c i a l pT grafame. 
As r-^gaids */^-*An^d. oldi^ay N . r i s h e r w r i t e s : 
j p a r t i a l i y i n r e p l y , an /grab, Jt^ajcx Aziz All al-'<>a6rl 
of -he t t oraan gsn xal s t a f f , i n i t i a t e d a new s o c i e t y 
CoXiec Che cove.-ent (Al-Ahd) t h e covenant was comprisedi 
e x c l u s i v e l y of ..rjay of- f ic- i ' j d.d be aiae for the n d l i t a r y , 
wnat £he ytmnu Arab s o c i a t y WAS fox c i v i l i a n s , i t had 
many memoers i n B e i r u t , t)aiiia&cu&, and Jf-ghdad. Perhaps 
g e t U n g wind ot tiio act ion* young Turks* i^ t t iout warning 
a r r e s t e d Aziz All i n 1914, He had oeen a ppmb&r of urton 
anc p r o g r e s s i n ^aelonice of-fore 1908 dnd hac vvcn htnour 
dur-ng then^rch c r I^taftbul in ic*c>^  , d u n r T i l l l t a r y 
iidsaion X.L Y«sii.«n in. i v i u , ano turi(<g the »i,ar j o a i n s t 
I t a l y Jr Lioya, c.'i.^ra''-d d t h t e a s o ? in li^ya Aziz All 
was t i i s c , touno g u i l t y , and condeooied to uOath. ? u b l i c 
cpenion he «f..r so iri<5iun-?nt e s p e e J l l y In ^f^yft't, t h a t 
t •© B r i t i s h pxota&teo t o t h e P o x t e . rte was par oned 
ana s a i l d for Egypt <s& a p u b l i c h»?ro, t o le<=:d hi in 
covenant irom Ca i ro . Any hope t h a t i n Your<g Turk* 1 evad-
e r s had for Ar.^b Coropfaration and p a r t i c i p a t i o n was 
now c<.n>,.letely liispciilfeo. wttoi.iafd^iu and i-^ lsld».isf(i 
f o r Arab l e a c e r s d i s i n t e g r a t e o in t h e face of an i-^i&ti 
onvicu:» and unoe r s t j uoab l e u r i f t t o l u r ^ i s a n a - i o n a -
oisin s i v/i i n a c t i o n s of ra^c<«l 'Young T u r k s ' . 1 
ixz u s u a l , a w e l t e r of s o c i e t i e s ^nd p a r t i e s sprung i n t o 
beino ne t on ly a?Tonq tho Arabs i n I s t a n b u l >ut al sc- among t 
t h e s e i n uaraascus, d e t r u t , Baghdad, Aloppe and c thv r ^rao 
1. Mi dole feast «A Hls toyy. (London, 196C)), p . 3 5 5 . 
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c i t i « 8 . An l a c r t a n t one was th« ' L i t e r a r y d u ^ * , w i c h a lnos t 
ItBiti^diately tock the p l a c e of t h e Gttonian Aiab F a t e r n l t y i n 
Is tanDul« Tne &uece»sor o i s a ^ w a d p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i o s , i t 
posed as a m9ntiu(^ p l a c e , l i u x a r v , and d u b hcu&cfcr /Uabs, 
l i v i n g ht vhe c o i t a l and a cen t ra f(,r Arab t r a v e l e r s . wltMin 
a s l ic r t t ime i t s menbersnip readifid thousanos ond 3r.:nch«s 
were locatfec thrcu . lic.ut 3 y r l e and I raq* This «as o, en t e s t i -
mony of j i c i s t r Areb c o a c U u i n e s j ; but i t ,. »s, i rapcss ib le to 
yiiivtitit Ax.Hjbt s e t t i n g r e l a x e d i n t h e duo ncuse, f ron d i scu* 
ssiiicj - u J i t i . j i p a l c s c p a / as i t ertair-.-x; tc. t h e Arab s i t u « -
«icn, 
t-ii\i.,^.hei x.K x t a n t icujj .,hlcn was loriuea oy i saroni te 
ncteiulsb in Cai ro , ii> Nowcr..jir K. 9 , ..ai» a ^ - i t t l h a o -ol Lubf^ani* 
I t .•;«* icui.oai: j y Iiiitcnv.\^r "Ansun, /\r.tun al Ja. i y y a t and 
iv3uc civi-i"-. i c f t i . t h : v»ar, i t rcc;: i.w coH'tist indenanding 
be t s r corn.-ret / f d c i l i t i c r . , i . t h ln tnr ai! i i s t o r ount l«btfK)n« 
/J . - t . . ! : . ; '-ht ^uf: r-^ -gt j t . i i t ^ ciS.,t;< „>]). i nc r eay ing t h e mifflb«r 
of i t s .T.emoers end wiaesing i t s jovvtrs, and cUnexing t h e Blka, 
T r i p o l i t c L^eirut t c mount Ltoanon, t o fcrrc x-hat c^n» t o b« 
knovjti under t h e f rench nu^nd ^ta a« the grsnt" Li ?an. This l a s t 
p o i n t cacie to f irm t. ie main is .u i^ ivz lUch zhi: I t t l h a d MOrkad 
at tier t he cu t uxeak cf war, v4ien t h e p a r t i t i o n cf t h e Ottoman 
eaij.>ire, bee : « a p c s f i b i l i t y the I t t i h^c, tho pre?id*?nt of 
wrdch froT ivlV vjz: August!Adib, l e s t I t s r a i s o n d e t r e vdth 
t h e French cccupdt icn of t h e Lebanon, 
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The oo t t famous of the A r ^ n a t i o n a l i s t sodet ic^s of l a t e 
Ottoman days was cal led ^1 Jaia'lvvjih •1-Arabivvah ai Fata t . 
8im,jly known as al Fetat , i t was an u l t r e secret Arab society, 
was iourided in Pe r i s on November 1*-, 1909 by a group of A r ^ 
s tudents who were thanpur^incj tbf ' i r hiqher s tudies in t h a t 
c i t y , flKiSt act ive amung wbon was Taufiq al-Nature^. I t i s 
s ign i f i can t triat t|dLs socie ty was an e n t i r e l y Muslim nr-b 
o rgan iza t ion . I t was f i r s t c t l ad "Jandyyeh 9I N^tiqln bi«l 
Dad.-^ inuch was l a t e r , in I91i , c h ^ ;ed to "Al-Jarg wah a^-
/^rabivvah al- t^atat*. the purpose of VHG socioty *vas, p o l i t i e a -
l ly» to cQtain A-ab independence vitn in tn»i fr.?nf» ork of 
2 
a r^cioi Cttotuan Lj[i,d e. 
Al-Fatat , f.undedln Pa r i s if. j 11 uy bsv-a A-ab ftudents, 
i t s Center l a t e r nioved to Uemascus, and i t s tflesribershlp 
row to tv'O nundr^c. I t pi r-yet an important par t In the 
^^•cxtc. iuf.uiit i t ions J-tvr.fin t.: ' sOoXit riusain end the 
i r i l i s h a . ' tnor i t i es in C?iro, -.vr' ch Ice to the r v o l t 
iii /uauici o di-'St iuiKish ru le ; the ou i i -a ry leader of 
t n . r . ' v t l t , iiu ^ i"s rcrs J,alj.5l (.33'^i"5s0.f 3 --'Wier of 
v.."in bv,cJi^ 'wy. 
/ d - f g t a t , the roott importtfit of dll these s o c i e t i e s , 
ain.td cu au., liitti 5rKje end^nt fui tn*? nxao prov^nc s . l t moved 
i t s i.t^ at. (,u,.rtf I- tier t^tis tc •-'ttrut, anu then to Damscus, 
waere ii& t.ic(liUfrri ni r^f-ialy increaseo. 
pec - r Hafisfiec^' . / r i tes aUcut t i d s scci**ty: 
en tht J r t i t i tiv-- cf a l ^ i a t a t tne acvtuhnt then snifted 
to P a r i s . ,^here an r^-b national corqrcs<5 as held in 
Jxsna i<^13. lav ateatit.^ was h a s t i l y oxgafiizec, and then 
over'Aii€*lm5n*) in,?jority of the delegates cats© frcis Syria 
lu^^>£I tn«?i> tn« ctn-er AXeO provinces of tne e n t i r e . 
Howevt'x, i t aroused considerable i n t e r e s t anr caused. 
1. L i t e r a l l y "the s<uci«ty of t . r s e .voc ust t.ia l a t t e r 
Ded. L,,d i s tne f i f t een th l e t t e r cf the Arauic Alphaoet, the 
Arabs cl alHj tn t n & i«; t er i s found only ir. t h e i r Alphabet 
and tnat i s correct proncunci . t icn i& the t e s t of a '.tue 
Aroo. Z.N./.eine, o p . c i t . , F.No., p .S4. 
2* iJStk^'t p*95. 
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the C.U.F. to fet, jrUvlng failftd to ptrsuadt th« Fr«)eh 
to ban tH9 ccn9r«t3», t h * CU«P. tt»nt tt i«lx s«cr«tary to 
Pdxls tc »nt«r in to n«9ot ia t lonf vdtn i t s leactvrt. 
The «rgur&«nt th<«t t l ^ y r«ach«d, appe«rad to ^« an 1B^>OI> 
t a n t v i c t o r y for th« AT ads. A r ^ i e 0«cau* th« stodlua of 
Ins t ruc t ! ' i. i n p3ia«.y and s«cof)dary schools, an6 tho 
I s i p o r t ^ V i K i l n t sixut l o c a l i z i n g l i l l i t a r y sorvicts was 
concodod* Thero «v«r« to bo f l v a Arab govamors ganaral 
and Bdniaum of throa Ar«b ainlstar^> I n tho Ottoman govar-
nmant.1 
Gaorga Antonlus, doscrlOas t h i s s o c i a t y t ' 
A l -Fata t * was founoad I n Par is I n I 9 1 i t no other s o d a t y 
had p l a y d as o a t a n l n i n g a par t i n tha history of tha 
nat ional n^vwaant. I t s foundors wara savan yu\«ng Arabs, 
a l l of thaw Mo a l l - s , ««ho tiff pursuing th^ i r hignar s tu-
dies i n thft Franch c ^ ^ i t a l , i t s foundation rac^-lls that 
of tha Boirut sacret scclsty of 1875, tha cbjacts of tha 
society laara tc Mcrk for tha indapandanco of tha Arab 
(x^untrias, and t h ^ r 11 Deration from Turkish or ^ y other 
a l l ana domination, 
For tna f i r s t two years, i t s centre was p a r i s , and I t s 
mambarshlp renalnso s n a i l i t h a n , as i t s fou« dars gradua* 
ted and returned to t h e i r VOOMS, i t was s d f t a d to <^^-
rut i n 1913 and i n the fol lowing ye«r to Uvnaseus, l i t 
uaabersnip cose toover 200, a l l c f wiion were Mosllns, 
b«it wi th a fsw ehristi«sns". 
He wr i tes 4 ^ u t tne other sociat ias aisot^ 
A l - ^ n a t a d a al-Adabl A l -Fa ta t , al-Ahd, al-v.aatanlyya. 
Th'^se four soc ie t ies , ^ d a fow othe is cf lesser lc^>or-
t.r>nca, were i n existancs whm\ a i resh wave cf the Arab 
ooveaent brokeout a a inst tha l^rk lsh resistiaNrkce. I t 
Ofsqign i n i ie i rut i n the l a s t days of 1913 but the sano 
t i o e carr ieo i t to Par is wnere an Ar.a^ congress was 
iield six OKinths l a t e r . 
I n a e i r u t , the i n i t i a t i v e was taken by an i n f l u e n c i a l 
ocdy who for od tnenselvas into a ooomttae of r e f c m 
eooi^osed of eighty s ix ewi^ers of a l l creeds a^d drew 
u a scheoM for tne grant of have ru le to the Ardib pro -
vinces of the Ottoman eo^ire. The scheoa f i t t e d In to 
the frutae work of ex is t ing adoilnlstz^tive divis ions 
and f u l l y leeognixed Turkish domination, aut i t orew a 
d s t l n c t i o n ii^etween questions of an is iperlal charac-
t e r such as foreign a f f a i r s , def« ic», Tgwik Coflin«ini-> 
l,OD.cit^«. p. 134. 
3* i M ^ * t P*t 112-113. 
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cat ions and nat ional finances, and questions of a 
regional character , such as provincial administra-
t i c n and revenues and local se rv ices . An»ng other 
,«#«forms and the scheme provided for the recognition 
of Axaoic as the o f f i c i a l lanvjua<^e and for i t s odopt-
icn on parliament on a footing of equal i ty with Turkish, 
Aoout the middle of February 1913, the committee of 
rf^form gave puol ic ly to t h e t r scheme. Public meetinfs 
v/ere held in O^nascus, Aleppo, Acre, Nablus, Baghdad 
and Basra, and telegrams acclaifidng the scheme as ^eing 
thfj expression of -he universal oes i re in the Arab pro-
vinces Proud in to ccnr tant inople . The C.U.P. in pcwer, 
hos t i l e to the thought of decentra l i at ion, took measures 
tc p r s s s the ay i t a t ion . 
ihe Ax&o^ :a:3n w d i e , coiitit.ueu iu ^rcaa ior reforms. 
Indeed the keynote of the /ear iVi3 wVi&taer i; Constantinople 
itfefcli or iu the iMob provii.ces oi the LttorAan em. 3 re was the 
vtiord Mblaa ' refoia . Consequently, cri Oecember 21, 1912, a 
gruup of reformers cirew up a statement containing ioiuteci . 
i tems wi icfwrixitf v>..-c.i i.nc'iuded the ,:jppoir.'tei/iciit of foxeign 
;_:vl viTv ciui cxpexts if- V r io i ' . cv .rfimoi.t (..Or^artinents, chosen 
fioiii wurupijn coij..irits idL^h no po l ic ico i i n t e r e s t s in the 
Lttoiuaf' iii.iyixe, 
/Jaf«,.r»g tae soc i e t i e s , one .ost im or tan t society Hizb ^ 1 -
Lamark.aziv/an al loar ivvh al • uthmani" , ( the ottoman adraini-
s t r . t i v e cit cen t ra l i s ation pa r ty ) . This party establ ished in 
Cdiro in 1912, by experienced Arab puol ic f iqures . The objec-
t i v e s were to mobilize Arab public opinion ano impress upon 
the 'yojng Tur^s* ttie need to organize tne new Ottoman Empire 
on a iaore federal uatds . I t s Headquarters re.uained sef ly in 
• • } • > ^ i.,Jt 
2. Z,N. Zeine, . o p . c i t . . p , 101. 
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Cairo, although brdnches w«r« locatad In Iraq and byrla 
ano closa contact was malntainad vdth th« l i terary club in 
Istanbul. Tha dacentralizaticn party strassad party nachlnary 
and an;}oyad p o l i t i c k success during tha la t half of 1912» 
^han the Union and progres party was out of power. 
M Ht,ifr ilrfciffiaKiaAYYa a!k'%4§^Yr§ §k Mt^apf. which 
wai toundad TrTCalroln Daceaber 19I2f and which as i t s 
names shovvad, was dedicated to the acNLevement of adsii-
n l s t re t ive decentralization and provincial self govem-
ment In the Ottoman hnplra* 
The founders were again Syrian* the onst proBdne^r^BonQ 
theta belnq Moham a^nd Rashid tUda, Baflq al-Azaoi, Shlbll 
Shumyll^ Iskendar Amn*eln and Muhabbal Bin al Katib. The 
progrifoe of the party was obviously <3»kln to the Iceas 
of Prince ^bah al oln and the (tirrlyet M1*1 t i l a f fer» 
f a s l , in Xstanoul, w Ich was opposed to the conalttee of 
union and progress* I t may well be that tha a c t i v i t i e s 
of rtizb al*laner*Kazlya BT^ to be understood not so much 
injterffls of Istanbul p o l i t i c s which eventually led to the 
coraplete heg^niony of the Contmittee of union and progress, 
Atjaln their prograavae ctfinot explain* rather contradict 
their a t t l v i t i e s at the beginning of the 1914<-18 war, 
whm they seen to have organized spying In Syria and 
M^sopotl^ amia on behalf of tne "^rltlsh authorities In 
Egypt. 2 
Antonlus give^ the folloMing account auou% the Decen-
tra l lzat lon partyi** 
The other Important Public Society was founded in Cairo 
towards the end of 1912, vdth the name of 'the Cttomtfi 
Decentralization. Party. I t s objects were two foldi to 
liBpress upon the rulers of Turkey tha need for decentra* 
llzikig the actalnlstratlon of the enplre; to mobilize 
Arab opinion in support of Decentralization. I t s founders 
were, for the laost part, men of experl«)ce and good stan-
ding, who had made their maz^  in Public l i f e . The statu* 
tea of the ioc lety provided for ^ e l i ^ r a t e party 
machine. The control was vgfsted in a 
1. ^dney K. Fisher., aSjJ^'t P« t 354. 
2. ,{iy^gYgl9tf»ft4fl gf If^m** N^ w "^diticn, v o l . I I I . , p.5l5 
3. fiBxiiii., pp. 99-100. 
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coi«&itt«9 of tM«nty iMffibers domiciled in Egypt 
tfid a smallar txdcutlv* body of six of th«ir own 
number, azdnchst w«r« astablifthed In »vtry toirfi 
of Syria and s a a l l * ' agftncies in a number of other 
l o c d l i t i e s and the c losest contact was maintained 
bet.et^n i t s branches and other Arab po l i t i ca l atso* 
ciat ions in Syria and Iraqt «nd of course with a}-> 
Muntada al*Adabi in Constantinople in abcut a y«ar, 
the contiHittee of the uecentralization party had become 
the best-organized and nx>st authoritative ^ o k e s n ^ 
of the Arab aspirations. 
The ii^^rtcince of ti i is society in the history of the 
Arab novement was that i t provided i t s f i r s t essay 
in the science of organixed effort . The batt le between 
the CU.P. with their policy of verlf icaUon at the 
centre ano the Arabs clafliouring for home rule had 
gone on far three years in that in te m i t t ^ t dispersed 
way wfilch i s charecterist ic of Arab war fare; and the 
foundation of the society was an attemot at co*ordina-> 
ting fhe eftorts into one, concerted and contincus 
pressure. 
H 
AHAB REVOLT 
I t i s a w«ll-knoMn fact t^at Sultan Abdul Ha(&ld»was v\ 
astute rular. Ha a&filoyad a vast number of agents and spies* 
He vigoriously followed the policy of * divide and rule* and 
useu <dl possiale meiAs to invi te tribal and fandly feuds 
^vhereas possiole to k i l l his j^pponents. Sometimes his 
49>posents were so popular and prcioir.ent th,)t he was forced 
to adopt other mettiods. In t i i s case he issued then with af\ 
invi tat ion, whxch they could hardly refuse, to come and 
se t t lo in Constantinople where they woulo be treated with 
Honour and difference but kept under the close wat h of the 
sultan* s spies. 
^iistoricall y the met iiftooitant of these consul sory 
uests of the sultan ivdS Husain b.Ali, Thirty seventh in 
l ine of o.'scent fron. the prophet Mch<^ nin.ad anc a memoer cf 
the Hashidte fsinily of Arabia, vv!iich by long tradition had 
provided the holder of the prestigious o f f ice of brand Sharif 
of Mecca. In Ic 2 i^sain, at th ;^ age of thirtynnine, arrived 
in the Capital i t h ds wife and four young sons. Ali, Abdullah, 
Faisal and laid, to stay for f i f teen years in a v i l l a on the 
Sespnorus. Dignitieo and iti^erious, i f 3«netitne rdlful amti 
patulant, Husdildt decaifie a faatiliar figuxe in Constantinople 
where he aad a lax^e c i rc le of admirers, iiib sons were 
eoucated and grew to manhood durring th is period. 
1. Peter Mansfieol, o o . c i t . . p. 177 
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3y th« spiring c€ 1914, tn« young Turks were daeply 
regretting tn«ir rejection of Aodul Hainid*s advice In 
having sent Husain b. *Ali aack tc Arabia as Grand Sharif 
of Mecca* Jut tney were forc<co to adudt there a9 no easy 
solution. A ioere threat to remove him from off ice had been 
enough to provide a violent readfen in the ^ftJaz• 
F^rsiost among the Arab deputies in tne Ottoman parl ia-
raent was tne Amir * Abdul) ah, the second son of tne Sharif 
of Mecca. Outside the Bejaz, 'Aodullah made the fu l l e s t use 
of his apportunities as the Sharif's »>n and the right hand 
man of riis father. He vt>as bent upon a t ra i l of strength vdth 
the Tur.^. rkisain looked towards the Britain as >4.8 a l ly . 
In the f i r s t week of February 1914 he sent * Abdullah to 
Cairo tc call upon Lord Kitchener. In the presence of Sir 
Hi»n«ld storrs,^he gave kitchener on account of the stiained 
relation oetween the Turkish autixirities and th« sbarif. 
rie knew that theC'tj'Phed secretly decided to depose hit 
fatner, afxd he gave kitchener to understand that i f they 
carried out thoir intention there would probably be a revolt 
in the Hijaz. At that time Kitchener did not otake any 
comudttHtint against the Turks bee«ut.>e Britain was s t i l } Conuni* 
3 
t ted tc the policy of preservation of the Ottonan tiopire. 
1. Kitchener was the Brit ish Auent in Egypt., 
2. Mr.(Mow s i r } . / Ficnald Stores, the oriental secretary 
ot the Brit ish Agency. 
3. George Antonlus, o p . c i t . . p. 128. 
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The ia^ortance of those ccnversati< nslay in th i s , 
that *Andr * Abdullah's approaches h^pened to synchronise 
vidth certain speculdtions which wore agetatir^ kitch«ar*s 
own mind. Different solutions .resented themselves tc 
his ndnd. cne was that a i>ortion cf soutnem Syriat might 
in course of time be detached from the tttonan Empire 
and made to cotue under British protection, so that the 
bel t of British influence might stretch uninterruptedly 
iron Egypt to the Persian Gulf. Another /^as thet the 
Arab provinc&s cf the Cttoroan kii^ ;}ire inight be encouraged 
to form tnemselves into an autoncmous state or chain of 
state friendly %> Gro^t Britain gn6 extanding all the way 
frora the Mediierr^ean sea board in the .vest to the 
Persian frontier in the East - • In other Mords he had 
come oy an independent process of reasoning, to a point 
where he was envisaging the very p o s ^ o i l i t i e s that 
vi9iB being ccntenplated by Arab national ist leaders; 
and i t was ot a time when his »dnd wasousy with these 
speculations that the Aadr* Abdullah, himself a member 
of one of the secret soc i t i e s and an tnthiisiastic be l i e -
ver in the fruittulness of an Anglo-Arab understanding. 
Nevertheless, th i s f i r s t encounter between kitchener and 
the young Hashmlte prince was to have inipcrtant con equences. 
I t led to the creation of three Arab iionarchies, with British 
support, ein6 a po l i t i ca l association betiveen England and the 
Arabs, ..hich, although impemanent and in u.any ways disast -
rous, was to dominate the affairs of west Asia for a genera-
t ion. 
The f i r s t KitchMier-*Abcbillah meeting had no practical 
resul ts , but i t established a rapport between the two man. 
Prior to the out break of the 4far, German influence in the 
Ottoman eo^i e had grown out of all proportion to the in f lu -
ence of the other powers. I t was especial ly noticeable in 
the irilitary f i e ld . In 1914 Ottoman army w. s trained and 
instructed by a mission ci fouxty t^o Geri^ dn Officers under 
the Comi and cf General Litnon von Sanders. In August, j.914 
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thtt whol* situation changed, a r i i i s h diplomdcy had fai led 
and Turkey si^neo a secrat treaty of al l iance with Garnaany. 
At the out bradk of the f i r s t Wbrld ^ax on August 2, 
1914 the Ottoman bsg^irs was ruled by Sultan t^ ohasuitad V over 
seventy years of age and in frai l health the Sultan, v.ho 
had oeen held prisoner in a Palace in Constantinople for 
thirty two years oy I s predecesoor, *Addul*Han)id IX, and 
who had been placed on the throne by the ycui.g Turks, was 
a notoinal ruler «.nly. The Ottoman hii^}ixe was now ef fect ive ly 
ruled by a trtUmverate of young Turks bnvei, Talat and Jaiaal. 
But Enver Pasha was the dominei t figure of the three ana he 
was inclined to.ards Germany. Even the G-and Vizir, the 
Egyptian Prince Syed.Halim, was rK* more than a convenient 
front for these three leaders. Biver was minister cf war, 
and chief of the General staff, but his influence for excee-
oed these functions and eventually be everged as a real master 
of Turkey at v^ ax. 
Ottoman envolvement in world war 1, and on the side 
of the central pow-ers, certainly was not inevitable . Dappitt 
1. The t iaaty continued to oe kept secret in the hopa 
of securing dalievery of the battleships from drltain, with 
s t r i c t press censarship being astablishod to make sure i t 
would not leak out. J .S . Show, o o . c i t . . p. 113. 
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the newdy •merging patr iot ic f«rvour, nost u.ea&ttrs of th« cabinet 
anci the CU.P. nany Turkish paoplt, xaaliz«d that tha Enpira was 
haruly in a stata tc support any oiajor a i l i t a r y efforts , so seen 
after tha series of war, that had decimated i t s population and 
finances as well as i t s arsed forces. Although Germany had baen 
building up the army, i t did not real ly expect the forte to be 
aole to maice a slynlficant military contriouticn even i i i t 
decided to join the Central powers. Modernization ha only 
begun. Sesides, most mend^ers, of the C.U.P, amd the aass of 
the Public s t i l l f e l t closer to Britan and France than to 
Garmai^ y. 
The rapio adoption oy the traditional nations of the 
non huropean world of tha European ideological and ins t i tu* 
tional con4>lex known as national ise tias been a doadnant 
charactexistic of the t entieth century. The prevailing 
Interest in nationalism also attracted tha A a^b vuorld. The 
revolt of June 1916 raised by Andr Husain b, All of Mecca was 
«n event of greatest influence in directing non-Arab attention 
to the problena of the Arabs. Aithin the Arab \vorld tha Arab 
revolt i s viewd as the culmination of the Arab awakening 
which had long since be^i davaloping, a'wng tha Arab paoplat. 
The revolt which began on Monciayi the 3th of June 1916 
wcis on a mich smaller libafee than wha^ the o^arif vented. He 
rose in revolt only when the government refused to guarantee 
1« liZiSkf P* 310. 
2. isarnest C.Dawn, From Ottoaanisw to Arabisa i London, 1973) 
' • » 1. 
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his Amir ate in ta« Hejaz. The sh.irif 's negotiations with th« 
Jr i t i sh unck/uotcdly r^s«ci prospects of something fcr gr«at«r 
thcH an autonofflc^us Amirete of Macca. Husain beyan his revolt 
against th« Cttomtft gcvernraent aftar having reachad agreement 
^dth rapresentotiveh of ATcb national ist soc ie t i e s . Husaiil^ s 
son Abdullah becsffie convened of the necessi ty of araieu revolt 
well before his father^ Uid^ ^ d by July 1914, had become a 
convert to Arab nativ nalisii). These tv«o persons played an 
important role in the revolt.'*-
The Arab revolt was s t ra t ig i ca l ly important to Britain. 
I t imnobilized some 30,Q00 Turkish troops alon^ the railway 
frodi Afiuaen to Madina, prevented tna Turko->uerm^ fore s in 
2 
Syria from linking jp with the Turkish garxison in Yaman. 
The Sharif of Mecca was one of the most previleged and 
respected grandees of the Ottoman umpire, sirtce the middle 
of the tenth century Mecca and the tiejaz had aewn autoncmcus 
uncer the rule of the Amir of Mecca* always cne of the 
numerous Sharif's or discendants of Mohani-ad, native of tha 
Hajaz. By the Ottoman perioo i«ecca and f<^ adina v^ere cf great 
id^oxtance to the powerful Musliid sultans, as the Mughals, 
the Manlutvs and the Ottomtfis, who sought to oolsterlbair 
posit ions by patronising Islam in order to validate thalr 
assumption of the honorofics and prerogatives of the c a l i -
phate. 
1. Ii2id*» P* ^T» 
2. Peter Mansfield, aiUSiX'* P« 197. 
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Tn« AfBirs of Mecca« honoured and powerful though th«y 
were^ could nsver assert axnplete Ind^Midence. Although the 
Cttonan lacked the capaiaility of subjugating the Hejaz to 
direct rule, they could on no occaesicn eo^loy Irres i s table 
pressure or force, .hen the Aadrate of Mecca became vacant 
in the suflttner of 1906 the rivalry between the t.«o Meecsn 
d a n s for the of f ice became entagled with the rivalry oet-
ween the victorious contaittee of Union tfid Progress and the 
'Old Turks*. All Haider who had long been at oust i,\ith sultan 
Abd al-Hanid, sought to obtain the appointment. According 
to Abdullah, the young Turks tr ied tc name H.i Haioer to the 
posit ion, dut the urand vizlrr, Kafldl Pasha» eno -he sultan 
were workim* to l imit the influence cf the cooHuittee for 
t h i s purpose they appointed Husain as ABiir of Mecca* 
Husain*s policy as Amir followeu the general l ines of 
Abd ai-Hi«8>id*s meinorandum. HB stressed his loyalty to the 
Ottoman iultan and the rel igious sentiment wuich oounc the 
Hejaz to the aspire and provided the basis for the prestige 
and autncrity of the Amir of Mecca* Cn the other ha()o, he 
res isted the efforts of the unionist governoMnt and i t s 
adherents in the HeJaz to encroch on the >^ cial ^>osition 
of the Amir. Despite his d i f f i c u l t i e s v^th the Unionists 
from 1908 to 1911. Husain showed hif.self to be t^aloyal subject 
1. Kamest C.qa»f», o p . c i t . . p* 4 
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of the suited. In 1911 th« Arab deputes in ttut Otcoman 
parliadaent sent a l e t tar to him through * Abdul) ah requesting 
hi» to lead the Arabs in throvdn^ off the Turkish yoke. The 
la t t er includ d a declaration signed by th ir ty f ive Arab 
deputies. However, Husain did not respond to the Arab ca l l . 
Despite Hussain* s loyalty tc the Ottoman Caliphate, the 
campaign in *Asir to the f i r s t real ly serious c r i s i s in the 
relat ions oetween Husain and the government. 
The end of the tialkan v/ars saw the Turks intensifying 
the policy of centralization. Tholr attempt to strengthen 
tneir control over the 14ejaz, created a cr i s i s w^dch cnused 
the Hashisites tc consider the ioea of revolution ^ d which 
perhaps turned the eyes of Arao nat ional is ts once incre towards 
Mecca. Towards the end of 1913, Wahib bey was appointed vail 
no Coiwnonder of troops, and arrived in the Hejaz, vvlth the 
insttuct ions to extend the railroad froa Medina to Mecca and 
to apply the law of Vilayats. But he was opposed by the people 
of Hejaz. After the arrival of -ahij, ADdullah l e f t the riejaz 
for constantincple to at .end the coniaing session of the 
Ottoman parliament. In Constantinople, Aodullah tried to win 
the Cabinet to d s father's policy. Tal t opened a conV^ersation 
v4.th nin, with the st, tenant th t the crises in the ttejaz 
had been set t led, and t h ^ acquired, what*happened*? Abttellah 
replied that the government wished to end the special position 
of the .Hejaz and ake i t an Ottoman vi layet , out the sharif 
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was dfliter^nined to maintain everything as i t was. 
In the mttantima, certain events were leading 'Abdullah 
to consicer the possit>ility that ttrltish might enable hit 
fath er to res i s t the Turks. £arly in Feb. 1914, during the 
height of the er ia i s in the riejaz, the Kitchner called on 
* Abdullah, ^ c said thrt he lad knowledge that the Turks..-^ 
had strengthened their forces in the Hejaz and Intended to 
introduce founcaAiental changes there. In the a>ui&e of 
discuss i .n , Kitchener sked to r^bdullah what his father 
would do in case the Turks sticuld try to remove h.n. 
Aodullah re ieplied, oy asking whetner great drltan would aid 
Husein i t he resisted the Turks. Kitcivier's reply wes that 
dritan cculo net interfei^. in the internal aft airs cf Turkey, 
vtdth wiiich Great Sritain had friendly relat ions. 'Abdullah 
Chen u>roceedeo to constantlncple and discussed the question 
cf the tiejaz with the Gr^d v iz i r , Talat and Anwer. *Abdulla^> 
returned to Hejaz* out before reacning Kejaz he stopped in 
Cairo and met kitchener, who sent Honald storrs the oriental 
secretary, to sc- him. During his conteersatxon v^bdullah 
c'Sked storvfis. .vhether Great Britain ight not send a dozen 
or a half cozen tnacnine guns to t-iusain for use a ainst 
the Turks. Storrs replied thet i s governtdent coulo not 
supply sxmsfcr use against a friendly povver.^ 
A.^dullah*s knowledge tc the Arab national ist (novement 
also helped convince nim tn.-t a revolt could be successful. 
i * i^L^'t P* 20. 
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Cn the othei ha^  d, the c r i s i s of early 1( 14 se ms tv have 
it%.ellQd 'Aadullah to Jcl(> the nat ional ist .ovenent. In 
April, 1914, *Ao6ullah returned to the Hejaz to present 
to his father the govt nnient* s offer and, in adcitlcn, hit 
own lans ana arguments for a revolutionary solution, 'to 
argued that the iiejaz, witn the aid of the Arabs ui i t s in 
the Lttoman forces in byria and Iraq and with tiritish diplo-
metic support, could ootain independerice from the Turks, 
^ d toen \fctk for the formation of a large independent 
Arab ta^e. S e d f l c a l l y , 'Abdullah proposed to seiz the 
pilyiritns, Faisal and All, (Hu5ain*s other sons) op osed 
the sctieme on t;ie ^und th t Turkey v.as too strong, out 
the plan was f inal ly adopted, provisionally, with action 
oeing set lor stwetiHte in 1915. 
MI the same tia.e Husain also delayed and m«de o-n^ironiite 
proposals to tne Turks. After *^dullah informed him of 
Talats* '^xoposels, the Mdr of uiecca vdred l is reply to 
t:)e govemniw-t, 1 
lAy son . . . has transmitted to me the iiigh proposals 
and decisions front the Grand v i z i r in the matter of 
the exteiiticn of tne t-iejaz Hallroad to Mecca.There 
I s nothing wiich requires that ccns.. derations be 
given to wnat my share Mill oe, while 1 enjoy t i e 
prosperity of the caliphate, nt the f i r s t apportu-
nity , 1 snail seno by my son . . . my impressions 
regarding possible means of attaining t n i s tiigh 
goal udt <out afiecting the means of livelihooci 
of t.ie tr ioes and of the pcpulation of the Islafldc 
hoi / lands. 
1. 1 bi d.. )>. 22. 
-119-
rti« co<un«ncinyi of .t r in 1914, anu the suusequent 
Cttomsn involvement put asloe the questions of the provin-
cial law in the a«jaz ^ d the extension of the railroad 
^ d created a new dilemma iot Husain and his sons, tn the 
Haslmite side» since the *mV' changeo the ccnoitions upon 
wdch the tentaviely planneo revolt had oeen predicted, 
the provincial plan -^ as dropped. Cn the other hand, the 
Ottoman oovemment be9an to press Husain to s:>p,.>crt the 
empire's vtat e f forts . ..'hen r^bdullah retumea from c<.nstan-> 
tincj^le and informed his father of the ta lks , the la ter 
wrote l e t t e r tc the sultan in wiiich he aovised hia a a i n s t 
entering trie war. 
The policy adopt«o by the sharif cf Mecca cDixed 6delf 
with requests for c i l i t^ay and economic arrangements 
designed to leouce the per i l s of the situation. In August 
the Autir wrote to the Giand viz ir that i f tne etnpire enters 
tne fi&r, i t would be necessary to provision at once the 
Yemen, *A8ir and Hejazi with three years of stores of supp-
l i e s , arsis and equipment for iaoth regular troops and vdbn* 
teers . After Turkey entered the MaT, liusain wired the gove n-
ment rev^uest.ng hin to -end the nuney to the yeraen, Asir 
Vi6 Hejaz. The Aiaix receive^ nothing supplies nor money, 
and on repeateu requests, received the same tredtment* 
The Turkish order for general {sooillzation was is-^ued 
on the 2nd of August and under cover of i t , the ccur.tiies 
surrounding i:igypt, Syria was the nost important from the 
military point of view. <vtien Turkey entered the ,,ait these 
groups were formed into an army. Known as the fourth army, 
with head quarters at Damascus. Cn the western frontier of 
^Q/P^ there wa . th t unknown quantity, the i'anusi chief, 
who, altiicugh he ^^rofossed friendship for c^reat Britain, was 
Known to be in close relations .dth tne Turks and vdth the 
sultan of Uarfar. H was s t i l l engager in i K s t i t i t l e s vith 
the I ta l ians . Turkii^ h emissaiies were scon despatched to 
him ano vdth c t f ers of money and h&ncurs, and with injut* 
t ions frutn the caliph to preach iihad in tiis n?roe, ^ 
Amcnr^  the statesmen of the £ntent2B^, no t.ne perhaps 
ffiore al ive to the dangers of the position in the Arab world 
tnan kitchen r* ^ d i t tnust remain to nis credit and that 
of Konald storrs thr<t tttey were the f i r s t to thl tc of meet-
ing toem by the bold stroke of on al l iance with Mecca. The 
grand sh,.rif*s ^ositicn was indeed uni<ue, as regards both 
the rrdlitary contribution he could make and the po l i t i ca l 
value of his intervention. Other chiefs in Axa~)ia there were, 
ascendency over their own foil ewers was aosolute and whose 
military resc^urces were at l a s t as promising as these of 
the rlejaz. But from the Bitente point of view, Husain had 
two outstanding as .e t s wtUch w«re not possesi^ed by any of 
his neighbv^urs. One was the strategic advantage of hi^ 
i . vieorge Antonius, o o . c i t . . p. 137. 
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posit ion at tne c«ntrtt of th« Tuiklsh power in the peninsu-
1 , The other was the Inoooparable asset ot his prestige 
In tne iAus in world, which drlved I t s force from his descent 
as well aft from his o f f i ce . 
Husaln,meanwhile , had been apnroached by dr l t i sh 
aut.K)rltles, On October, 17,1914, 'Abdullah received « 
la t ter troic stcrrs containing a rr«ssage from kitchener 
inquiring v^thex Husain wcul6 support Turkey or great 
Britain in case Turkey should enter the war on the 8ld«o 
of beruiany. *Abdullah*s reply on behalf of his father, wiilch 
reached Cairo on Cctcber 30, was friendly though ceuticus, 
Iw indicated that the Afliir would not wi l l ingly support the 
Turks. At the beglnlng of Ncvember, imtuvolately after Turkey's 
entry into the war, storrs sent another l e t t e r to 'Abdullah 
containing a :iiessaye from Kltchenex. The message :tated that 
If the Sharif tfid the 'Arab nations aided Great Britain In 
the war, dritain would ieo>gnlze and support the independence 
of the Aoilrdte of the Arabs and would guarantee Araol^ 
dgalnst intervention ano the Arabs against external agress-
ion. Britain ucreover expressed approval of the assumption 
of the callpnate by an Arab. The Sharif's reply, w ich 
reached Cairo on ueomber loth, was that he would not adept 
policy host i le to Great Britain, out that because of 
his positxcn in Islam he could raot break Immediately wdth 
>& 
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Turkiiy. During tlM f i r s t half of X9X5 contacts between tht 
ar l t i sh authorities in tgyi^t and the Amir of Mecca continued • 
principal ly through the intenaediary of s i r AegSnalo «dngate, 
who was the Governor General of Sudan. 
Throughout the entire period Husain expressed no change 
2 
in his posit ion, but in i^pril itflngate infonsed hin thati 
HLs aaj«^ty*s (iovernnwit would make i t an essential 
conciticn in the peace terms that the Aiaoian i^enin^ 
sula and i t s Moh s^madan Holy Places should remain in 
the hands of an independent soverMgn state . I t was 
ia^ossible to define at the moment how much territo^ry 
should be included in t h i s s tate . 
In January 1915 Sharif Husain recsiveci an emissary 
from Fauzi al-ciakri who wes the member of al^Fatat. his 
elder brother Naseu was a mei^ei of iil »Fetat. but before 
receiving his orders to proceed to Meccst ^ ^** taken into 
the soc iety 's secret, ana given a message to take to the 
Sharif. 
The mes age wriich was oral* was to t h i s effectt 
The nat ional ist la»69z% in Syria and XraQt including, 
seni. r Ar b o f f i c i e r s in the Turkish army, favoured 
1* l^kA*f P* 26. 
2. Earnest C.Dawn, o ^ . c i t . . pp. 26-27. 
3 . This young member had recently oeen mobilized for 
service in the Turkish army and had obtained, ostensibly 1 
as the perc^is i te cf a younger son, a decorative post in 
the ocdy guard of the Gr$nO Sharif. 
4 . George Antonius, o o . c i t . . p. 149. 
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a revolt for the attainment of Arab ind^endencef 
would the Sharif consent to lead i t , and i f so, 
vvould he receive a deputation in Mecca or delegate 
^>ersons of trust to concert neasures. 
^auzi arrived in Mecca in the la s t week of January 
and told Husain, the nat ional is t plans, and ;.)rcposed that 
iijsain assume the leadership of the Arab revolt. I t would 
l ike the form of a mutiny by the Arab troops stationed in 
Syriat whose of f icers were oMmezs of M-Ahd. 
In January, 1915 an accident revealed to liusain how 
far tne young Turiis had been prepared to go in order to 
unseat nics. At Janial's resuest, Husain had ordeied an 
Axao force undex the command of Ali, to acconv.any t.te 
Turkish force, which Wahio uvas ccving north to join in 
the attack on the Juez Caoal* i'hen .^ ahik set out in Jai'Uary 
*Alt» ecccmpanied hiir. from Mecca to K a^dinai but in the la t ter 
pl^ce Ali declared th t iiusain had ordered hi.-n to leeve to 
.V, hib here. In the meantime a secret (x>rrespondance between 
Wahib end Constantinople v^nich dealt vith plans to depose 
Husain and i s faniily and to end the special position of 
the riejaz becaiAe known. Only the out break of '^at had 
interfereu vdth the execution of these plans. Tnerefore, 
Ali stopK'ed at Madina atui then went to Mecca* where he 
showed the documents to lii s father. This unexpectedly 
1, tamest C.Dawn., o p . c i t . . p.27. 
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ciiscovered proof of Unionist intentions, co Inc^  wh«n i t 
did, placed Hu&ain in a quandary. Ha petsonsl ly was s t i l l 
inclined towards seeking a acluticn within ttie Ottom^ 
ijBpixe, Faisal were therefore, charged nith presenting 
the dccuB>ents to the brand \^zir and seeking redress for 
the plot . At the same time, Faisal was to make contacts vvith 
the ndt icnai i s ts in byria surveying the situaticn in order 
to estim.te the extert to wtdch a zevolutlon was i i e ly 
and what prepar^ions had been m de for such a revolution. 
Faisal arrived in Damascus on tt^ arch 26, 19lA, and 
b&canie a guest of At. Pasha al-iiekzi. He received the 
leaders cf al-^atat and ^-Ahd. and discuss d the po l i t i ca l 
i tuat lon vdth ima^, Faisal tcuac the situation in Syria 
oinfused. Many persons begced Faisal to accept the leader-
ship of the revolt, which would oegin socn, end three of 
the r<^gular divisions in ^yria were ready to revolt. 3ut 
puolic cpenion was divided, and in military c irc les the 
opinion that Germany would soon with the \iax prev^led. 
At soon as i t had became evident that Turkey uas 
joining the war, 'Aziz *Ali had, from his retirement in 
^Qyp^ f ^^t^^ a peremptory nessage to the leading menbers 
of fll-rtntfi 
X. Ibid, p , . 2B. 
-125-
That tncy were on no account to be teitipted into 
hast l le ecticn against Turkey, as the fact of hex 
becoskino bell igerent would expose her Arab provinces 
tc foreign conquesttiuntil soiae ef fect ive guarantee 
against huropean d signs, were obtained, i t was their 
outy to stand oy Turkey. 1 
Cn tnoix sloe dno acting independently, the lead rs 
of al-i-citat heu passed their xesoJtion, which in ,uj&tance 
saio tne sanse thing. The two societicfS vteie new cf cnr roind, 
and th( ir taain concern uc'c><ne to explore the changes of their 
seiziruj the opportunity provided uy the .ai to contain valid 
guarantees of iuture Arab independence. They knew nctning 
at xhe time of Kitchener's correspond, ance «tith the shcrif. 
Faisal st yed in constantinoi^le l e s s them one n»Lnth, 
and r ocheo Janascus on iy^ ay 23, there he found that the 
weraoers of al-Fat^tf and al-Ah^ ftao dra n up a pi ^ in :ii» 
abscente. They had craven up a protocol ^ definding he condi-
t ions cn which the A a^b leaoers would be prepared to co-ope-
rate with great Britain against Turkey, and they planned 
that Faisal should take th i s protocol to Mecca ena ask his 
father to find out wheth< r i t was ac eptable to the 3r i t i sh 
governMent as a basis for conc@rted action. 
Cn June 20, Faisal arrived in Mecca, reported to his 
fcthcr, and declared hi se l f to be a co; vort to revolution. 
1. George Antonius, o o . c i t . . p. 135. 
2. The Damascus protocol i s extienely iR^portant text , 
not only for ;.hat i t contains, out also on account ct the 
use tc wnich i t was afterwards put oy the Sharif Husain 
when in the following July, he resuned his negotiations 
with Great dritein. George Antonius, o u . c i t . . p. 15$. 
Sharlf and tils sens went on to his summer residence at 
al-Talft to discuss the -o l i cy . Faisal gave advice to his 
father to eel ay the r v o l t , until the Brit ish had been 
properly approached and until Turkey had either suftered 
crippling losses or an al l ied landing had been mace at 
Alexcndia . 3ut *Aadul]ah was i^ ot sat isf ied witn Faisal 
and adviced l^s father tcr . ro d ai > 1 ng tne rt^volt. * Abdullah 
se ms to h a e Cdr:ied the day with th i s argua>entsi 
The wax cculc nave crdy one consei-.uence for the 
,\x usj They ,«culd remain in the nocse of th« ' j tv .m-
ment whether the Turks and Germany or the French 
enc 3r i t i sh vionj i t was nccets.ry to proclaim the 
/^ab aiov.aent ano (titus) escdh'e through war the 
necessary consequence of susmlssicn to al l ien rule. 
In the internal, tne i r i t i s h authorities in cqypt 
hao. ta.en what :.!easux©s they coul . to parry the threat of 
Jihdida At f i r s t the rincipal actors had oeen thcocriantal 
secretary at the Brit ish agency (»Vjr.ion^ld Storrs) and 
the diractor of military intelli^gence in Cairo (Leiut. 
Col.G. F.Clyton). In January 1915, Sir Hcnery Lci6»hon tot k 
up ids duties as rdgh con^ssioner for E ypt ano the Sud^ 
storrs and Clyton opened conversations with the Arab leaders 
domiciled in Egy^t. Cn« of the f i r s t to t^ e approached was 
*Aziz 'Ali , and with him Sayyid Hashid Hida, a far fuiaed 
theologian, politidban ano rHformvr, and a fervent exponent 
I . uarnest c. La.yn, o o . c i t . . p.31 
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of MusIlra-AXob regeneration. Th« conversations turned on 
the ttieaie of Kitchen rs message to t.ie sharif n^d were 
directed to persuedittg the Arabs that their future lay 
in an al l iance ^ith hngland.*^ 
Those leaders who, l ike Aziz Ali and Has'iic Hlds, had 
enough influence to ^ y their followers in Syria ^^ d Iraq, 
asked for guarantees of /Xab independence as an indispen-
saole condition of a call to Arab revolt. And no one ir> 
Egypt was in a position to give the required assurance. The 
conversations were not without result , they opened the eyes 
of the Jr i t i sh authoi i t ies to the f a t i i l t f ^ o f trying to win 
over the Arabs without def inite pledges tc then, t^dngate 
had come to the s.tne conclusion that i t called for the 
inmediate is^ue of a proclanation vyith def inite assurance 
relating to the future of Arabia and the fate of the Cali-
phate. This declaration was intended to al lay ^n l lm fears 
rather tnan staisfy Arab po l i t i ca l aspiration. The declara-
tion was published early in June. 
In auttioiislnq th i s declaration, the i3ritish gcvem-
taent were, in one direction, going a step osyoung kitchener's 
assurance^} of 31 st of October 1914. He had proraised the 
snaxif th^it Kraoia woulo be defended against external aggre-
S:>ion. Jut on the essential Arab demand that d s guarantee 
1. George Antordus, Ou.ci t . . p. 159. 
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shculo apply to syr la and l iaQ as u«ll as to the Pardnsula. 
Tha govarniaant cf Inoia lied ba«n ac t ive in tha ir f i e l d , 
and looked upon the Araoian Peitinsula as t h e i r specia l 
concern. I t was u e l d that had directad the operat ions for 
the occupation of i a s r a i n November 1914. Towards the end 
of the year. Captain J.iwShakaspeare, of the Indian P o l i -
t i c a l c^rvice, had be«n delegated on a m s s i o n to Ibn Sa'ud* 
to t ry and secure his co-Oe«ration in the cause of the A l l i e s . 
Ion oa'ud was not so wel l -d isposed to^vards the Turks as to 
need reducing and j u s t as Turkey wa;> ant ir iny tne wai, a 
me.Tijer c f al-Ahd. depyted by ' i i i i z •Ali had, arrived at 
t i i s capi ta l to s o l i c i t h i s support for the n a t i o n a l i s t Ceuse 
and had been vvell rece ived . At the same t i .6, h i s r c l e , as 
the chief of the .i/ahhabis, placed him in s d e l i c a t e pos i t i on 
i n regard tc the holy iA/ar, Ion S^'ud h, d warmly sup..orted 
the Sharif i n ;iis absenti tn from enoorsing the c a l l to 
^^had.-*-
An agreement was also ccnduced by tne govervimer.t of 
Iniua, vlth the l o r i s l in Apxil . LiKe the sujse>..uent t rea ty 
with Ion o£*uc, t d b agreement l e l e a t e o to locdl i n t e r e s t s 
only; anc neitrter inttvuciient contained any reference to the 
broad i s s u e s of the Arub national oiovetncnt. Nor was I d r l s l 
1. Ibii^.. p. I 6 i . 
dny (Dortt than Ibn Sa*ud, In a position to make a substantial 
m i l i a r y or aicral contribution to tha a^r against Turkayt 
.Men th« Sharif rasumad nago^i.tions in July I9i->, tha War 
was going none to well far the Al l i es in the Near bast. The 
operations in Galipoii hdd oeen eostly and unsuccessful. 
The Turkish attack on cgypt had been repulsed, jut the threat 
remained and was int obi l iz iny large fcrces, the oultan of 
Darfar, s t i l l in close touch v\ith the Sanusi, was shewing 
signs of responding to che call of Jihadr The Turkish 
forces in the Yauien h^o invaded the Aden proteclorate and 
driving ox'i the ar i t i sh troops sent to protect Lahaj , the 
i r i t i i ih forces in the /urab world were every where on the 
defensive, "*• 
I t was while he was t lus pre-occupied with the dangers 
s t i l l threatening Egypt that slr.Hanery McMohan received a 
note from Sh rif t^sain. 
The Hashlmites having decided to undertake the revolt , 
tkjsain in i t i a t ed negotiations with Great Jritain uy sending 
an unsigned and undated Ipttar to dir ;1enery McMahon, British 
riigh Comirds&ioner at Cairo, wnich was sent with a l e t t a r 
!• l3Xd,. jj. 16 -> 
oated July 14, 1915 fro in Abdullah to Storrs. In the •xchangt 
of l « t t«rs vkiiich followed during the second half of 1913* 
Husain auuyht to ojtain Brit ish recognition of an Aiab State 
within the frontier specified by tha Damascus protocol, /^hile 
Mdtohan sought to exclude certain areas in wdch Ureat Britain 
and France had special in teres t s . 3y the end of 1915 agree-> 
laent had been reached on al l points except certain vaguely 
defined terx i tor ies in Syria wherein French interes t s were 
involved.^ In a l e t t e r d ted Janu. ry 1, 1916, Husain stated 
to Mc*>ahan th.-t ttie v i l l a y e t s of Aleppo and tJeirut cculd not 
b9 excluded tr*->;. the AXob Kinqdom, jut that in orcer not to 
dayi^e the al l iance betvt^en lirltain and F tince, he would 
postpone his demands until the end of the tVar. Husain* s 
negotiations vdth the Britibh then wer«2 not entirely s a t i s -
factory in aciiieving acceptance of AraO terri torial damands. 
Tne negotiations between Britain and the sharit ^ d 
the agreement vidch led to d s final decision to rai4e the 
flag *f revclt are embodied in an exchange oi l e t t e r s betwsen 
July 191b and January 1916 known as«the Husain-Mcf'.ahon 
corres.oncence". ^ r Henery McMahon, the Brit ish high 
CO mm! 5 si oner in Bgypt, was delegated to act in t h i s natter 
on the Brit ish govt-mcient* s betftHf* 
1. <:arnest C.Dav l^, aHa-^^'t P* 31* 
2, Peter Mansfield, ou.ct-t.,. p.191. 
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This corx«spond«nc« I t of cardial importance be^ausa 
i t oec ta<i the suuseq-iont oasis cf Ar^ b^ nat ional ist c^arg«?s 
against i r i t a i n cf oetrayal. Tna dabiite ccnt iuad to t h i s 
day and will navar be resolvad bacausa of the deliberately 
iapr«cise s ty le in which the l e t t a r s were vvrittent^ 
McMahon*8 l e t t e r s resenble a Gilbert and suliivan 
pazody of the Arabian Mohts. One beganjTo the exce-
l l e n t and well ocrn sayyed, the descendant of Sharif 's , 
the crovtftof the proud, scicn of Moh«aunad*s Tree tfid 
branch of che quralshite TriMik, him ot the Exalted 
presence and of the lo f ty rank, Sayyed son of Sayyad, 
Sharif son of sharif. the venerable, ttonoured Sayyed, 
o is excellency the sharif Husain lord of the many. 
Amir of Mecca the Blessed the lodestar of the fa i th -
ful ^ o the Cynesure of all devout deli ever s, uiay his 
illessing desc«>nd a^ >on the people in their ^lultituc'es. 
In d s f i r s t l e t t e r Husain proposed that dritain should 
support the creation of an area of Arab independence eirJsrac-
ing the whole of wnat i s now ^yria, Leoancn, Jordan, Iraq. 
ama the an l ire Aiauian Peninsula with the exception cf Aden 
- a Brit ish Colony adndnistered the government of ik>abay. 
In the ensuing correspondence the sharif maoa a few reluctant 
and ia^recise concessions. He accepted that Britain's trea-
t i e s with certain Arabiai< cniefs should remain and agreed 
to the temporary Brit ish military occupation of M^sopotaftiia* 
Sharif Husaifi did not conci.ent on the claim in McMahaa* t 
second l e t t e r that i2 
1. George Antonius, o . c i t , . p. 167 (F.N,) 
2. Peter Wansfield, c p . c i t . . p. 192. 
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Xt I s uno«r»tood that th^ Arabs have «lr«ady d«cid«d 
to seek th« o-unsels ^no aovic^ of Gr««t aritain • x -
d u s i v a l y and that such Europtan advisers and o f f i -
c i a l s as may b« needed to establish sound system of 
aci.dnlstr;jti^n shall be ar i t i sh . 
The must crucial passag«^ of all was the Brit ish asser* 
t lcn thut the .'orticns of Syria lying to the Mest of the 
d i s t r i c t s of Bamascus, tkitas^ Hama and Almpim, Cannot be 
said to oe purely Arab, and tRust on th.-jt account be ajqpec-
ted irom the proposed delinutaticn, Husain neither acc^ted 
nor - ejected th is claim but pc s toned his ded-sion. The 
question therefore, renains open Jether the land of Palestine 
(vAlch was not an Ottoman aoiainistrative teflon but a widely 
acc^ted geographical entity) was or was (K>t intended to be 
included in the area of Axab Ind^endence* Brit ish apologists 
have had to use dubious l o y i f to d a i a that Palestine lay 
to the West of Damascus. T^y have a stronger case in asser-
ting that the sharif always understood th„t the Al l i e s never 
intended Palestine to oe ^ independent Arab State.''' 
The Brit ish government's contention i s that Pale t ine 
waft excluded by implication, when s ir Henery McMahon not i -
f ied the Sharif that portions of Syria lying to the i/tost of 
the d i s t r i c t s of Damascus, i^nes, H a^a and /Meppo were to be 
excluded from the a^ea of Ar^ ind^endence. The controversy 
l*JLi2LSi«t P* 193< 
1& s t i l l goln^ en, and ^odnant p«>pl« in an out of gcvazn* 
n«nt circles ar« s t i l l loudly tttaintaining in SCBM Cc:»s«t, 
quit* 9«nuinly • that Pal«stin« was in fact axsludad ay 
air Hanary l«clA«hon from tha area of Arat> indaptmdanea.-*' 
Jlut trutri c ^ scarcely b« oaniad that Szltaln was 
doui>lc daaling Mltti tha Arabs, Deeausc> at tha sa«»« ti»« 
i t was nagotisting with tha sharif Husain ov r tha futura 
of tha Arabian ^rovincas of tha Ottoman anpira and waa 
discussing tha sa»s suojacts wdth Franca and i^ti ia and 
kaaping tha twc sati of nagotiatione Biq>arats* In axtanua-
tion i t Can only t»« argustf that Sritain was engaged in a 
daadly war ¥dth Garoiany and had to t»ke account of tha 
wishes of i t s principal allies* 
In Fabr ary 1916, Husain dropped nis botabahall, ha 
<• 
tdegraphad contantinopla daaa^tiing iaii<«dldta ra«ognition 
of tna hereditary claims of his dynasty. On June t» IV16, 
Has«in foraially proclaimed the independence of his Hashniti 
dynasty and the a)dstttn,e of a*state of revolt* a.^alnst 
Ottonan authiurity. A foxtnight Istar, In a lengthy Puhlic 
prodaaation pronuncia&<«i»t6 # ^^ sharif l i s ted tha reasons 
for his action. He citeu the loss of influence and tarrltory 
a«iffered &y tha mmctire aince 1906, tha inaptituoa of tha 
1. ueoiga Antenius, o. . c i t . . p. 1?^. 
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young Turk reQlmtt in (k>««&tlc as well as foxelgn matters, 
Constantinopla* s in fa lr t r dtaent spec i f ica l ly , of tha 
HaJ at ^nd the orutal hangings of certain aiidnwit Araiss. 
^et the largest part of the manifesto was devoed to r e l i -
gious grievances, e.g. laws of Is lan had been disregarded, 
the shari.^ had oe«.fi flouted, the *QMr«n* had been breached, 
fast days had net ^een observed • Apparently Husain prefered 
to base >ds case on the alleged athelsc and itepiety of the 
youny Turks* 
At sunrise on the ,fth June, the two brothers rode out 
to the toab of Hanie, where the 15,CX)0 recruits raised by 
the Sharif were in Caoap* and proelained the independece of 
the Arabs froB Turkish rule in the nam» of the shariS-Husain 
2 
Lord of Mtcca, the Arab revolt had begun. In Mecca, the 
revolt was fixed for the following Saturday, the lOth of June. 
Fai al soon became the acknoMdedged leader of the revolt. 
When/arrived in Damascus, early in the following January, he 
found ccnoit^ons changed oeyond recognition. He had a< :e 
vdth the set t led purpose of fonenting a revolt of the Arab 
divis ions in the Turkish arny ant a nats rising of the popu-
lat ion , on a signal froie his &ther. The l a s t regaining Arab 
divis ions had been t r ^ s f e r r e d with os t of ois friends fron 
al-Ahd. and tneir places taken by battal ions naniied by Turks. 
1. Howard M. iachar. The Smeroence of the Midole fc-at-
1914-192» (New Ybrk, 1969), D.i30. 
2. Geor;.;e Antonius, o p . e i t . . p. 194. 
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Proadn«nt c iv i l i ans tiiO bettn deported by th« hundred, to 
dist«fnt pldces in iVidtolia* 
Among thasa wera scna of tha best known andaost Influe* 
nt^l naans in Syria* where arrests scorned to show that Jam«l^ 
had done with his t a c t i c s cf Public for bearance, i^harif 
Husain Intervened vdth telegramuies lo Jaiael to the grand 
vezir and to the sultan urging that, i f any the accused 
found gui l ty , punishment be limited to l i f e sentences} other* 
wise, blood well cry for i>iood,3 
Faisel received the order to return a few days after 
the execution of the 6th of May. I t was so wor<^d in the 
code he had agreed upon with his father, as to convey that 
the revolt was ifnadnent. On the lOth of May, Faisal l e f t for 
Madina His brother *Ali, had oeen in constant cowounication 
4 
with tneir father and knew that the revolt was io^ilnent. 
The names oi the revolt CMsed stupor in Turkey and 
in Germany and was screened from the Public for seve al weeks. 
AS la te a* the 26th June, on the 29th, the f i r s t admission 
was madi^  in an announceiaent published in D^nascus in the 
o f f i c i a l al-sharah/of that to say that certain tribal 
sect ions had attaelMd a few posts in the neighiXurhcod in 
1. George AHtonius, OD,cit. . p. 188. 
2. Jamal pasklldwas the governor and com o^cnder in chief 
of the Lttoman forces in Syr^ a. 
3 . George Antonius, OD.cit>. ... 189 
4 . l l i i j j . , p. 193. 
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in Mi«din«, but aiMdng no BMintion of th« captur* of Moeca 
and Jodda or tha sharlf. 
In Syria tha Turks took pai:ticular pains to discradit 
andbolittla tha sharif** rising. In tha intarval* 120 othar 
Arab notablas fron all over :»yrla had baan arrastad tfid 
dapartt^ d to Anatoli at Tha af facts of tha sharif*s rising 
in IraMt and taof particularly in tnasa tracts wtdch wara 
alraady undar British Occupation was aainly conditionad by 
tha raaetion of tha govaznn«)t of India to i t . Two factors 
govarned that raaetion. Ona was tha daap santiioant of attach-
nant to tha caliphata pravailing aaong tha Muslias of Indiat 
tha othar was that tha govam^Dant of India had dasigns upon 
Iraq w^ich thay ragardad as a fiald for futura oolcnization. 
Thair <:ttituda to tha Arab tnovamant was funda«antally dataz^ 
ndnad by thasa two factors) ssio t U s gava thair foraign policy 
a parochial nd acquisitiva outlook wdch aada i t inialcal 
to tha ioaa of an Arab ravolt.'^ 
In tha Araoian Panintula, tha naws of tha rising had 
a profound affact. I t did not win ovar thp two Arab rulars 
•— Ibn Hashid ano tha laaM of tha Yanan. All tha othar 
rulers in tha Panlnsula hail ad tha ravolt vdth an approval 
which found i t s opan a;qpra«si&n in a durbar hald on tha 
20th of ^iova^ar at Kuv^ait, tha shaikh MuhaflKnara and 
1* IkL^ff PP* 202-2D5. 
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and over 150 owher persons amongett whom wtxe powerful el nor 
cMieftaina. 
In i^ypt and the ^dan the news of the Sharif* s rising 
came ot a pa t icular spvortune movenent. At f i r s t , the news 
of the Sharif*s rising mads l i t t l e impression in Egypt. 
There was a straingent censorship of the press w^dch reven* 
ted any open condennation, i>ut the h o s t i l i t y was real and 
scarcely val id . Among the Syrians and Iraqi cominunities th« 
revolt was hailed vdth universal enthusiasm. Syrian influence 
in the news papers of Cairo and Khartun gave i t a good pressv^-
iidthin days aiter raising the st^dard of r«volt, the 
Sharif* s followers achieved their f i r s t success, the captives 
were slaughtered instant ly . Gn June, 9, another 4,000 Arab 
attacifed the part of Jidda. I n i t i a l l y they were beaten off | 
but t.Mc days later a squadron of Qritisn gun ix)ats and sea-
planes oombarded the town, ana the Turks prcoptly capitu-
lated to the Arabs. Rebegb defended by l e s s the» 30 Turks, 
was Captured vdth similar case. So on July 27, Yanbo, Taif, 
was besieged by, 5,000 tribesman and eventually surrsndred 
on Sep tester 22, and vdthin the pc-riod of one su8»er, even-
tual ly the entire Arabian Hed sea coast h«d bsen dear td 
of Turks. 
1. Ib id . , o p . c i t . . p. 207. 
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Aftsr tiMs* i n i t i a l v ie tar ies hDw«v«r, the revolt soon 
l o s t i t s aofflcnticn.^ Husain*s aaa\ fa i led to overrun other 
TurlUsh strong hclds, in the Hejaz. The Sharif's unoi&cip-
l ineo bands hardly formed an army in the modem sense. Led 
oy riis«in*s sons, the Arabs were concentrated in three 
principal groups. Cne of about S,000 men und«r *Ali, based 
on Rabeghj another of 4,CXX) under *Ab<^llah, near Meccai 
and another of 7,000 under Faisal, based on Yaabo, the 
Hashimite forces we^e separated. The revolt had ttpmn begun 
with a ser ies of o r i l l i e n t surprises, t^ ut the Turks had 
regained their composure, and vdthin six months after ^ s a l n s 
declaration of independenc*, they were threatening to win 
back all they had l o s t . 
In that f i r s t and most important of his proclamations, 
the Sharif explained his action and appealed to al l Musliat 
to follow his exao^le. He tool his stanc on th« two p late -
forms of ralivjicn and nationalism, but ^oke as one who 
was primarily concerned with the welfare of Islam. Ttie 
proclamation denounced the Anti-Muslim practices of tlM 
C.U.P. of which i t enumerated instances, and the arbitrary 
tyranny of the Bnver-Jamal-Talat d i fu** ^^ represented the 
revolt as a re l ig ious and national duty, and as a God given 
opportunit/ for the attainment of indep«idM)ce. I t ended 
1. Howard M. Sachar, o p . c i t . . p. 133. 
-140-
oy calling up.n «11 Muslims through out th« Morlu to follow 
his exafflple, in aischarge of th«ir obligations to him, as 
Sharif of SAacca, ^f\(i to tha cau^a of Islaade sol idarity .^ 
Ona of the f i r s t military consaquencas of tha revolt 
was that i t dlsposad of tha Garman axpaciition undar Baron 
von stdtzingan, Tha Garstan tsission had jouenayad dcwn on 
tha Jtojaz Hallway as for south as al-Aala. Tha naln Turkish 
fo^^ce hid gona to Madina* I t was tha arrival of th i s Turco-
Garnan axpadition that had decioad tha Sharif to proclita 
tha rising whan ha did. Ha had not intandad to do so until 
the following August, by which tima ha could hava coropletad 
ois praparatioris. 3ut he having weighted tha altazaativas 
had decided in favour of Imnediate aeticn. 
ohazif had fa i led to capture Madina, -'Ut his inu.adiata 
military coject ivas had all been attained vdth the fa l l of 
Taif in the l a t t er half of Sapteaoer, the three months that 
followed ware the carkest in tha history of tha Arab camp-
aign. All danger cf a uiarch on Mecca was f ina l ly cispelled 
in the follovdng January, when one of the Sharif's arsdai 
led Dy tha Amir Faisal, mcved northwards, and with tha 
help of the Brit ish navy occupied the ort of i^ajh. 
1. George Antonius, oa>.cit.. p. 2D7 
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I t was during th«t« soonths th«t Brit ish and French 
missions astabiishad thaiaselvas in J@dda.^ Tha actual 
control of A ab tmlitdiy opardtions was at f i r s t entrusted 
to Mziz *Ali vvho ti&6 volunterad for tna task, iUt arrived 
in Jadda in Saptes^er to assune com and. 3ut ha die not 
hold his coBUDand for longt he l e f t , and was eventually 
succeedeo by Ja*far al-'Askari*Jaf ar, too, had at f i r s t 
been unvdlling to jo in revolt* Ha was profoundly affacted 
by the news and, uttering a curse en all Aiabs « ^ continued 
to serve the Turks after such savagery, volunt^rad for 
3 
service ^ith the shaxif* 
On the 29)d of i^ovel&bcr, i f was ar^nouncod that sharif 
Husain had been proclaimed king. The news was at once t e l e -
graphed by Amir Aodullah, to the principal Allied and neutral 
goveinments, requesting for their recognition of the new 
t i t l e . 
The chapter which had openad with the rising in Medina 
on tile 3th of June closed tiiith the Cloture of Wajh on tha 
25th of January. Tha revolt had found i t s faet the forces 
i . The f i r s t to arrive was Lieut Colonel CC.<dlson. 
of the Sudan po l i t i ca l servica, who ca.ae as British agent. 
In saptecnber a French stission under oolonal E.BraBacnd lanil* 
ad in Jedoa. T.i:.Lawrenca arrived in October, Sir Haginald 
M&ngate was maoe Conaiander in CM.&f of operation in Hajaz. 
2. Aziz had been watcning events c lose ly and biding his 
time s <v.rtly a^ter Turkeys entry into tne iitMX, ha had been 
approachad by the Brit ish authorities in Cairo that tn dis* 
covering t n . t breat Britain was not yet pr^dred arid prepared 
to give an expl ic i t and ^ e c i f i c pledge in favour of Arab 
independence. 
3 . George Antonius, o o . e i t . . p. 212. 
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of tn« Htvolt h«d, by that tim*, sorted tliomseivos out into 
throe nain groups each of /.dch was led by one of tho Sharif's 
sens. AS the occupation of i$ajh on the 25th of Jar>«ary, 19X7* 
had orcught the f i r s t phsse of the revolt to close, so the 
cif>ture of *Aqaba* in the following July narks the beginning 
of the l a s t and the most spectacular phase of the Arab drive 
towards Damascus. The capture *Aqaba* marks the turning 
points. Hitherto, the revolt had the Bejaz for a theatre 
and tne forces supplied by the tr ibes oy i t s fighting e l e -
GMnts. k^>w the setne had shifted to Syria, 
In i t s military itaplicaticns, the tnove to *Aqaba* caused 
serious eiabrficeiiient to the Tuiko-uerman conmand in Syria at 
a t ine when every available man and gun were needed to appose 
tho Brit ish advance on Jerusalaau But i t s po l i t i ca l conseque-
ces, although l e s s apparent at f i r s t , were more dtfnaging s t i l l , 
*Aqaba* became the tangible eadbcdlment of the revolt and a 
base for the po l i t i ca l underauning as well as the mili .ary 
undoing of the Turkish power in Syria.'*' 
The po l i t i ca l action anifested i t s e l f in a variety 
of ways, al l of them tending to v^aken Turkey by vdnning 
the Axabs f Syria over to the Allied side the f r indpal 
weapon or propaganoa employed was that, tlianks to the ag^so-
ment concluded bet«»een Sir Henery McMahon and Sharif 
1. George Antonlus, o p . c i t . . p. 225. 
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Hus«in th« Allied cause had becoiM identicul vAth thtt caus* 
of Arab ind«pendttncfe. And that th« trui^ph with Allied ams 
would bring fraed&m to tha u^rab paeplas. Tha po l i t i ca l eon» 
s«quenc«s of th i s phase of tlia Anglo-Axab partnership arc 
important not only from an histori<,al point of vit-v., tMjt 
also iar tha sake of tnair bearing u^on the controversies 
which revjed in the yc«rs foliovdng the «ar,'^ These cc t ro -
vers ies af ected the fate of all the Arab ter i t or i e s that 
l i e ou::^ioe the Arabian Peninsulat and everywtiere, in those 
re9ions protests accoopaned by violence taking tha f«ra of 
armed insurrections were made against the <-.ettlemen: divised 
by the Ali i s. Xn course cf time, tnese protests led to radi-
cal xcvisi^ns of the original settlement, vdth the single 
exception of that portion of Syria, which i s now known as 
the mandated territory of Palestine, which had not been 
excluded iron the area in woich (ireat Britain had pledged 
2 
herself to recognise and uphold an indepenoent Arab s tate . 
The Arab risinus hod already resulted in greater l o s se s 
thgn Turkey could af ord. I t tnay be reeknoed at a censer-
vative estimate that, by the end of March 19X8, in all the 
nun^er of Turk fJ-lled, captured or contained by the Arab 
l*..li2Lll*t P* 228. 
2* l o i d . . p. 22B. 
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revolt ABiountcd already to soma 35,000. 
Th« Arai> hagul«zs covered tlMir right flank, dogging 
tha atapc of tha Fourth Arnyt w-dla tha tribal hosts charged 
wiaely at the retreatimj Turks, galloping and fighting as 
they vs,«nt, in a caad race towards the goal of the Mevolt. The 
f i r s t to arrive were the Sharif Naser ar^ d Nurl Sha'lan with 
their forces who, reached the outskirts of i^ atadscus on the 
evening of the 30th of bepteober, but in defence to the 
wighes expressed ay the Comtacnder-in-chief, tticy abstained 
fron entering i t that night and oontwnteo themselv^ s with 
sending in a stron^ contir.gent to carry the t idings tc the 
populdtion and a message enjoining the setting up of an 
Arao governnent, Trds had already done, and Nasir*s {sessen* 
gers, ds they reached the main square, be held the Aiab 
flag ; lying. Four hundred years of Ottoman dcsdnatic nj^ i^ ad 
passed into History, The rest of :>yrla was occupied before 
Octooer, the occupation of d«irut and Al^po and almost 
every other tovjn 1: Syria gave fcise to simildr scenes of 
rejoicing as had greeted the libr.itors in Dan^ascus, In 
Lebanon which had the worst of the v i s i t a t i o n whole v i l lages 
perished. The effect of these v i s i t a t i o n s wer only too 
v i s i o l e , when the Brit ish forces enter»:^ d deirut, 
AS the War wW)t on, the Entente's need to secure a l l i e s 
against the control powers led i t to make arrangement by 
Aidch eneny territory, nainly that ot the Ottomans, was 
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promised in return for varlcus forms of Martinw asslst«nc« 
Th« result waSAteries of agraemants dividing tha Ottoman 
EoH i^ra, sona of n l^ ch particularly these involving tna Arab 
nat ional i s t s «nd the Zionists, were contradicory. The 
promises Aere sanccessful intecuring efi active wartima 
support, but they gave r i s e to new a>nfl icts and u i t t emess 
in the post war vozld*'*' In the two score years that had 
e l d ^ e d between Abdul-damid's accessici and the war of 1914, 
the sultan had to surrender several rich provinc-S In Asia 
Minor to ftussiat Syprus and L^ypt to Great Jritain, Tunisia 
to France Lioiya to I ta ly and aosnea-Herzegovina to Austria. 
Negotiations were open d early in 1915, and presently 
a s e r i e i of secret agreements were concluded at various 
dates in the f ixs t three years of the ^ax, in which the four 
A l l i e s helped themselvus handsomely to s l i c e s of the Qttomtfi 
empire. There were three major agreements concerning VMst 
Asia made during the War. The f i r s t often called the Istefi-
nul Aareeiaent> because i t purported to s e t t l e the question 
of who should control the Ottomtfi Capital, was concluded 
by an exchange of notes aiong Hussia, bngl^id and France 
on March 1;, 1915, 
1. J. S. Shaw, 99r^%'* p. 32D. 
2. George Antonius, fi&SLk't P* 243, 
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Th« teuslira Hcly pl$c«« in M«cca and Madlna and tha 
rest of ATdbla and ttia Arsbs world would ba detachad 
froffi tha Ottoman c^plra and placad undar Inoepandant 
AraJi rula. Tha division of Iran betwaan ilussia end 
drit<?ln as »^f6 on or ig inal ly in 1907 would ba con-
tlnuad, Tha nautral i^na fcnDorly maintainad as a 
buffar batwaan triam would go to tha lat tar , with tha 
excaption cf Isfanan and tha t a s t e m sacticns near 
Afghanistan, to b« t»km% ovar by ^s&ia*l 
Probai>ly tha best known and aost s ignif icant of War 
t ina sacrat agra^ ^^ mants rag^-rding tha Middla East was that 
r achad batwaan dritaln and France on /.ay 16, 1916, as a 
re u l t of a l«-ng sari as of nagotiations carried on by Sir, 
Mark bkyas and ^aorge pi cot (and thus usually called tha 
Skyas - Picot agraecDent*) to adjust their elaiats to tha 
Asiatic portions of tha Ottoman £apire. The Constantinople 
agreeeuent was, therafo e, the true proginator of the sykat* 
picot agreeaierit, 
Tha sykes HP!cot agreeisent, as i t i s generally called 
wr,s entered into by Great Britain vjlth France and Russia* 
in the spring of 19l6»^ 
The two delegates (the Franca delegate was r/^ cnsic/^ ar 
F.Gaorga-ficot, his dr i t i sh colleague was Sir '^ark 
oykes), together drew up a schesia for the disposal 
of those parts of tha Otton^ kn^ire which ware co-
vi ted Dv Great iiritain and Iranca* They were than 
instructed to procoed to petrograd inordar to di scuss 
their proposals \Adth the ftussian Govomnent. Negotia-
t ions were opened there about ths nidcla of March 
1916, and resulted in a three cornered understanding 
1. J. S. Show* o;>.cit.. p. 321* 
2. George Antonius o u . c i t . . p. 245. 
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•]qpr«S5«d in draft not** to b* •xchanged b«twftMi 
th« three gov»mi»ent and ^^rasantly the notes wero 
formally axchanged on vaziout datat in April and 
May of that year. In than w*rt daflnad the Ottoman 
terr l tor ias wrdch each of the three po«vers desired 
tue ether two to recognise as i t s sphere cf influence. 
Peter Mdnsiield describes the ;;>ykes.Picot avreement 
in these MordstI 
The sykes-pieot agretnent i s deeribad by Arab writers 
such as George Antoliius as a Ihggapg d9CTWfy^ ,^and 
i t i s easy to sei» whyiXn the so called rectangle for^ 
med by ^ r i a t Lebanon,Jordan, I sra i l and Irac cf today. 
Brit:.in and France p laned to assuise direct control 
over the most pcpulaus acvanced areas. 
Yahga >vni«j ani qivts an intresting account of the 
agreement in these wcrds:^ 
uiring Morlo wax X, there were three secret agreeu>ents 
among the members of the Triple (dritain, France ^ d 
aussia) hntfnte which ctelt vdth the Ottouan iropire. 
one was the Constantinope Agreefoent of March 13, 1915 
vyhich divided parts of north Syria and Asia Miner 
aoong the rnenber countries. The second was the London 
Agreement of A r i l 2^, 1915, which was arranged when 
I t a l y joined the War and denanded i t s share of the 
spoi l s . In these ttio agreements the Ferti le c;recent 
was l e ^ to iaxaat tiritain an6 France. 
Ln Octcuer 21, 1915, tne Brit ish infcrmed the Fxmk 
about the Husaln /^.cMahon correspondence ^ d sug^  e s -
ted that tney get together and discuss their into* 
res t s i(i the Fert i le Crescent* Accordingly, oir 
tfark sykes of viritain and Charles Georges - Pi cot 
of France reached an agre<3nent by February 1916. 
Later th i s sM^iuid agreeiaent wa« rat i f ied by Russia 
^ d I ta ly . «:dthout regard to the pledge to the Arabs, 
1. gPtgi.t'f P* -193. 
2. gPt^^t., pp. 294-295. 
-148-
th* F«rtll« Cr«»c«nt wat divided into thr«« pasts . 
At th« inslstc^e* of Hyt:i«« Palastin*, b«c«ut« 
of i t s holy plaeasy was tnads in t smat i cna l . Ths 
rsst was dlvidsd oy a 11ns sstsnding fxow ths 
MsdltsxT.nean U>ast, north of Hal-^ a in a norttv-
SdStsxly direction to ths Psri^an ocritex South 
of Mosul. Ths rsglon north of t h i s l i n s was to 
got to Francs and south of ths l i n s to Grsat 
dri ta ln . Furthsrnors. ths northsm rsglon was 
dlvidsd into two parts, ens unosr dirsct Frsneh 
control and ths cthsr I t s *inf lusncs' . Similarly 
ths SGutasm rsglon wa dlvidsd into two parts* 
ons uncsr ths dirsct Brit ish control and ths 
othsr undsr i t s *lnfluencs*. 
A'hat ths sykss<>Picot /^rssmsnt did wsr f i r s t , to 
cut up, ths Atsto Hoctangls in such a inannsr as tv placs 
ar t i f i c i a l o a s t a d e in tho v.ay ot unity. '«n awak<Hilng had 
taken place since Palmsrsvcri* s days, and ths national 
movement was now a fcrce vdtti ths plank of AxaO unity as 
wall as Indspsndencs in the forefront of i t s s ins. 
Another psculerity of ths agrsem^it was that I t 
provided for a tapsy-turvy po l i t i ca l structurs in which 
the f i r s t ..srs to oone l a s t and ths l a s t f i r s t . Tne inhsOl-
tants of Syrls and l i a q wcrs p o l i t i c a l l y mors dsvslopsd snd 
7n<$turs than the inhooitants of ths I n l ^ d rsgions. Yet ths 
agrsemsnt providsd the gro<^tsr part of Syria and Iraq might 
bs placed a rsgime of direct foreign d<^nlstration. iM.l9 
ths inland rsglon were in sny csss to fcrm ind^sndent 
Area s t r a i t s . 
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Th« «9r«eflittnt had b^en negctiatcd «nd concluded vdt)v 
out th« knowlttdg* of shaxlf Hutsin and I t conv.ain«d provifi-
slons widch w«r« in dlr«ct confl ict with tha tarme of Hanry 
McMahon*t coiipact with hiia. H9 only haard of tha axittanc* 
of the agraanant soma aightean mounts latar.''' 
Tha Agreemant was s^crat, out tha Bolshavlks mada 
i t a public roperty in November 1917, Jaraal Pesha of 
Turkey send tha agreement to King iiisaln and .^reposed 
a separate Turkic-Arab peace. He oespatched a secret 
emissary to Aqabai carrying a l e t t er from riicTi to Amir 
Faisal and the other to Jafar Pash«, The l e t t e s ware 
dated Novanber 26, the l a t t er addressed to Faisal was 
worded as an m^peal from cne serious mindad Muslim to 
another. * 
That i t was the duty of those who cared for the 
glory of Isltfn dedicatedthair energies, and i f 
need be their l i v e s , to i t s service; that Faisal 
and his father had beon mislead by prosdsad of Axab 
independence into rebelling a s inst tha sufrt^e 
authority in Islam; that those promises had now been 
shown to have been utterly mandaccus sir>ce the true 
iritenstlcns of the Al l i es vmf to p^xtiiAon tha Arab 
countries and Brit ish in Iraq and international in 
Palsstinax and that the only course l e f t for the 
Arabs to take was to return to the Ctvoman fold and 
^acure tneir legitimate rights by coiuiiing to tfi 
understanding with tha Turks. 
1. George Ar'tcnuis, o u . c i t . . p. 248. 
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Th* I • i t e r concluded «dth an invitat ion to Faisal 
to coma in parson to uaiascus undar proaisa of a s a f s -
oonduct in crcar to opan negotiations* 
Tha o^har powarful threat to dritainPs naw relat ions 
with tha Arabs was l a s s ap^a'ttntly dangerous but was to 
have a nore l a ting af iact . This was tha famous Balfour 
Declaration of 2 Noves^ar 1917. I t was » statem^t of 
Brit ish govarntoant policy, although i t took the forai of 
a l e t t e r from the Brit ish Foreis«n secretary, Arthur Jamas 
daltour, to a Ie.^ding Brit ish Jew, Lord i^thsciiild, I t s 
terms wriich ate deeply ingrained in the ndnds of uost Arabs 
EBust s t i l l be recalled for any undcxstanding of tUe Arab 
psychei^ 
His Majesty's Government view with favour tha 
establishment in Palestine of a National jicm* for 
tlia facil it i i^a the achievement of th i s object, i t 
•jelng d e a r l y understood that notning shall be dona 
which may perjudice the c i v i l and rel igious rights 
of existing ncn-jawish communities in Palestine, or 
the rignts «nd po l i t i ca l states enjoyed by Jews in 
any otner country. 
An inter-departmental Comodttee under tne Diairmanship 
cf iii.r luaurice de Sanson cf the Foreign Office, was ^pointed 
to formulate the policy fox the future of the Cttoman Espira, 
in Asia* The com. i t t e e r«>com!.endad that the French demand 
1. Petex htaiisfield, OP. c i t . . p. 200* 
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for the Inculsian cf *PaL«stin«* in ttie tdxritdry clain>«d 
jy tliem should be a-^ posed* 'Palestine*, said the Comadttee 
lautt be recognised as a country whose destiny i.Ajst oe the 
subject cf special nt^gotiations, in i.hich both bell ignents 
and neutrals are interested. Alt.«ugh Great Jritain had 
in X9i2 acc'pted the view that Syria was p o l i t i c a l l y French 
Preserve, •! 
G.Antonius saysx 
ihe tticught began to gain ground in certain 3r i t i sh 
c i rc le s thot in the event cf a ii^ ieakup cf the Ottoman 
bopire, an ef iort should be made to detach s^  ut.iem 
oyria as for n rth a« Hai^a and Acre to form a sepa-
rate entity and tc fa l l under Brit ish inf uence* 
These fundar.'ental considerations were added a n«w cnet 
•ccssioned by the necess i t i e s of ^^ ar, H«volt and disorders 
with in the Ottoman £mpire would hesterjilts collapse. The 
sick man of Europe who had !o99n kept al ive for so long in 
Bri ta in's interes ts must be allowed to id io . The foreign 
secretary Sir Edward urey, to ld the French Asibassador of 
that we had a;reaoy stipulated thatt^ 
when Turkey disappeared from Constantinople and 
the s t ra i t s , there must, in the interest of Is lan, 
be 9^ independent Muslim pol i t i ca l unit scmev-here 
e l se . I t s centre would naturally be the Muslim Holy 
Places and i t vould include Arabia* But we ust 
s e t t l e what e l se should be included, we ^urselves, 
nsa not, yet come to a definite openion wjtther .r.es-
opetanl<a should^be included in t h i s i dependent 
Moslem st^te, wether we should put for ward a claim 
for ourselves iiS that region. 
1. a i Kedourie, f ^ M ? feas^ jn^ ^qlaOtf (Lor.don 1956) p.33 
2. George Antonius, a £ j j l i . » p.261. 
3 . blr Eoward Grey, Twenty f ive years (London, i< 2:J) 
vol.IX, p.236. 
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^Irkes "Pi cot AQXAamcnt was k*pt sacret. wtwn Husaln 
heard abuut the axistance of the AgraeiSi nt, h« asked th« 
dxi t i sh for explanations, and thay, on three occassionst 
assured ^m th, t they would nelp in the estdolishment of 
an Arab s tate . The Araos believed their assurancest with 
the Ottomans losing on/practical ly al l fronts, a Turco-
ATab V treaty did not tiave any meaning. The Arabs could 
not do imjch e lse out to hope for the better. The Arabs have 
^paalad to tne Brit ish yovexnmant for the asta:Jiishroent 
of an Arab stact^, tc which i^raoia ano ttie ^Moslem) iioly 
places MDuld oeloi.g: 
In so far as th i s concern tha t irit ish fovernavit, 
may have declared thair agreement with th i s request, 
on condition th.^ .t Arabia dad ares her n ^ t i l i t y to 
Turkey, and tbat Syria shall be exdudad from t . i is 
new st3te in view of our comiuetments to hrance. 
In tt^e spria^ of 1918, when tha feel ing aroused by 
the appearance cf tha dalfour Jedar tion and the disdoura 
of tne sykes-i'icot Agreement was working hivoc vdth tha 
Ai>glo-Ardb ali iance, a ^j^oop of seven proninent Arabs l iving 
in Cairo presented a tiiaiaurandua asking for a d e a r dadara-
t ion of i r i t i s h policy. The tiritish reply, which became known 
as tne i;eclar..ticn of the ;»even. was given the widest publicity. 
!• Ib id . , p. 243. 
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K«ferring to the Arab terx i tor ies l ioerated oy the action^ 
of the hxab ariuies, the Brit ish government declared i t s 
policy in the e .o be that * the future govemraent of these 
t erx i tor i e s should k>e based u^on the prif«ciples oi the consent 
of the governed*. (Hth regard to those t err i tor i e s s t i l l 
under Turkish rule the ar i t iah government (Mrely asserted 
i t s desire that the oppressed people in these t err i tor i e s 
should obtain their freedom and independence. 
The decleration of the seven i s the im st important of 
policy publicly made oy Great Britain in c^nnrction v.ith 
the Arab Revolt, in their stotem«nt, the Foxcign of f ice 
dealt with the whole of the region claiioed by Sharif Husain 
as the area of legitimate Ar^ in<topendence» and defended 
the l ir i t ish Government's policy vdth regard to the future 
of tnat area* For the purpose of that definition they regar-
ded tue &r€a as fa l l ing into four categories detorm. ned by 
the miilitary s i tua^n at that time. 
The f i r s t categories ccmprised ( i ) the Arab ter i t o r i e s 
wiich Mere frecj and independent aefore the a^r» and 
( i i ) the t err i tor ie s l ibrated from Turkish rule by 
the action of the Araos them&slves. 
The third category co:Tf>ri8ed ( i l l ) the Arab terx i tor ies 
liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the 
Allied amies. 
The fourth category con^rised ( iv) the Arab t err i tor i e s 
tnat were t h ^ s t i l l under Turkish rule .2 
1. Peter Wansfield, fl£jufi4i». P« 2)7, 
2. oecrge Antcnius, p>..cit . . p. 272. 
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Lafttly, ther« Appeared a f e t days before th« Ar i s t i c * 
yet another r^eclaraticn, issued jo l i . t ly by Great Britain 
and France it th is tii^e, in whdch ^'I•d;^•8 were made to the 
Ara)t>s in regard to the future of the northern Arab countries. 
On the 7th of Noventber 191^, an o f t i c i s i coo:.unique u^ as 
given to the press in Palestine, Syria and Iraq oy the 
a r i t i s h Billitary com>i<.nc8 in these t err i tor i e s , and given 
even wider publicity than the L>eclaration of the seven. I t 
contOiined the text of a statew^ent of policy, in \M^ Uch the 
aims pursued by the fiench and i r i t i s h governments in regard 
to those ecu. t r i e s wer:^  broadly out lineil. 
The text ct t'cui statement i s universally knovun as the 
Anglo-French Declaratton, The issue of tn i s Declaration was 
brought oy the cr i t i ca l situation which had suddenly arisen 
in tne Arab terr i tor ies occupied by the Al l i e s . The i n i t i a l 
cause of i t had been the incident of the Arab flag in Beirut. 
Thi:. sale tnat tho goal of the dr i t i sh and French 
governments was the complete and final l iberation 
cf peoples oppressed by the Turks, and the setting 
up of national govemmen-s asnti adrrdnistration vvhich 
should derive their authority fxom the free exercise 
cf the i n i t i a t i v e and ch i ce of the in ?genous poou-
l.^ti.n. 
The war was won, victory had carzied i t s standard as 
fcr as i t had dreaioedt to the vexy confines of i t s Kingdom. 
1. Pet r Mansfield, o p . c i t , , p. 207, 
-JL55-
All the Araaic speaking provinces of the Cttonan ait Ire 
in Asia were ^i l a s t rid of the alien yoke th, t had lain 
on them for four centauries. The area cf the Turk's defea* 
teo was precisely the area of Arab aspirations «r\d i t s 
frontiers concldvd exactly vdth tho .« defined by Sharif 
Husain as the natural l ind t s of Arab independence. 
when the Mar caffie tc an end the A l l i e s descrii;>ed the 
whole area of Arab rectangle as occupied Ene .y Territory, 
to be administered under military law pending a peace s e t t l e -
utent. Alreody the broad l i n e s of the afi^ ended Sykes-Picot 
a^reeinent were oecoialng clegr. Iraq was maiitalned ^^ s a 
single ut'it .under Angle-Indian adalni strati en with a Jr i t i sh 
c i v i l cooiuiiission'^r a^ i t ^ e a d , Lecupied .^emy Territory Ad-> 
1 
ministration (C&• T. A ^uth) covered the approximate sz9» 
of bha future Palestine mandate. C.E. lA.west ccu'f}rised the 
whole ^ayrian and Lebanese coastal area from Tyre to c i l i d a 
and was unO^j. the French. 
.hen A^ nir Faisal arrived in Paris in Jan. 1919, as lead 
of the Hejaz Deligation to the Peace conference, he encouS* 
tared three main influences at i«rk in op,.osition to t >• 
fulfilffient of /\xai3 hopes. Lrn was the Brit ish inf iexial ist lc 
intdi-est in Iraq and ralest ine , the seconcl the French imper. a* 
l i s t i c interest in Syria, the ti^iird in league with the f i r s t 
1. Peter Mansfield, op.cj^t.. p. 209, 
2. Another French administrttion, known as 0.c;,T./A.North 
had b««i set up in d l i c i a , but th i s lay out side the Ax^ 
Rectan^ls. 
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th« Zionist naticn«l i i . t ic interss t in Palest ine. 
I t was of l i t t l e us* because all the important decision 
has alruddy been taken witf^out hi» knowlecge es the i r i t i s h 
and French Prin<e Ministers Lloyed George and Clemenceau^ ,^ 
had reached an underst ndir.g on the revision of the Sykes-
Pio>t Agreeiwint. 
7hj unfortunate ia i sa l «tt«q>ted to retrive what he 
cculd for Arab aspirations. Taking :iis s-and on tne doctrines 
of self-dotexraination ^!r»acbed by President All sen and res-
tated in the Auglc-French Declaration, he pppposed that a 
eofi>:.ls&ion of enquiry be sent to syria and i'alestine to 
examine the wishes cf the inria:>it^ts. President dlson 
enthusiast ical ly accepted the proposal, and his suggestion 
that the coounission should consist of Uritish, French, I ta l ian 
and Americtfv menders was endorsed by the etn^fsrence. But In 
rea l i ty the Fiench were strongly host i le to the Coounission, 
while the Qritish were Lukewarn. Eventually all '-he parties 
except the Americans withdraw. The American appointementee^, 
Henry King and charles crane,^ decided to go n their own, 
and their repcrt fu l ly explains British and Fronch h t s t i l i t y 
toward', the coanission. After exhaustive consultations with 
the people of 6yria they reported that while owerw^lming 
Majority op;)osed the mandatory systen, there was an ackno lodged 
1. Ibid«. p. 209 
2. Ur..ienry C.King was president of Oberlin College in 
Ohlo.l/lr.Chdrles H.Cr«ne, a prouient bussinoss rotfi ^ d oriental 
trave l ler , was a po l i t i ca l supporter of President, dlson, who 
appointed hits U. S.Minlster to Chin« in 1922, 
n*«4 for out ftid* dssist«nc«t provided i t cane f i r s t fron 
U}m United states or, as second cticlce* fron tiritain. On 
no aecount why did they want from France. Healizlnq that 
the nendatory system was inevlt^>le, the cooKidssion reco* 
mi.ended that the United s tates should nave the manciate for 
Syriat and tiritain for Iraq, l^rovided that the mandate was 
of l inai ted duration and that the mandatory was inhc sense 
a o l o n i z l n ^ power. They also recottuendeo that Faisal should 
becone King of Syria and that Iraq should have an Arab 
nonarch. 
On the Zionist question they declared themselves to 
have set out with a strong disposition in favour of zionivi 
and to have found such to ^prove of in the Zionist aspira* 
t ion and plans, out to nave couududed that the xtreme<ir 
Zionist progranwaa must be greatly laodifiad i f tine c i v i l 
and r e l i j i o u s rights vL the non«>Je.dsh innaoitants of Pales-
t ine are to oe protected in accoroance with the terms cf 
the iolfuur joctaration. The (Cing Crance cora-ission* s report 
was igiicxcu oy tne ;d!;.ies: The cooKoissions* revert in ter -
linked the fact . tii«:.t i t was )iot. cnly ,jngio-Fr€nch 
iqp«rldl i s t ambitious bllt also trK,3e cf ^lonism 
wrsich were l ike ly to confl ict Aith the hopes and 
aspirations of the Arabs. 
1, Peter Mansfield, o p . c i t . , p.211. 
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How«ver, in Mttch 1918 a Zionist cooffidtslon ax iv4 
in Jerusal*(n h«adtd by chal(t) M«izaann, I t s o f i i d a l mission 
was to act as a link oetwasn ths ar l t i sh aut.ioritlss and 
ths Jewish population, to halp vdth ra l i s f vvork to stimu-
l a t e JawLsh aducdtional and cultural a c t i v l t i a s . In 1918, 
the rea l i ty about Palestine, which the ^ o o i s t s had to face, 
was that the country was overwhelodt.gly Arab and i t was 
Britain* s duty as the mandatory power to oring i t to &elf 
governmtnt as quickly as possible there was l i t t l e l i k e l i -
hood that the Zionist would be able to create a Jewish 
majority in Palestine i^efore t h i s hapened and in t h i s 
case the Arabs woulo be is\ the position to decide just what 
s ize and kind of Jewsh ncitional home should exist in their 
country . As John Kirachi wrotet 
Thus, when weizmann departed for hone in^nptember 
lv l8 tiii. ii.ission anc th t cf the Zionist commission 
was in effect at an end* They had corae to lay the 
fcund.^ticns cf a Jewish state and they l e f t vAth 
Palest ine et to tjecame §m Arab state— anc i t pro-
bably woulo ha>e become one but for the Hitler holo-
caust amdi the second world war. 
Atiile Faisal was way in Faris the former secret Arab 
nat ional is t society ^"f^t^t formed an Ar^b indepand nee 
party wnich gained Faisdl 's supj^ort on his rotuxn, A General 
Syrian Congress iceeting in Damascus, cal led for recognition 
of the independence of Uyria and Iraqi and i t was all the 
more vigorlous as i t was voiced by those who had taken an 
active part in the revolt , A great number cf po l i t i ca l leaders. 
1. ^r. ohaim v«e zmann, lecturer in chemistry at Manchester 
University were active in ibngland during the ^ar. Dr. ^izmenn 
who weterial ly ccntrijuted to the Brit ish Hat effort by d i s -
c vering a new methods of uroducinh acetone attracted the 
attention of Jx i t i sh o f f i c i a l s to Zionist aspiration as early 
as 1914. 
2* y^ei|t.^tt#^^| I^raenjhe untold storv of v^ hv w fai lad 
iirny officttxs and stu<i«ntt fxoffi Palest in* ^ d Iraq, «« 
well d& froRt all parts of Syria. Ta/tn together, they rapra* 
eentaci the vl<^ws and faelin^s of tha tfaftt najcrlty in those 
countries en tha tvno doi&'i^ nant issuastunity and ind^fpandenca.^ 
<^ai8al alone was aware oi tha harih r e a l i t i e s of power. 36wing 
to the stiLug pressure ficm British wbich ha could not 
aftorH to ignore, tia returned to Paris in November 1919 to 
reach a provisional agreenant with Clemance^j, pending a 
final settle(neit, providing for French occupation of tha 
Syrian costal areas anu a French iconopoly of assisttfica to 
the AXct^ state in the inter ior . Faisal 's not-blooded young 
followers in Damascus refused to aCtept any such promiss 
and in March V 20 the general Syrian passed a resolution 
pro^daiCiting the inc pe-dence of Syria as a sovereign stata 
and a ccnstituticnal oiunarchy with Amir Faisal as ay^ing. 
u 
A meeing of Irac)i leaders passed a sisnilar resol^ticn concer-
ning Iraq and cliose Ainir i/ioduliah as^King.^ 
Britain and France xeactad swift ly. Declaring that thty 
did net reccgnlze the Damascus resolution. They hcasti ly 
convened a rr.'^ i t ine cf the supreme council of the League of 
Nations, the supreme council -wpt at San Rsffio and tock tha 
following oecisions on the 25th of April. 
1, George Antonuis, o p . c i t . . p, 303. 
2. Peter Mansfied, o j i , j ^ , , p. 214, 
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Aft (S^rge Antcnuis Mrit«st ^ 
rh« whcl« of th« Arab Ii»ctan9le lying between the 
hil«dit«rian««n and tha Ptrs lm frontier was to be 
placed under mandatory rule. Syria was to be broken 
up into three separate fracticntsPalest ine, the 
Lebanon, and a reduced * Syria* Iraq was tc remain 
undivided. 
The decision taken at son iiioiaeo wers made public on 
the 5th of May and their promulgaticn gave birth tc a new 
sentiment in the Arab world. The decisions of U>n Horreo 
Conference were not carried out without considerable blood 
shed. fKpart froi tne f ight ng in Syria v.nere was an uprising 
against the Jews by WiUslin and Chlttstan Ar.^ .bs in Palestine. 
In Iraq also wn«ro Arrb hopes had been thowartec by the 
astablisliinent of an Anglo-'laaion admini-stratien with v irtue-
a l ly no Arabs participation. 
To devise a aid t ied policy for ths wh lo region, Londdn 
createu a i'dddle ^ast Departa^ent in Dec^r.ioer 1^20. I t was 
placed unoar the co lc i ia l o f f ice , at that tiine lieaded by 
Alnst^n Churchill, The Cclonial :iecrctary efv c eked a general 
i r i t i s h cc-nference on Midale Eastern a-fairu, wiiich met in 
Cairo, ;«arch 12-24, i 921. I t was presided ever by Churchill 
hiai-elf, and at ended tjy Sir Percy Ccx aj^ d oir tierbert 
Samuel, Laurence, Clayton, Camwallis, Ger rude dell and 
others. 
I* i22AjELl«t P* <^ !>« 
2, Peter Mansileld, o o l e i u . p .2 l6 . 
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This conference made the follondng dedsionttX 
The Kings Ip of Ir«s was tc be offered to the 
deposed King of Syria, l^aisal. *>^dullah was to 
be ottered the emirate of Tren^ordan. In order 
to appease Iraqi nationalisis the Mandate was to 
be replaced by a treaty of al l iance, which would 
be concluded vdth Faisal upon his advent to the 
thaone* 
/ifter the Cairo Conference, Churchill went to Jerusalen 
where h« reached an agreement vdth Abdullah by wiiich Britain 
wculd endeavor to ootaln from France to l iberal izat ion of 
her policy in Syria incrder tn^. an Ar^b governi..ent under 
Aiuir * Abdullah L.^ gnt oe t.staolished in iJafiiascus* Now Faisal 
in Jagndad and 'Abcull&h in r,is ne«>.' capital cf AiTia<><, wheir 
aged and new i9it\.orly xos^ntful fattier s t i l l presentwd a 
prcoler^ La«->-ence was Ui8^>a^ched tc jedaa tc jersuade the 
old man to accept the accocuplishment iact thdt ^^yria, Lebanon 
and F-alttstine wbie all l e s t tc the rultt of ids f a ^ l y . 
Thus by IC 21 the found tions for the new order in tlM 
Arab M i c l e tasi were la id . Despite the i/dltenian ideology 
of sclf-detexmludtion and despite American inttjrvention in 
Paris , tne new peace was i ioperiai ist ic in character and 
c o n sponded in the main to tne na^or war time agx^ements. 
Vat fcr the Arabs i t *,»» not exactly a change i£n old to 
new mestexs. True enough, the new scti^lement did not f u l f i l l 
1. !j«org« Lencyzowski, ou.cit .> pp, 96-97. 
2. Pet r Mansfield, cp.c i t .> o.219. 
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th« Arab p o l i t i c a l picxjram as -on««liv«d In 19iJ. Neverth«le»», 
i t marked an Important advance toward., eventual eu.ansipation 
«dth the dceeptanc cf the p r inc ip l e of citfioates, the oig 
owers had to pay at l e a s t l i p service to SQlf-dctir<tilnation 
arid to in tema' - ional res^onsi ia i l i ty . Furtaer .;oru active 
aAd v io len t op ositiion to the new system, manlfe&t«ic in 
Syria IraQt ^nd Pa les t ine , revealed ne,v, deeply s t i r r e d 
forces of national!sia -wnicli th« w»st in the Itng run, Mculd 
no Icnger be able tc disregard and v^ath wiiich, c^ s i the 
case of IraQf i t would o»? ooliged tc ccra,>ro'>'i se,"^ 
i , oeorge Lenczowski., o p . c i t . . p . 98* 
C H A P T g B 
VI 
AHAB NAnCNALlSM d&TlNEa4 THE TMD WLALDWAHS & AFTER 
Th« attitud* of the Arab nat ional i s t s towards tha w«st«m 
povrars was datersilned during tha f i r s t world War and subsequent 
peace settlement. Ttiose years were not without taeir gains. 
In the l ight of the foregoing events, the years i918«'20 9em 
to have been crucial in the Eoodem history of the Arabs. They 
ushered in t t e f i r s t piias* of Arab struggle with the west 
for po l i t i ca l independence. I t was during t h i s period that 
Arab nationalism reached i t s formative age* becaine, more mi l i -
tant, more anti-Western and anti iB^er ia l i s t s . I t l ived almost 
exclusively on deep pooteu suspedcn, resei^tment and hos t i l i ty 
towards >^glo-French domination in Arab lands, and towards 
the establishment of the Jevdsh National hone in Palestine.*^ 
During the period between the two world wars. Great, 
Britain, anc to l e s ser degree France, tried to regulate 
their relations with the countries under their tut i lage by 
mems of various t rea t i e s , which slowly granted longer 
measures of self gLvernment, and which helped in laying the 
foundations of Indigenous government in those countries. 
The f^r er Arab provinces of the Ottoman Eo^ire were divlderi 
.nto Arab provinces of the Cttom«n Bapire were divided into 
1. 2.N,zeine, Tf^ f ^^ UlHti* i ,^ P,.j^ y,^ ^ ;^t,V & ethers , (eds) , 
p. 547, 
several s t^t t s , only the most backward of wdch was recog-
nised as immediately independent, the other being placed 
under Brit ish cx French Control.i- This was all the more 
diappointing because i t waa Gzeat Britain wtiich had pro-
mised the the Arab independence and unity, and had appeared 
to be the fjriend of Arab nationalism. Thus the movement took 
on, in those years, an anti-Brit ish and anti-French, and even 
in general an anti western Complexion* Indeed, the mere fact 
that ureat Britain and France were now in control of the 
Arab a>untries would have been enough to give i t such a 
complexion. The h&stility was mingled with disappointment, 
since p o l i t i c a l l y these t^o powers had seemed for a moment 
to be the friends of the nat ional i s ts ; out also with gfatitude 
since culturally the (ocvement was deeply indebt to thffs.^ 
The development of Arab naticnalism in the Fert i le 
Crescent proceeded during tho post-war period. I t was vtinu-
lated by the tensions between the mandatory powers and the 
Axab peoples under their control, by the partition of the 
Ferti le crescent into f ive separate t err i tor i e s and by Jewish 
inmi^t ion into Palest ine. <dthcugh these were/^curxant 
clashes between the Arabs and the Jews frooi 192D onward, these 
did not have wide repercussions until the following decades. 
i . A. d.H#urani, o p . c i t . . p. 104, 
2. ^JsLsl,, p. 104. 
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Th« soricus disturbances of 1936, aarkftd tli« point J^ yihLch 
th« Pal«stin« pxoblsB b«e««« in th« rtportory of Mab n«tio* 
natlisn,'*^ 
Th« r«s«ntaront of tho nationalists incroasad all this 
tina, and led to laora unrast and agitation in 1936, in Iraq, 
Syria, Lsb^ton, and Palestina. Ganaral 3akr Sldiq^^ supported 
by young nationalist army officers, car led out a successful 
military c&up d'etat in Baghdad on 29 October 1936. The 
Biilitary dictatorship which he est)|blished, case tc an end 
vdthin ten nonths, but the army's interference in the govem-
nent continued in the years followed* The French Govemaent 
entered into prolonged negotiations f irst with a Syritft 
and thfln --dth a Leb^neee delegation for the purpose of 
'turning a new page* of peace and friwnds^p between France 
and the Aiob nationalists. The result was a Franco-Syrian 
treaty and a Fr«nco-Lebtf)ese t i e . ty . There were ccrtJLn 
difficult and cofOKlicated conditions to be fulf i l led before 
these treaties were to enter into force* Syria and Lebanon 
were f irst tc be adnitted to the League of Nations and, of 
course, the French Syritfi and Lebanese parliaments had to 
rectify the treaties. Finally after a period of tranflkion 
wnich was to lost? three years, Syria and Lebanon were to 
1, P.M. Heit, satf i i i . , p. 300. 
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9m«r9« as fu l ly lnd«p«nd«nt states . Howtver, tii» next blow 
to nat ional is t aspirations w«ft th« l o t s of the d i s tr i c t of 
Al«x«ndritta ««!U.ch, aftar Franco-Turkish nayotlaticns^ 
bactfM autononous vdth tha constnt of the council of the 
Lsague of Nations, and 1939 was integrated in Turkey, jyiore* 
over after waiting for two years, t »e French government, under 
various national and international tensions, and especial ly 
with the gathering odnacing war clouds in Europe, was s t i l l 
has&tating tc rect i fy these t rea t i e s .^ 
Great Britain's trouble in Palsst ine were not tfiy l o s s 
than France's d i f f i c u l t i e s in Syria. The eonomous increase 
of Jevdsh inndgration into Palsst ine between 1933 and 1936 
intens i f ied iXrab resistance end opposition to the iialfour 
Declaration and led tc disorders, s tr ikes , bloodshed, and 
f ina l ly open rebellion from 1936 to 1939.^ 
Between i939» when the second World Wax brokeout, and 
1956 when the Suez cr ises occured, Anglo French Parasnuntcy 
in Egypt and the Fert i le crescent come to an end the French 
posit ion in Syria and Lebanon could not be maintained after 
the oollepse of French in 1940. At the end of the var, Britain 
1. Z«N.Zeine, asSlkX** P* ^7l« 
2. USdA't p. 571, 
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lackeci both tn« mattrial strength and the MIII to hold on, 
while th« Unltad States emerged as the predooiinent Mestem 
Power In the region, 3ritain abandoned the ra^idate for 
Palest ine in May 1948. The establ lstoent of the state of 
4$r^X4 and ihe Arab I s r a i l i war had moroentious consequences 
for the whcle region. The Wary the l a s t act of the old gene-
ration of Ard>> net ional i s t , thei^ fai lure to defeat the 
I s r a e l i s , or even to agree a concerted strategy, discT'-dited 
then and the governments in woich they predominated, A revo-
lutionary situatScn was createdr 
THk ..JUdI>^ PadNaULAt 
Outside Sauoi Araoia and Yemen, the Arabian i^eninsula 
and the Persian Gulf were under direct or indirect Brit ish 
control. However, the Imani Yahya (1903-48) never accepted 
Brit ish rule over the Aden protector«te in Southern Arabia. 
Although in 1934 he signed a forty-year treaty of peace 
and friendship udth Britain which accepted (^lKnen*s southern 
frontier as the s t a t u s - c ^ until future negotiations could 
reach a final sett lenent, i t was only an uneasy truce which 
followed. In 1936 and 1937 Harold Ingrsms, one more outstand-
ing Anglo-Arab, persuaded the tr ibes and rulers ot the Hedra* 
•ount to siyn a truce wiUch becane known as Ingr^* s peaces 
and 1938 the Aden protectorate, oivided administratively into 
1. P.W.Holt, o o . d t . . p. 301. 
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th* M«tt«m protectorate. Along the /tiestern six>res of thr 
Qulf many of the frontiers of most of the ssall tribal states 
under Brit ish protection remained undefined. This was of 
saall consequence unt i l l t i i is desolate region was ciiscovered 
to contain a large proportion of the world* & o i l resources. 
Thus the ownership of the subsoil becane a question of 
Bajor iiaportance. 
The delit^tdtion of Ibn S#'^ ud*s northern frontier was 
a natter for nt-^otiation with Great Britain who held the 
atfidates for the t err i tor i e s bordering upon his post Mar 
aquisit lons. ;^hortly after his annexation of the Jabal iham-
aaii the frontier between that terri tory and the ntfidated 
state of Iraq was fixed in an agreement concluded in 1927, 
o by the liUjhaBffiara Agreement.* The Brit ish Government decided 
tc open negotiations with Ibn Sa*ud without waitin: for the 
conclusion of his com(>aiyn against the Hejaz. On November, 
2, 1925, an agreement was concluded by Sir Qilbert Clayto9 
and Ibn S«ud, by the name of Hadda agreement. This was the 
f i r s t agreemf^nt. The second was a general Brit ish Saudi 
Arabian treaty signed at Jidda on May 20, 1927. The treaty 
reaflirmed Britain's recogniticn of Ibn Saud* s 'complete 
and absolute independen^^e*, provided for non^aggressicn and 
1. Peter Mansfield, SSLuSil,** P* 243. 
2. George Antonios, oi^.cit . . p. 342. 
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•nd friendly xtlations« for Ibn S«ud's ^ekno^ed ement 
of the special 3x1 W) position in Sexein and in the Gulf 
Sheikhdoms, and for eo-operation in suppressing the slav-
trade. ^  
The treaty of Jedda nade no radical change in the 
tracdticnal ly good British-Saudi relat ions but by culmina-
ting some causes cf f r ic t i cn i t placed them un a sol id foo-
t iny, dritain did not «sk for and did net obtain «ny bases 
or po l i t i ca l privi lages in Ibn Sa*ud*s Kingdom, but her p( * 
s i t ion i-emained pre-eminent.'^ Having placed his relations 
vdth Great Britain upon a new and satisfactory basis, Ibn 
Sa*ud proceeded to strengthen his international position 
by the conclusion of t r e a t i e s vdth those foreign Powers whose 
in teres t s involved the governance of Muslim populations, 
ihct i s to say with Holland, France, liussia and I ta ly . He 
also entered into treaty relations with Turkey and Persia. 
But s t i l l more significant fron. the point of view of the 
Arab natiunal movement was the cluin of pacts and t rea t i e s 
which bound the Kingdom of Sa*udi Arabia to i t s neighbours 
in the Yemen, Iras and Egypt.'' 
At the outbreak of Wbrld War II Ibn Sa*ud adopted a 
pol icy of neutrality. As a result riis policy was markedly 
benevolent toward the i^est. The King* s friendly neutrality 
l.Qecrge Lenczowski, oo. c it .» p.436, 
2. Ib id . , p. 437, 
3 . George Antonius, o p . c i t . . p.344. 
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w«8 oy no nttans a ncgliglbla afts<»t to tho Allies* ttspeclally 
to Graat Britain. Had ha tuccun^ad l ike scna Arab extremists 
to pro-Axis temptaticns, he roiyht have preachec a holy war 
on the i«est. The ax>st s ignif icant po l i t i ca l development 
affectiny Arabia in \Max time was, howevex, the growth of 
close co*operavion vdth the united states* I t was revolutio-
nary in i t s consequences for both countries, for Saudi Arabia 
and for iha United states* Until 1940 the American Govern; ent 
had pract ical ly ignored baudi Araoia* For seven years jperican 
Oil Coi^panies had c a n i e d out vss t operations ir|/eastem 
Arabia without the benefit of o f f i c ia l government protection, 
the ^ar changed all that*^ 
Before the second world war, Egypt was a constitutional 
fltonarchy. Qy the convention of Montreux in 1937 the cppitu* 
lot ions had been abolished, and in tne same year, Egypt had 
been admitted to the League of Nations* //hen the second world 
war began in Septeo^er 1939, the Egyptians by thtfn had knovtfi 
Brit ish rule cdrectly or indirect ly for f i f t y seven years* 
These were years ot t r ia l and tribulation for all concerned. 
I t i s true, that t h i s perioo of foreign rule it^osed upon 
the Arabs by militory conquest and victory was unpopular, 
1. George Lenczowski, o p . c i t . . p. 440* 
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but i t i s untru* to say that th«r« was no cooperation what 
so ever vAth the representatives of Great aritairi and f^tnc^ 
in t h i s region. There were those who by education, taopra-
nent and po l i t i ca l incl inat ion, adndreo the western i n s t i -
tut ions of oeinocxacy, tMestem culture, and western ways of 
l i f e . They were a ainority, out some of then vi^ re influenctial 
dnd helpful to the aandlbry powers. At the sai&e time the 
struggle for po l i t i ca l incependence consolidated regional 
and terr i tor ia l nationalism in the Bdndated t err i tor i e s . 
Thus while the i . e a l of Arab unity was maintained, a strong 
attachment developadt in every newly bom country to the 
preservation of i t s independence.'*' 
The manner in which Britain lAnilaterally declared 
kqypV a independence, \/Mle reserving i t s right to control 
what i t regarded as v i ta l imperial in teres t s in the coun-ry, 
was a prescription for po l i t i ca l i n s t a b i l i t y in the country. 
y<Mle Britain aimed to secuxe a treaty with iigypt which would 
place Anglo"iigyptian relat ions on a perm^ent footing what 
would be satisfactory for Britain.^ 
In 1939, three y^ars after the Anglo-£gyptian Treaty, 
Great Britain had not evacuated Egypt as i t had promised. 
'/(hen the war came in Septend^er, the Bri t i sh used the provisions 
1. Z.N. Zone, ed. i^.M.HeltSOthers, o o c i t . . p.579. 
2. Peter Mansfield, cu .pi^. . p. 243. 
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of the treaty and selnt nore troops into the co ntry. During 
the War the Egyptian did nothing to satx>tage the Brit ish 
War effort , aut neither did the government bow to the dr i t i th 
demand to declare war against the Axis, They believed th t tae 
Axis powers were going to vdn (and did not acceptable to 
the S r i t i s h ) . I t i s one of the ^ n i e s of history that in 
1942 the Brit ish surrourided the royal Abd&n Palace in Cairo 
with tanks and told Kin9 Faruq either to appoint the wefMst 
Nahhas Pasha as Prime Minister or leave the country. He 
surr^undered, and appointed the formerly anti«>3ritlsh Nahhas 
Pasha, ^  
tVhen the d^ger of Geraan victory was l i f t ed by the defeat 
of General iteionel at al-Alamyn and the landing of Anerican^ 
in North Africa* Nahhas Pasha had served his usefulness to 
the Brit ish, Kiny Faruq, took advantage of the situation and 
oisinissed hin. He choose the Anti yvafd leadez of Sa*d party. 
All Mehar^ to fora a government, on February 24, 1945 Mahar 
was assassinated by young Egyptian. Nuqreshi Pasha, who 
.'^s second in Comu^6 of the Sa*ad party, succeded nin. Two 
cays la ter he declared war on Gernany and Japan* Egypt also 
la ter becaae a charter member of the united nations. 
1. Yahya Ar«ajanl, Si^j^tj^,, p . 3 3 i . 
2. ^ n of that Maher Pashah whon Crorner had caused to 
be removed/office ^s under secretary for a^ as a bad 
advi ser. f^^  
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Mi Mahcr had kufiif^ gx*«t influtnc« ov«r th« yoonq 
King F«ruci. Zt now »p««x«d th«t tti« Priai««Minlst«r w«t 
•ctivttly •ncoux«g«4Athe King to adopt « policy of r«insur«neo 
with tho Axi» pcwors In vi«» of the io^tndlng d«f««st cf 
Sritain, and ba raalatad dxit iah fmi99ts i£$e braaking-off 
of diploa«tic ralat lcnt with Xtaly*7tha Brit ish suspeeiodis^ 
wora not without qrcunds wat dancnttratad soma tnonths latar, 
whan tha oolusans advancing into Cyr«naic^ in ^avail's push 
capturad en an I ta l ian ganaral a highly seciat l i itter addr<?* 
ssad by tha G.&«C. 3r i t i sh troops in Egypt to tha Egyptian 
JAlnistar of Oafanca and discussing ..he dafanco of tha Saina 
Oasis, which had baan antrustad to an Egyptian unit. T s^ 
Brit ish authtoritias concludaci that tha I t a l i c s had obtainad 
tha Xattar before the departure of Italitc^n leyaticn staff and 
accordingly suspected .Ali-Mahad and his *Inner cabinet*«-
Salih Harb, the minister cf Defence, ^ d Aziz Mi 4l-Misri, 
tha Chief of Staff -^ of being re^ons ib le for the leakage. 
Tha £;gy t ian authorities subsequently held on enquiry which 
purported to vindicate these persons, da in ing t h i t i t was 
not established whether tha leakage had ccoarad on tha 
Brit ish oi the bg^tian si da. 
Although l^ypt did not declare wax against the Ax^s, 
her army did assi^tin tha defence of the f^stexn Desert in 
X. Oaorge &iark, p o . d t - . p. X97, 
2.Jkddi P« 197. 
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tht dnti-aircraft defence of the Canal Zbne ^d the c i t i e s 
of Egypt, And in April i9i<i stimulateu by Genexal wavell*s 
winter success in routing the I ta l ian armies in Cyrenaica 
tfdth a torce only a fraction oi their s i ze , the Egyptian 
govemoient accepted Brit ish represMitations that the conv 
sulates of such neutralf but unfriendly powers as J^an, 
^ngry, iW^ia an4Bul9aria in such strategic centres as 
Alexandria. Poxt said, and ^ e g were nests of espionage* 
and closed them down. 
i^yptian leaders struggled to secure their full indepen-
dence. Those Egyptiaf' po l i t i c ians who mi ht have been pre-
pared to conprondse ^ t h B r i t o n were constantly outbid by 
flore extreiae nat ional i s ts , who reject«^d any 1 ea that Britain 
should continue to act as Egypt*s guardian.''' 
The jyiiddle East pol t i ca l barometer continued to f luc -
tuate with the changing strategic s i tuation, 3y January 1942 
the cisascers of Pearl Harbour and Singapore, ^ d the second 
Brit ish retreat in Cyrinaica before fk>iamel*s forces gave 
now encovragement to the enemies* In Egypt the government 
of Husaln Sirri had since 1940 co-opereted loyal ly . 3ut 
havin, no aajority backing in parliament i t s l i f e wa pre-
carious and i t s policy corre^ondingly irresolute Faced in 
the autumn of 1941 with a grovdng t ide of pro-Axis anti -
1. Peter Mansfield, SiJ^MSXl^t P* 2444 
dr l t l sh propagandt, In which th« po«v*rful and extrandst 
Iktfay^ n al-Kuali>Bun or tha Muslin Srothexhood organization 
pleyad a pzotuinent part, i t aceodad to Brit ish reprasantatlons 
by arrasting i t s laadar Hastf) al-Bunna* 
In January 1942 tha fai lure of tha Egyptian authoritiat 
to break tha alack market and ensure a proper distribution 
of bwad Cairo coincidad with tha ndlitary disa^^rj^j and 
promoted a wave of anti -Brit ish feel ing, with students march-
ing doiwn main s treets shcuting *Me axe Hoaunal's soldiers*. 
For some time the Brit ish embassy and military authorities 
came tc the ccr.clusicn thet a stron-j government in ugypt was 
necessary to seojre the ndlitary posit ion, ^/nii t h i s could 
only be secured by toringioQ back the ^fafd, wnich had recent-
l y been growing rest ive in opposition. The Mafd government 
loya l ly co-operated with Britain in the anxious days of June-
July 1942. In this second great ..dlitary c t l s i s of the Midole 
t:ast cofflpaign, faced c learly with choosing for Britain or 
the cespirad l tal i t f )S, tna Egyptian government and people 
firmly stood beoind Britain.^ 
There were now three major p i l i t i c a l forces in Egypt. 
The K-^ ng, Zaghloul*s wafd party and the Brit ish, vdth th« 
1. George e.Kirk, ssusSkX** P* 2D0. 
2* l o i d . . p. 201. 
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l a s t holding ul t ia«t« •uti:iorlty. In the years 1922-36 seme 
pattern repeated i t e l f eeveral times. The King who regarMd 
the Wafd «* '^ > *"**/• would deaaolve parliament or suspended 
the a>nstitution and rule for a t ine through ministers of 
his o«n choice. Liberal eonsitutionalism fai led to take 
root in Egypt.''' 
Brit ish domin^ce was xeduceo by the decl3r.t*on of 
independence, Jut i t \.sas s t i l l quite encu< h^ to arouse the 
angry resentment of E^y^ti^ nat ional ist undei Sa* ad Zeghlul*s 
f i e r l y leadersnip. Anglo- gyptij^ relat ions reached their 
f i z i t ffl#jox c r i s i s in Kov.l9'2<4-wlth the murder !>: ;^alro of 
iiir-Lee stack. ^ 
/ .^hloul, the old nat ional ist w^rxfor di<»d in 1927 and 
was succeedea at the head of the wafd by Nahhad Pashe. He 
was a l e s ser man, but the Mafd wes s t i l l the ofely popular 
party with mass support. In 1931 King Faud succeeded in his 
aim of ou«tinv^ the #ifafd from power, ^^ending the constitu-
t ion, he cal lec u^ >on sidqy Pasha an able right-wing authori-
tarian and ndllionaire businessman, who emended the electoral 
lew to ensure the defeat of the fiai6 in the e lect ions . Cn 
several occasions between 192i end 1936 renewed attempts 
had been made to agree on an Anglo-£gyptian c-
1, Peter Mansfiedl, o j . c i t . . p. 2 4 . 
2. The governor-general of the sudan, who oy convention 
wes sirdar (Commonder in chief) of the Egyptian army. 
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treaty. But they had all broken down on the question of 
the reserved ^joints in the 1922 declaration of independence 
especial ly the Sudan. But in 1936 the situation had changed.^ 
The struggle against the Anglo Egypti^ treaty of 
1936 took Bgypt much of the way towards ful l independence. 
The treaty w s^ to l a s t twenty years; both parties were convni-
tted to a further al l iance in 1956, but Egypt would than have 
the right to submit to third party Judgement, the question 
of whether Brit ish troops were tf)y longer necessary in Bgypt. 
The Brit ish occupation of Egypt was formally ended, but t h i s 
did not mean that Brit ish troops would leave the country. 
As Egypt's defence capability ioproved they would be withdrawn 
gradually to the Suez Ctfial Zone, «nd S i n ^ , where the ir 
number would be l imited to 10,CXX) l ^ d forces and 400 air 
p i l o t s . The treaty contained another provision wnich ultimately 
mecnt tli.it i t did not f ina l ly s e t t l e tfM Anglo-£gy,jtian 
problem. Britain reserved the right cf re-occupation with 
unrestricted use of Egyptian ports, airports and roads in 
the event of War.* 
At t-iiQ same time ugypt gained control over i t s own 
security forces for the f i r s t time since 1882. The Brit ish 
high cou'idssicner became an ambassador. The Brit ish inspec-
tor general ot the Egypt!,3n army was replaced by &n Egyptian, 
1. Peter Mansfiedl, o p . c i t . . p. 245. 
2. Ib id . , p. 246. 
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and military inta l l iyenc* was i^yptianized. Tha nuinbar of 
Europe^) in tha pol ice waft to be reduced by 2D percent a 
year, although an &)glishnan. Thonas Rasult, Scour^tcof 
narcaticft*, pedlera, regained haad of the Cairo police 
until 1946. Tha capitulati . nt were f ina l ly ranoved aid 
Egypt obtained ful l rights of Jwdadlcation and taxation 
over all residents. 
The po l i t i ca l develoivcient in Iraq after the f l r c t mAi 
t%ar i s (narked by the conclusion of four diffe ant treat ies of 
al l iance with Great 3rit«n, nanely, those of October 1922» 
January 1926, December 1927 and June 1930,* This mult ipl ic i ty 
was perhaps inev i tab le i l t was the ref lect ion of the qgp bet* 
ween the ar i t i sh and lra4l nations of what the treaty should 
1. Ib id . , p. 246. 
2. In 1930 when General Nuri as-Sa*id concluded the Anglo 
Iraqi Treaty, a regrouping of parties imsediately followed 
General Nuri fomed tha *Ahd party whc.se aim was to carry into 
e f i ec t the treaty of 1930 and to oring the mandata to an and* 
The treaty was regaro^d by rival po l i t i c ians , such as Yasin 
•l-Hashid and his followers, as unsatisfactory for the raal i* 
zation of the national aspirations of Iraq. Former (Msibsrs 
df '-^'^ aha'b and i^ili&l part ies cone toaether and organized 
^^* X>cHa»aI»watni (l.'ational JrotnarhoodJ party. The leader 
of the ^kft^ was Yari.n al-Hashni ano tha aost prominent (wsabsrs 
were RasMd *Ali al*Gaylani, HLksMt sulaynen, «nd Mohaamad 
Zaki, the Watani Party wMle o f f i c i a l l y remaining as a sepa* 
rate party was in close 1930, Li«e former parties, thess 
new parties also aiowd at achieving the indepenowice of Iracu 
and the only differences anong thsa were on the a^ans of aff* 
acting t h i s . After the winning of Iraq's independence in 1932 
the *Ahd Party dissolved. The ether two parti s, thcuyh they 
survived after 1932, lo&t t.&ir purpose and were disLOlved 
in 1934 and J93S respectively. Thus al l tne po l i t i ca l parties 
died natural de^th, since thdlr, raisonde*tr^ had disi«)p««rsd. 
ciee MaJid Khadduri, IndtBffntitn^ gf 1^§B 193^1956 (London i960), 
pp., 29<»30. 
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•in at, and of tht att«nptt aadt to ktxiaq* i t . In tht Bzitith 
mind, th« treaty was to ba a naw robe for tha mandata and 
would hava to ^xant Great Britain t right of control in tba 
affai^^s of tha new states. In tha mind of tha Iraqi laadert, 
tha clain to a right of control and indaed to mandata of 
any -dna was not one that tNiy wrara prepBX d to admit, tfid 
in thair undaratanding tha traaty would hava to ba ona of 
allianca betwa«i t«o indapendant paxtnars antaring fraaly 
into t i e s for tha furtharanca of thair nutual intarasta*^ 
The dad&ive treaty was that w Ich was a>neludad at 
Baghdad on June 30, 1930 and rectified later in the year* 
I t would sponsor the adinission of Iraq as a soverign inde-
pendent state to menbership of tha League of Nations in 
1952, and th^t i t would c^e into force as soon as Iras 
had bean admitted to ttie league. The adndssicn of Iraq 
to the League of Nations*, writes Majid Khaddurii^ 
*the end of an epoch during i»hii.h King Faysal and tha 
Iraqi nationalists had been too much pra-occupiad in 
bringing the mandate to an end to pay proper att«ition 
to internal reforms* 
In 1939, the Prime Minister of Iraq was *Nuri al-Sa*id. 
Ni^extol ess, he ner«ly broka diploaiatic ralatiuns vdth Qamany 
and did not daclare A'ar. Local ^^oliticl^jn 1940 foxced Nuxi 
1. Antonius, George., oo . c i t . . p. 360* 
2. oa . c i t i . p*34. 
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•1 S«*ld to resign th« picoilexship in favour of ttM nationa-
l i s t Hathid al Gailani, a man hotUl* to ttM Brit ish. This 
vdth Britain*s i n i t i a l ravorsas at ttia hands of Garmany qgif 
r i s s to nautral trancs in I r a ^ po l i t i ca l c i r c l e s . As Majid 
Khaddyri writast'^ 
. . . N o t only did Oanaral Nuri f a i l to influence tha 
course of lrac^*s foreign policy after Rashid *Ali 
had iMcoma Priiaiar, but, isora s ignif icant , tha la ter 
condously raoved to reverse Nuri*s policy* -From tNi 
outbreak of the .^gt to the fa l l of France (Jwie 1940) 
openion in Iraq had so radically changed that Hasiiid 
*Ali« undoubtedly to his great sat isfact ion crifted 
into the leadership of 3 movenent which h/d been in 
the making. 
The Pan*Arab ideology, xsiUMdiviui because widely spread 
among the p o l i t i c a l l y conscious people of Iraqi and ilk 
hdd Ovcctoe the traditional policy for the Iraqi govern* 
fiient to work for the xeal i iat ion of that ideology, v&th 
Syria and Palestine under foreign control Iraq had 
naturally become the hot bad of Arab Nationalisis'^ 
I t vdll be recalle>i that Great Britain had invited Iraq 
to participate in the 1939 a>nference to find a solution to 
the Palest ine probl<». Fiixthentore, Hajj Anin al Husaini, 
who had f l eo to Leb^on, was given asylum in Baghdad, Iraq 
liad become the c ^ t e r of Pan-Arabism. The nat ional ist PriiM-
Minister, Rashid *Ali al Gailsnl, quite naively to entice 
tha i ir i t ish into discarding eh4 *Balfcur Decleration* and 
declaring the independence of Arab Palestlnep-' In return 
X. i l2 l^. , p. 162* 
^. Yahya, Arm^jani, sua^SH** P*339. 
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Iraq v«uld foxn«lXy Join th« Al l l« s and dvdaxe war against 
th« Axfts* But th« r«fus«l of Gx*at Britain to a>s^>ly with 
such a -actutst str«ngth«nsd Gailani and his fallo>A nationt-
l i s t s in th«ij; hope, that coopaxaticn with tha Axis mi^ht 
nelp uham to aciUava thair goal* Hajj Anin al-Husaini was 
alxeaoy in touch with Garmans. Gailini joined hands with 
hin and astablishad contact idth vonp«i|»aaj' Tha Brit ish 
could not toliXata such a c t i v i t i a s , and aske .^ tha regant 
Abdullajt to disniise Gailaikl.As a result of tha interplay 
of Iraqi p o l i t i c s , Gailani l o s t his oft i c e to Ganaral Taha-
al-Hastai in January 1941. Oetarainad to return to owar 
Rashid, in conspiracy vdth a group of four colonels^ known 
as tha Golden Square' axecutec a Coupdi*etat <.n April 3 , 
austlng Taha it%6 assur>.lng the pieniership. Regent * Abdullah 
Nuri al-Sa*id and a iBajority of tha c^^inet rnes^rs ascapad 
to TransJorcan.'^ For the remainder of the '^sr, Nuri->Sa*ld 
was ^rlffie Minister. By d«clarching ^fi»x against the Axis, 
Iraq was the f i r s t Viest Asian country to bacocte a inattbar 
of the United Nations, Iraq playad a part in the transporta-
t ion of 'Ji9X supplies to the Soviet lAilon.^ 
1. The Geiinan Airibas ador in Ankara* 
2. These ware Colonels Salih ed~Din, KaaiQ Shahib, Fehad 
^aid, and Mahraud Salman. 
3 . Gaoitge I.anczows!U, oo. c i t . . p.247. 
4 . Vahya, Axs^ani, o p . e i t . . p.340. 
Th« collapse of Haslild All*s req mo onablod th« regent 
•nd tho oxilod to return to Ir«q. Tho country w s no govern* 
ed by tho pro*«lly group, sir\6 no a«jor d l f f i e u l t l e t wore 
o]q>eriencod into Iraq during the next four ye«rt» In 1942 
Iraq becetne a recipient of land-'leaso aid fron the United 
s tates and an Anerican sailitary talssion arrlvod in Basra 
to aid in £or»^aroing war supplies to the Soviet Union. On 
January l6 , 1943 Iraq decldred war on Gemany, I t a l y and 
Japan, <ant the 22nd She signed the IMited Kationa d e d a i a -
t ion, tho f i r s t /\rab country to became e l i g i b l e to attend 
the future 5an Francisco Conferenco. 
I t i s txue that Axis propaganda had aroused the ^an* 
Arahs against Britain, but i t was infact th^ k<5:>(£nt c^nti-
Brit ish fueling w:)ich, underchanged viorld conditions, was 
f u l l y exploited by the opponents of Anglo*Iraqi collabora* 
t i c n . The revival of «^nti-British feeliny was i ot an isolated 
phenoi&enon confined to Iraq* The fai lure of the general Arab 
nat icnal i s t n)cvesi<mt to aciiieve the Unity ano independence 
of the Arab countries was one cause, and thaxe were other 
factors peculiar to Iraq. <^ s Khauduri writett2 
The talent cause of any national ist up l^^avels in 
the Ara^ world were inherent in the unsatisfactory 
settlement fol losing the f i r s t worlc war. Great 
Britain had promised the Arebt the realization od 
their national aspirations, namoly freodom from 
1. aaorge, Lsncrttwski, o p . c i t . . p. 248, 
2. o p . c i t . - pp. 168-169• 
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Turkish contxol and tha •st«bXishm«nt of « Unlt«d 
Arab Kingdon CoRpxiting, in th« laaln the Farti l* 
Cre»c»nt and th* Arat>ian Pfninsub« By th« peact 
sttttlenent, however the Fartlla era scent was neatly 
dlviced into separate e n t i t i e s under Sr i t i sh and 
French nandr.te, while the Arabian Peninsula, which 
was l e f t to work out i t s own salvation, was exposed 
to ^ r e i g n Influence on i t s boarders* Tha A T ^ nation-
a l i s t s neadless to say* were fax^ fr&n sat is f ied by 
such tm arrangement, since they were not proposed 
to aCO»pt any se t t l ment sort of Unity and coo^lete 
independence. They wanted independence as a matter 
of right, et eabodied in Urs#t Bri ta in 's pledges 
to i^arlf Husain, ratner tnan as a matter of capacity 
fox self government as l a i o dowrt in the mandate system 
Failing to aciiieve unity and independence the Ar^ 
nat ional i s t s naturally contended that ^oth Britain 
and France had cel ibexetely follcwed a policy of 
divide at Armoere by creating s a a i and weak states 
in order to a^isfy the l i l . tperia l i s t designs. Britain 
pcrhap^A would have a l l owd a cjreater degree of uuity 
(Irfionq the Ar,?b countries i f she were ten s«le Euro-
pean power in tne Arb world, out the instance vt 
Franco in claitning Syria and Lebanon, as assioned to 
her in thesykesrPicot agreement of 16 May 1916, had 
decidedly agravated '^'nv tendency of dividing the 
Arab world into separate ^^heres o^ influence. 
In the later pert of the war, Iraqi ' s energies, so 
far as foreign relations were concerned, were focussed en 
collabcration with other Arab states in the creatior, of 
^^^ Arab League and in ^idvocat ng, simultaneously, the 
"Greater Syria* plan, which would result in the unification 
of Syria* Iraq and T r ^ s j o r d ^ under a Conraan Hashmite crown. 
From the begining of 19:^ the French rule divided tha 
Mandated T e n i t o r i e s into four different ad^nistrat ive 
unitst The State of Great Lebanon, kncwn lat^r as the 
1* kSUJ^'t PP« 166-I6^. 
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LebancM ^^ubl ic) Th« Stat* of Syria l a t t r callad tha 
Syrian Hapublic; iMch ineludad Sanjaq of Alaxandratta, tha 
state of tha Alvds, known fron as tha Govarnr..ent of tatakia 
and tha goyernnivnt of Jsbal Druza* This organization lastad 
until 1936 whan tha Fxancs<-Syrian Traaty was signad in tha 
stfaa yaars which was to l a s t for 25 ysars. According to tha 
Traatyt tha Syrian Govarnnant was to bound to giva al l tha 
f a c i l i t i a s xaquirad by tha Franch forces, including tha 
use of Syrian waters and p^rt^as by Franch Vassals, 
Howavar, what WJS ia<i^ oxt«d to tha Syrian nat icnal i s t s 
vvas the fact tnrt the ct unt^ y was s t i l l under foreign coni-
iiuti^i aynd that the Arab leaders had no direct authority 
in t n t i i c'Ain countries, iut tha extraordinaxy ^ve«ts which 
took place during gn6 after to second Horld /.ar did not keep 
the Arabs in the same placet The Arab lands found thensalvat 
d irect ly Involved in the «?ai' after the collapse of Franca 
in 1< 40. In June 194u tha France autrKxities in tha Levant 
threw tneir weight on the side of tha Vichy gcvernnient in 
Fiance, Mltn the result that the ^iritish and uaul l i s t Free 
Frwtch forces, operatin,. from Palestine, attac^ied ano defeated 
the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon in July 1971,''-
The Syritfi and tha Lebanese nat ional i s t s considered 
the / fa l l France as an oppoxtunity to press fox their imtnadiata 
1. Z,N. Zeine, (eds) P,h*ikilt, QD. c i t . . p. 
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-— inc}*p«)d«nee. The collaps* of tht Fr«nch franc* and 
tha economic h^rs^dp w!iich rasultad, g«v« the jyria gn6 
tha Latotfiaaa paop]« occassion to caxry on strikes, organise 
p o l i t i c a l domenstrations ^nd demand indep«nd«nee* The 
rr<^asures which General ^entz took to sat i s fy the nations* 
l i s t s were not e f fect ive .^ 
The out break of War brougtit iBuaeciiate chan<jes in every 
^httxa of l i f e , in Syria and Lebanon, as in the other count* 
r i e s invclved* At the beginning ct the viox the important 
part of W'dch the forces in the Mandate Territories vvere 
cost wds shown by the ap, ointment of General we^and as 
Cooimenderin-chief of tne ^i:ench forc<^s in tne Levant. Other 
nessures were t«^ken to place the t e r r i t c r i e s iu a ^ t e cf 
defence. Ti» urgency cf the situation was some what easedt 
however, by the decision of the I ta l ian Government to remain 
neutral*^ 
Various p c l i t i c c l messures were also taken to ensure 
the safety of the country. Cn July 7,1999, the president 
of the JFiOKUblic resigned, and on July 10th nev^  French High 
Conffidssioner, babriel Pueaux suq»ended the constitution 
dissolved the ch^aber, ano appointed a ncn*political council 
of Llxi^cior to govern the country under his authority. Sisd* 
lar Btessuras war ^ also taken in Leaanon soon after the out 
1. Yauya Armajdnl, SkjJ^** P«340. 
2. A.ri.HDurdni, ftu.cit.. p.330. 
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br««k of th« i¥ax* There th« High Coondssioncr su» «n<i«d 
th« Constitution and dissolvod tho ch«nb«r. Tho Pr«sid«tit 
of Lobtfion, howwor, r«naln«d in e f t i c o , but the nora«I 
cabinet was replaced by *a tiricile secretary of s tate who 
governed through c iv i l servents under French supervision.^ 
At the out"^reak of HAX tho Fr«)ch dissolved a nutter 
of nat ional is t org nization believed to be in syi^pathy vdth 
of 
the Axis, s^ntendLng soiae/their neetbers to long teres 
of inprisoniMnt. The majority of polltlcallyHiind#d Syrian, 
l i k e the brethejnn in Palestine decided that tbsz't was 
nothing to ci>oosc between oppression i>y a denocracy «rtd 
that exercised in the nane of Faseisai and consequently 
tho general attitude towards the 'Var one of i9)8thy «nd 
scept ic i sn towards octh s ides, though some f l i r t ed with 
the Axis Arsdstice Coamissions and a few coRnnitted thenselvoi 
2 
aore deeply. 
Towards the Fr«»nch, who wore facing a threat to thoir 
survival, Syrian and Lebane&e po l i t i ca l leaders c i rc le s 
expressed, at l eas t outwardly, their loyalty , stressing 
of 
also their attacnment to the caap;,d(i*inocracy. in real i ty , 
however, the Arab public openion was host i le to France eiid 
the Al l i e s in general. Resentment at Miat was believed to be 
1. George Lenezowski, S^Hjj&i'.'t p«275, 
2. G«»rge E.Kirk., aSLU^'* p.2D6. 
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a a&tr«y«l of th« AxJi* aft^x .«rXd «r«r I , t(^9»%im nt of 
Turkey on tb* Al«N4indr«tt« is«u*» ttui non«>ratific«tlon of 
th« ;^yri«n «nd L«t>«ntts« tx«atl«ft «nd t ^ •xcltMMnt ov«r 
th t Zionist question in Pal»8tin«-» a l l contrltMtao to a 
cMiflnity ant i -Al ly tr»nci in %ha Lavat^t.^ 
Apart from ttiasa, otn^r currtnts of po l i t ica l f aa l l r^ t 
•x i t tao t>«neath tha surface, kHit thara was l i t t l « ovsrt p o l i -
t i c a l act iv i ty during the f i r s t nina gicnths of the ax, Tht 
High CoKeistion«»r and th« ^yrain and Lebanasa authorities 
•onfined themselves laainly to the aeaeures of adadiiatrative 
reform ana eoonouic «nci financial control, The tafeguariHig 
of the food sup ly against tha act iv i t ies cf harders and 
profiteers WAS tmit constant preoccupation. I n external 
a f fa i rs , on« scuxee cf «nxiety was reooved by the conclusiot 
i n ftovetabar 1939, of tna Anglo-French-Turkish pact, and in 
March 1940, of a Turco-;»yrl an A^reeeient of Fzikendstiip and 
oood t^eiyiibouxlinaas. 3ut a ncfw anxiety grew up^ vAth the 
German offensive on the ^iiestam Front in May, 1940, and 
the entry of I t a l y into the fit i n June, i t reflected i t s e l f 
in the «dditior)al MMiaeures of precaution taken in tha 
Mandated Tarritcries«2 
1 . Ueorge L««caowck, ojgjjdj^*, p.a'TB. 
2. A.H.fkurani, OD.iAt>^ p.231* 
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Subftequcnt c}«v«lopm«nt incr««Sftcl the anxiety of th* 
Bri t i sh gov«mrn«nt. In August 1940, th« I ta l ian «nd Garman 
Aroistic* CoBunissions arrived in aairut, Harrvcn Henting 
arrived in Syria, and Garman propaganda, usually successful 
with the Axdbs, was stopped up considerably. The real c r i s i s 
occured in May X9#l. 
At the begir^g of 1941 the unrest w^dch had been so long 
la tent , cooie to Ahead. Strikes and demonstrations began in 
Syrian towns, and very soon turned into po l i t i ca l disturbances 
directeo by a number of nat ional is t connittees ^ d leaders, 
and above all by Shukri al-uauwaytli, who issued a nanifesto 
setting forth their object ives , lie Condemned th« existing 
govemnent of 3hij al-Khatib. He declared that the legal 
basis of French rule no longer existed since ttm League of 
Nations had ceased tc function. He, tirarefoxe, dea^ded the 
immediate formai-icn of a national yoverMoent. Shortly after-
v«ards, in ccnsequence oi th@ continuation of the disturbsnces, 
the Government of aahij al»Khatil^reslgned. There was -^  
tesiporary cessation of the unrest wdch the iHqh Conwdssioner 
negotiated with the shukri al-uuwwaytli and others for the 
fornaticn of a mo e representative Government, but distur* 
bances broke out once more after the fa i lure of the negotia-
t i cns . ^ During these uncertain coonths the true centre of 
1. Geoige Lencwaxki, SJSLIJA1»9 p. 276. 
2. A.H.Houroni, oj.elt..^ p.235. 
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Syrian po l i t i ca l « c t i v i t i « s \»«s Baghdad. 
On Jun* 8, 1941, Brit ish troops, undar th« coinmand of 
Sir Hanry Maitland ^Ison , cxossad the frontiers of Syria 
and Labanon and invaded Syria froai P<i.lestina. Transjordan 
and Iraq* The Free French eliraents accdpanied them. General, 
Henri l>enti*s troops put up tf^d exexpeetadly strong res i s ta -
nce, but after a laonth of fighting he sued for peace, snd on 
14th July an armistice i^ as siv^nad.''' Syria and Lebanon wero 
included in the ax9B under the Brit ish Middle £as- Command • 
The question of Franco-^yrian Lebanese relationship remained 
to be solved* On the day of the invasion, the French Commander 
General Catroux issued a :uroelenation in wnlch he stated 
that the Free French intended to put on end to the Mandatory 
regi.ne, to proclaioai Syria and Lebanon free and independent, 
and to negotiate a treaty wtUch MOuld define t h ^ r autual 
re lat ions! 
The proclamation seidt 
Inhabitai^ts of oyria ^ d Lebanon* 
At tne aoment hen th« forces of Free France, united 
to the forcds of the Brit ish eB%>ire, her al ly , are 
entering your terri tory , I declare that I assuaw the 
powers, respons ib i l i t i e s and duties of ihe represen-
ta t ive of France in the levant* I do th i s in the naae 
of Free France, which i s the traditional «nd real 
France, and in the name cf her chief General de Goulle. 
In trds capacity Z cane to pot #) end to the mandatory 
regime ano to , r o d aim you free and Ind^endwnt. 
1. Cseorge Lenexo^ski,* fiiUALi't p.277, 
2. A.H*riourani, a£jL^Lk»9 PP* 241-242. 
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*you Mill th*r«fo*r«, &• froa hM)C«forw«xd soveri9n 
dHc lnci^«nd«nt p«opI«s, and you will >>• abl« either 
to form yours«lv«s Into &ttp«r«t« states or to unit* 
IntQ a s inglt stata* In alther avMt, your Inoapand* 
•nt ^d sovadgn statat mill guarantaad by a traaty 
in w Ich our mutual ralat icns Mill ba daflnad* This 
traaty will ba na9otiatad at loon at potsiola b«tvii«an 
your raprasantivas and aytalf . Pending i t s conclusion 
•itr^«tttui|ti^|i»flition tdilll b« ona of d o s e unity in 
pursuit of a conmion ideal end com on air.nt. 
Inhabitants of oyria and Lebanon, you will sae fro* 
thia o«cioration th«t i f the Free French jno Bri t i th 
forcet crots your frontier, i t i s not to take sway 
your liberty« i t i t to ensure it» I t i s V> drive out 
of Syria the forces of i € t l e r • I t i s to prevent tha 
Ltvent iron becoiidnQ asn eneiiy bate directed as^ainst 
the Brit ish and against ourselves. 
•m who are fighting for the l iberty of peoples cannot 
allow the enemy to subjugate your county s t ^ by step 
obtain control of yuur persons and your belongings, 
and turn you :.int<> s lavt . me cannot allow the popu-
la t iont which France hat pron^ted to dapand to fa l l 
into the hands of the Bc»t wanton and p i t i l e t t aatt«>r 
that history has knoMf) we cannot allow the dg«*-long 
in teres t s of Franct in the levant to be handed over 
to the enemy. 
Inhabitents of Syria and Lebanon i f , in answer to our 
appeal, you ral>y to us, ycu snould Icnow that the 
Brit ish Government in agreeaent with Frae France hat 
prooitad to gr.^nt you all the advtfitagts enjoyed by 
the fre«r countries wttich BX9 associated Mdth them. 
Tmjs t h i s blockade udll be l i f t e d and you will enter 
into imiuediate relat ions with the starling bloc, 
which will give you enormous advtfttagtt from the olnt 
of view of your imports ^ d experts. You will je able 
to buy c^ nd s t l l free ly with 1^1 the free countries. 
Inhabitents of ^yria and Ltbanon* A yreat hour in your 
history has struck. Fr«nce declares you independent by 
the voice of h<^ r sons who §r9 fighting for her l i f e 
,nd for the Liberty of the ii»rld. 
• 1 9 0 
C«t«oux* s dedaxation was endorsed In a saparata 
statement ls'~;u«d In Cairo on the sane day oy Ai^as atior 
Six smiles Laapson (Lord Kill am) In the na»e of Great 
Britain. On June 24 General deOaulle appointed General 
Catroux * Deligate General and Plenipotentiary of Free 
France in the Levant • - a l i t t e replacing tne former 
t i t t i of HLgti Com iss ioner* and General deGaulle la id 
ckfvjn the ^ain l i n e s of the policy which he was to ado t 
in regard to Syrian and Lebanese independence. 
General Catroux, as representative of General de 
Gaulle,, head of Free prance, appointed new governors fcr 
Lebanon and Syria* This did not sat is fy the nat ional i s ts , 
v4)o danourtfd tor national independence*In the meantime, 
the Brit ish, whc had to ftup,^ly the economic needs of Syria, 
Lebanon tnrcuyri their Mi dale East supply center in Cairo, 
revised the currency and brought the two regions under 
the sterling blocl^. I t was an open secret that the t ir i t i th 
were encouraging the nat ional is t Iti'aders it. their dem«nd 
for independence. 
The attii-ude of the Brit ish government towards the 
future po l i t i ca l regime in Syria ^ d Lebanon w.s made 
d e a r from the aegining of the Free French administration. 
1. Yahya Armaj ani,^ y2AJSil*» P*34i. 
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First , i t d^sirs^d tc s«« th«s« States given their 
incependence, but secondly, subject to the fulfilment 
of that conoiticn, i : acknowled-jed the priority of France* • 
position over that cfany ether European power in Syria 
and Lebanon, Atteo^ts ivere iaade to reconcile these a t t i -
tucet. On August, Xt),194i. Oliver Lyttelton, Sxit ish 
Minis- r of otate for the Middle c s t , and General de 
Gal/ll«. exchanged l e t t e r s in which they r*-«ffirmed that 
"Great i iritain has no interest in :iyria or LebtfH>n, except 
to wdn the !«ar** and that once independence of th« Levant 
s tates has been achieved, "Francii shculd have the pre* 
doninent position in Syria and Lebanon over any other 
European power".*^ On S^tember 9t 1941, since declationt 
were made by Prime Minister Churchill in the iiouse of 
Comiaons. 
There followed a period of negotL-tions and discussions, 
during which the government of Khalid al<*Azm in Syria tfid 
that of Alfred Naccoche in Lebanon xemained in office* 
General Catrouxt in the l e t t e r in which he asked the Syrian 
Prime Minister to remain iry>ffice, stated that the Mandatory 
regime could not be terminated until the mccupation of tht 
i . A,H.HMnr«ii, afixj4t-» P*a*». 
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country was coi^pleta. Aft«r that a rc^in* of ind^andanct 
Mould ba Inauguratad, to ba guaramtaad by a traaty nagotla-
tad on a footln^;, of anUdlity, 
A f«w d^ys latar , on Ssptanbar 2B, 1941, OwztX catzoux 
pxoclalBwd tha Indapenuenc* of byxla. Tha ino^andanc* of 
L*btf)on was pxodaiiMd two seontht latax. On Novanbar, 26 
1941. To lap aaiant thase docunants, Ganaral catxoux asked 
Shaykh Taj al-Uin to assuna tba prasidancy of i»yrid and 
raquastad A> f rad Naccacba, pxasident of L«btfu>n, to ranain 
in that past. 
Aftar lonq hasitation, tha Frae Franch at l a s t da^dad 
to rastoxa eonstltutional govamaiant. In March 1943, provin« 
d a l gova niaent wexa astablishad in uoth Syria and Lebanon 
in oxdar to toaka tha oaeessary axx^gamants for the alactions» 
thct in Syria was haadad by Ata «1-Ayyubi, that in Lebanon 
by Dr.Ayyub Th.bit,^ In May 194^, tha Syrians conducted an 
e lect ion and chose nat icnal i s t leader ^hukki al*uuwaytly 
»* President of the new xepublic. The Lebanase followed 
the Same procedure in August and cnose their national ist 
3 leader 91 share alHChuri as president. 
1. George L«ncwDzski, £|LiJ(dLi*t P*278« 
2. A.H.Hfiuranit o. . d t . . p. 296. 
3 . Yahya Axeajani, £fiAJ4i»« P*341. 
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On Nov«al>«r 8^ i94a« th« L«b«ntt« parliament a<k>pt«d 
a xaaolution to dJTop fron tha eenatitution all thosa artielas 
thct raftrtad to Franca at a Mandatory powar. Tha French 
arraatad tha prasioant of Hapuollc ano tha laajority of t^s 
cabinet under arraat, suspendad ttia conatltutlon and 
appointed isalla &dda as head of the state and of tha 
governiaant. Tha lebanese replied vdth a general atrika 
and anti-Franch riots . On J«nuary 24,1944 a sindlar 
cjdais occured in 3yria, though in lass violent fom.'* 
Great Britain and the United Stataa and the joviet Union 
recognized the two republics and they, in turn, oy declar-
ing the war against the Aids^  in 1945, became Charter narobers 
of tha United Nations. Neverthalass, Qeneral da Goulla 
insisted upon * French prerogatives* and th-3 French dmy 
did not fully avaMiat* Syria untili^ril i94i, -j^.a i >ifMiti«d 
in Lebanon until Daceober of the sane yaav. Thus bcth 
republics ac^daved eonplete political enenidpation. I t 
was also during 1946 on 22 March, that independence was 
granted to Trans-Jordan. 
1. George Lenewozski, oo-e i t . , p.34l« 
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Ttit opening of ttM P«#e« Conf«r«nc« bzt>ught to Paxlt 
strong Zionist dslsgstlon, ix>th from Grsat 9ritaln and from 
th« Unltsd Statss . Cn April 25, 1920, ths Ail isd uiprsns 
Council allocatsd ths nandats ovsr Pal*stin« to Great Britain 
and on July 22,1922 Qraat Britain was formally confirraad 
as a«anddtory power lay tna Council of ttia Lsagus of Nations. 
Ths siandatt sxpxsssly providsd for a Jswish National Hoas 
in Palsstina FUndansntally tii« Palsstinsan Arabs ncvsr 
•ccsptsd ths Brit ish mandats at a l l . For t a i s rsascn thoy 
Gonsistantly rsjsetad 3ritan*s t«ntat ivs st«ps towards crsa* 
ting raprssttntativa ins t i tu t ions as prelude to self govem-
nent at soinetino in the future. Moreover they did t d s at 
a tlnie when the idlonists were also opposod to such moves 
because the jews were s t i l l only a small sdnority of the 
population and would havs been consisttfit ly outvoted.^ 
1, The d o n i s t view of 'Jewish 'National HQIBS* has been 
doscribed by a l i o n i s t Harny Sacher in the following words: 
"I say that we are concerned with i s the establishnent of the 
Jowish National Hoae what we are eoncexneo with i s that we 
shall have, as I said li^ef&Th^ ^fte&^mM^n to which there shall 
be no a r t i f i c i a l res tr ic t ions , that we shall be enable as a 
Jewish poople to pull al l our energies into Making what i s to 
be made of t h i s country so as to enable Jews to cone here 
and create t i i is civil!<!aT: tr.. sM (Mipeci amd oersand under wbe 
Mandate of the Guvernmont th^t i t snail do i t s part in f a d -
l i t atin that Mork. I t aay be, gn^ I say frankly we hope that 
one day as a result of t i s natural process there will be a 
Jewish Majority in t i s country. See by MehMood Husain, the 
Palsst ine Li jeration Organization, (Delhi, f9.79) , p .3 . 
2. Peter Mansfielo, Ot;?.ci^.. p. 248. 
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Xn 1911 ^ti«>Jii«lsh <ii sturbanc«s biroks cut, .^ hen «pp«als, 
protests arguments dla&Rttxatlon and t txikas fdlact to mov* 
tht d r i t i t h 9ev«m««nt to f u l f i l l I t s plsdgss to th« Arabs 
and follow a policy of Justlca and aquallty, tha Palsstlna 
Arabs , resort d fro« to t i n s to tlma, to vlolenca. Tha 
f i r s t axprasslon of Arabs fsallng oecurrad en Eastar Sunday 
In April 1920* tlM saeonc In May 1921» tha third In /^gust 
1929) and batwaen 1936 and 19391 «nd all[out raballlon broko 
out bv'ilch was pr^etadad by en praesdanted six soonths strlkas. 
Tba syobol of t h i s t o ta l l y unoo^>ronlsln9 Arab attltuda was 
Ha j^ Andn al-Husalnl.''' 
Four principal Comeisslon of inquiry ware appolntad 
dlr«etly as a result of the rlots« Tha Zionist rsada no 
sacrat of thalr Intentions, for as early as 1921, Dr.l^dar^ 
blodly the court of enquiry}^ 
1. A young metaber of one of the leadxn^ Jarusales Arab 
f a o l l i e s , who had studies at al*-Axher University In Cairo 
and had acted as racivtlng off icer for Faltals* drsy undar 
a r i t l s h occupation. Ha headed the Antl«Jawish danonstratlen 
In April 1920 and was sentenced by a Military court to f i fteen 
years In Prll^aon. He abscondad but was pardanad by Sir Herbaz4 
Saawal, who decided as a measure of w n d l l a t l o n of Arab opan«> 
lon, that he should be offered ttM post of iluftl of Jerusalei^ 
when the post fel vacant on tha death of his step brother. 
In 1922 he was elected head of tha Supreme Muslim Coundl 
wiilch had been formed by tha a r l t l s h mandatory government. 
From than onwards, ha was the • f fac t ive laader of the Palea» 
t in an Arabs. If for a period he was prapared to hold his 
hanu. In ef fect ha never altered his determinations to wage 
a l l uut war against both the i^rltlsh and tha i l o n l s t s to make 
Palest ine and Indepandwnt Axab s tates Sea ^etar Mansfield, 
o p . d t . , p.248. 
2. A meiaber of the Zionist Gomadsslon. 
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th«r« c«n t>« only on« *N«tion«l Honw In Palestine, «nd 
that a jatdsh ona, «ii<} no aquality In tha Partnership 
batwaen Jawa m4 Arabtt but « Jawiah prapondaranc* as 
aoonas tha nuoibara of tha raca BX* suf i idantly inc* 
raaa«d." j^  
Tha coM^asiona of inquiry wMich wara appoint«el to 
aat^l iah tha cauaaa for tha riot wvaxa aach followad by 
tha issua of a *Statament of Policy' aach atto^pting to 
Intarprat tha maanlng of *a National Nona*. On 3 Juna 192.>, 
tha Sritiah Govamotant iasuad «yhat bac^aa, known as *Tha 
Churchill Maaorandoa* *¥^al«stina i t to oMtoam aft Jawish aft 
England in i:Jigli&h? 
Tha statantant want to point out that "His Malasty'a 
Caovarmnent r'^ gardad any such axpactaticn as isiprae* 
ticaola tftd i\gv9 net such ain in view* hor hava thay 
at any tloKB comtasoplatad. • • tha disapp^sranca or tha 
subordination of tha Arabic population, Itftguagt or ^ 
cultura in Palastina. Thay would draw attantion to 
tha fact thdt tha tarms of tha (Balfour) Dadaration 
rafarxad to do not contaniplata that Palestina as a 
«^ la sh&uld ba convartad into a Jftwiah National 
Ho«a, but that such a ihu» ahould ba foundad in Palaa«> 
tina, 
Batwaan 1931 and 1935 thara «fat a graat auraf* of Jaidth 
iaorrjigrstion into Pal«8tina. In i t ia l ly this was aneouragtd 
by Zionist func and tiia optiisiatic aconoraic pro^>actt in 
X. a^ad HB44SJA, '^tUfiT tetyrtXt .PiHffUO*^ frfjitffi 
2» lj| |ji«» p«6i« 
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P«I«sUn« at a tin* whan the raat of tha world was suffar* 
Ing f FOB a sluop. In 1933 HLtlar* s advant to pow»r in Garnany 
wa« an additional stinultts as i t tpraad faar throu^tiout tha 
ja«d sh CoMAinitios of europa. 
In Apzil 1936 tha various Arab political group^in 
Palcstina ynitad to form tfi Arab High Conndttaa undar i^ ajj 
AKLn al-Husaini. In eraaticn against continuii^^ feax of tha 
grov/th of Jawl^h numbars in Pdla^tina «nd f&uxo iouaadidta 
alarn at tha dlscovary tn t^t tha ^onista vtef aoAiy ^ ling in 
ama for salf daianca, tha Hiyhar ttottodttaa called for a 
ganaral strika, woich davalopad into QMiaral Arab rahallion 
e 1 
supi^ortad by Syrian and Iraqi voluntj^ra. 
In 1937 a naw British Coanission of inquiry under Lord 
paal dadartd tha mandata as unworkable, and for tha f irst 
time recottmended the creation of an Arab-Jewish state in 
Palestine with a third small state under dritish administra-
tion for Jerusalen* Bethel hem, Naxareth and the surrounding 
areas* This idea as rejected by both Arabs and Jews and in 
the fcllowLnQ year vvas declared unworkable by the wbodhead 
technical Comadttee. In 1938 the Arab lebellion was renewed 
with increasing, violence. I t was primarily directed against 
1. Peter Mansfield, oo .c i t . . p«290. 
the aritish but J^vdsh t^tlMMnts «v«jr« «l8o attacked.'^ 
dzitain's next imv m»9 to call » itound Tablt Confa* 
rencfi In London in tiM ipYin9 of 1939* ;«hieh was atr.ondod 
by Zionist and Axab raprasontativas from Fal«stina and 
by daiigatas from tha axlsting Arab statas* The coi^osition 
of the Confarance introctocad an alaaant of novelty into 
Palostinean pol i t ics . Hitliarto tha arltish had tried to 
sati^led the c&ntzovarsy by eouaultation with Arab leaders 
frorrj ^  al«<;tina. This ConfaraDce acknowledged h^a Ar^ b 
v«rld*s Interest in l^alsstine by inviting the independent 
states of £gyr>t, Ixaq § Saudi Arabia, Txansjordan and Ya«an 
to attend but i t broke down to f aiiura» I t was at this point 
that tha British government deddad to tdke a orastic action 
to try to settle the zoblem in the fact of am inavitable 
coislng Hax. 
Tha Gonfereneo siet in London in February and March 1939. 
Tha Arabs tfid the jews held separate meetings because of tha 
refusal of the Palsstinians to set vdth tha Jewish delegation. 
Tha Conference produced no agreem^^tt each party adhered 
stubbornly to i t s own formula. Tha Arabs reltaratad their 
demand fox independence and insisted on tha stoppage of 
Jewish ioinlgration. Tha Jews msda an eloquent plea for 
iffiplamentation of tha Balfour Declaration in Hhis blacr.ast 
1. iJiLii., p. 2:^ 1. 
teur of J*Mlsh history* and «tr«ts«d th« n«ed of continued 
unlt*rrupt«d Imrdgratien. Brit ish com^roedsft piroposals w»r« 
r«J«ct«d by both part i t t . THa confcrenct disbandad vdthout 
proc^clng eny agrceaent,'^ 
On X7 May 1939 tha Dritiah Qovaxmnent iasuad a *Stata-
mant of Policy* which brntam* knoMfi »• *Tha MacDonald whita 
P^ar*. Aftar rafarring to tha tama of tha Mandata, tha 
tha (Stataaient* point out, tha Hoyal coaaiiasion and previous 
eoMBlssions of isnqulry hsva dr MH attantlon to tha attblgidty 
of cartain axprasslons In tha kandata, such as tha axprasa-
ion of* c national hoaa fox tha Jawi>h paopla* and thay hava 
found in t h i s aflihi<:juity and tha rasultlng uncartanity as to 
tha oojactlvas ot policy funoattantal causa and hos t i l i t y 
icf>.w*«i Arabs and J9w&, Tha Govafniaant was convinced that, 
in tha intarasts of peaca and wall baing of tha whola paopla 
of Pal«ttina, a clear daflnitlon of policy and objactivas 
was essantial* Conaaquantly, tha Brit ish (jovexnin«iiit dadarad 
that naithar th«ir undertakings to tha jaws nor the national 
interes t of liritain warranted that thay stK>ulo continue to 
oavelop the national hosts oayuung tha point already reached. 
The Governaent ttiarafora de(;iuadt 
l.Thdt the jevdsh t4atiunal i^na as anviaagad in tha 
Balfour Declaration and in previous statomMits of 
Brit ish pol cy had been astabllshadi 
!• George Lenczawski, p p . e l t . . p.324. 
2. Saod Had^awi, SSjJS^'* PP»63-64. 
2. Th«t to d«¥«l«p i t further against /jrab 
wltti«s ¥e«tlcl iM f violation to dxit^n*« 
undartakingt to tha Arabs* and that such 
a policy could only ba carriad out by tha 
usa of unjustifiabla forcK 
3. Thdt, tHarafora, aftar a adaission cf a final 
c^otfe of 75.000 aora Ja«dsh iaunigxants ov&r a 
paxicd of fiva yaars« Ja«iish inrlgration shotild 
stop. 
4. Th:t during th§s pariod of fiva yeara. a rastric* 
tion should ba placad on taa acquisition of fur-
thar land in Palsstina by tha Jaw«t md 
5* That at tha and of tha poriod of fiva yaars, 
salf governing institution should ba sat up 
in tha country* 
Tha whita Pap*x of 1939 Mtvisagad cha astablistoant 
within 10 yaars of an indapandant Palastina state. Thosa 
IP years waie to t}9 ccnsidarad as a transitional pariod 
during wiiich tha British Govamaant would continue to 
administer the country giving to Arabs and Jaws an increas-
ing st)are in tha governnant. A reprasantative oody to ba 
sat up at the and of five years to review tha vuorking of 
ar.angaiBsnts would make raeonmwtdations for tha drafting 
of a constitution of tha Independent Palestine ^ata. 
During these five years Je.^sh ianigration would be limited 
to 79«CXX) new entrants, and further icoadgration would depend 
on the consent of the Arabs* Tha Jaws through out tha world 
danoundod tne white paper. Demonstrations and protest meet* 
in s were held in Palestine. ^ Tha .Mte P#>er turned tha 
Zionist aovament eaphatically against Britain for tha f irst 
1. MahsDood Husain, Tha Palestine Lioeration Lroani^ation, (Delhi, 1975), p. 12. 
tloi«, but th« cut br«ak of w«x in S«ptemb«r pl«c«d th« 
Zionists in th* Paradoxical posit ion of iiavlng to sup^iort 
3xitain ay^inst th« cessaon anaay of Nazi (iarmany, Tha 
Odta of Palostina elaaxly dapandad on tha outcona of tha 
During <^rl VIM II tha Jaw& of Palestine wara whcla 
haartadly wdth tha iJrltiih in tha prosacution of dar and 
against tham in tha inplaaantation of tha 1939 .vhite PgpQZ, 
All th. t Can ba said about tha Arabs of tha Jaws of Palas* 
t ina i s that thay did not do anything to antagonisa tha 
Brit ish or to sabotage the war • f f o r t , ^ 
Perhaps tha oicst iniport/mt single event affecting 
Palest ine occured in the United States, Tha occassicn was 
an extraordinary Zionist organi ation meet ncj in Newyork 
held en May 11, 1942. In th i s Conference tha Zionist prog* 
rame was refcinttlatad to neat the chan^ng situation ^ d 
has since been called tha '^ItisoraprograBe*. The Confe-
rence urged tha fulfiment of tha * original purpose* of 
the aalfour U.deration «whlch was Interpretec to be tna 
creation of an independent J a ^ s h st<?t«». I t rejected the 
1939 'White paper*, supported tha creation of the j&idsh 
amy unoer i t s ovi«n fla<i favoured unlitsLted lsii>dgrrtion of 
1. Peter ;<)an8field, OD.cit. . p,253, 
2. Yahya ArmaJani, £EB.S2^., p.341. 
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Jewish to P«l«&tin« and urged th< t^ th« J«Mdsh agency b« given 
power and faci l i tate& to develop the state lands in Palestine 
for the use of Jewish refugees. In Palestine the opposition 
wss voiced hy oteiBbers of '^y^ Partytoostly in te l l ec tua l s led 
by JuddaiMagnus, who opposed the io«a of • puze Jewish state . 
Instead, they were far recondl ia t i cn vAtn the Arabs and 
supported the creation of a bination&l state* 
On the ba»is oi the *3iltmore Progran't the Jevdsh 
agency presented the Brit ish goveminent on 22 May 194b « 
forthnight after yt Day - - with the following dema^  dsi^ 
1. That an iiomedate decision be a:i(iOUnced to estab-
l i s h Palestine undivided and undininished* as a 
Jewish state* 
2* That the Je I s h agency be invested vdth the control 
of Jewish iandgraiion into Palestine) 
3 . That an international loan be raised to finance the 
iniBigxati&n of the * f i r s t odllion* Jews to Palestine} 
4* That reperations in kind from Oemany be grtfited to 
the Jewish People for the reauildingi^lPalestine, snd 
as « f i r s t instalment* that all German property in 
Palestine be u$ed for the resettlement of Je^s from 
feu rope, 
5. That free international f a c i l i t i e s be proviued for 
the exit and trc>nsit of all jews who vAsh to s e t t l e 
in Palestine. 
In July 1947, the Palestine tiovernsnalt, in a suppli-
laentsry meiDorandom to the U . N . f e c i a l Conodttee saidt^ 
1- l^Xsk** P j - ^ ^ . 
2. Sa^ ai Hac^wi, fiCxfi^., p.66. 
3 . IjgLiH., p . 74. 
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"W)i*n th« war agaiiist Qamany and Japan was s«an 
to ba approaching a sueeaasful concluaion, the 
Jaws 9xt>U9ht into action thair vvaapona of la«^ 
l a a ^ e a s and tarzoriait in support of their o^m 
po l i t i ca l aims ano aat»iticnt«« Tha Maraorandom 
pointad out, "Ttia right of any conounity to usa 
force as a maant of gaining i t s p o l i t i c a l «nds 
i s not adiaittad in tha Brit ish eoiKTion vyaalth. 
Since the baglning of 1945, tha Jaws hava icnpli* 
c i t y clainad t h i s right and have s^^pportad, by 
an org«<nizad easi^ai^n of landassnass, nurder and 
sabotage* thair contention that, whatever other 
in teres t s i j h t be concerned, notning should t>% 
allowed to st.3nd in tha way of Jevdsh rotate and 
free Jewish ioodgration into Pal«stina«>, 
Tha United Nations passed tne Parti t ion aasolution 
on 29 November, 1947. Tha Partition Resolution of 29 Nov. 
1947 had recomfflendtd the creation of a Jewish state on 
36% of the terri tory of Palsstina, and Axab state 43;^ and 
an international f^ione of Jerusalan and hnvirons on the 
raioaining 1%. The resolution declared the Arabs l iv ing 
in the are^vset aside for tna Jevdah state were to c&ntinua 
to reside there and to enjoy their fundamental rights and 
bd^ic hjiaari l i o e r t i e s under the guarantees of the United 
Naticns. The resclution turther stipulated that ihe Jewish 
md Arabs States ware tc cosae into being two months after 
Brit ish v\ith(ravirel on I5 t^ay 194e. Therefore, what actually 
emerged as the Jeidlsh state on 14 May 1948 was anything 
but tha * State* planned for under tha i^artition f lan. 
Tha new * State of Xsrail ' was tbe product of brute force. 
I t was erected in coo^l^te violatl;>n of the princi.>les f-t~ 
of th« United Nations Charter, the Universal Uedaraticn 
of Human Id^hts. The Partit ion of Paltotine nut only led 
to the Aiab I s r e i l i WBX in 1948^ 
vdth the establishment of the State of Israel , Zionisn 
ac^Aved i t s major cbjecti vest the creation In Palestine of 
a stat that a exclusively Jevdsh. Having b£;an given the 
t err i tor ia l base by the Brit ish, the zlcni&ts used every 
availaole means to terrorise the indigenous Arab population 
out of Palest ine. This was essential for no other n^ethods 
would ria^e induced tae Palestinion Arabs to l-^ave. 
Cn 14 K.ay 1948, the ziotvists . rodaitosd the state 
of Israel and formed a provincial govemisent* The aradet 
of the Arab countries (a l l of Mdch wrere uno^r European 
control) , wrdch iaced the I srae l i forces, did not exceed 
2D,0CX). AS for the i^al«8tinian Arabs, tbey had been sys* 
tanat ica l ly disarmed by the Mtfidatory gcvemaeiit during 
the Mandate. Consequently, tbey could not defend theaselvet 
3y the conclusion of the <«ar, eighty pex cent c£ the airea 
ot Palestine was occupied by ,the I s r a e l i s and two thirds 
of the Palestinians were uprooted jnd dispossessed* 
Hence, the P a l e s t i n e ^ - I s r a e l i confl ict i s , in i t s 
essence the stru99le of c^n indigenous population against 
the occupaticn of i t s terri tory by invading foreigners 
1 ^ casitt to th9 47«a Mlth no other int tnt lcn other th«n 
tc colonise the land and displace itc> inhabitant&. The 
c^esti&n i s si.M'ly on* of the right of th« P«l««tinean 
Arabs tc self-deteiirlnation. 
As a rasulti a dtlanma has «(i8t«d for tho Pa les t ! -
neans. Cfi one hand, chay aspira to regain their country 
and reassert tae ir iuent i ty , On the other, the i i country 
rV) 
hcis oe!.n occupied by a color.izing con^nity whose zioniat 
nature and structure has devlad their ferv«it hopes. 
Maxim Hociinson writesiThe 1949 arRiistica agre^mtnts 
had made provision for dendlitaHsed zones, which 
presented &ericu£ proclsiss ard v^re var i .as ly int<?r«-
preted. These ^ n e s caused a nundaer of incidents, 
CQspite the Presence of Joint arrtiistice cocMnission 
over Presioed by o f f i c i a l s of the U.M.truce super-
visory occy. 
generally spealfdn^, Xsraal't attitude in ti\K. in 
number able cases of fr ic t ion resulting front tnese 
fragi le frontiers waft for the lODSt part roundly 
condemned oy the various n l l l tary cowpaonders of the 
U,N,truce supervisory force* l«ith laonotoneltous r-^ gu* 
l a r i t y , the Israal ia denouncad them as dnti^sefnites. 
the repeated accusation led to the recall of some of 
Che a»nsionders, and induced others to take up a 
concil iatory attitulle tovkvrds I srae l . I t ss ras ;nlik< 
l y th^t the U«N« should have placed a ser ies of anti-
sendties Qt the head of i t 3 missi.n* In rea l i ty , 
I srae l s intransigent ^^ nd Mgresdve attitude emerget 
c learly from all these I n c i d ^ t s , ano I t i s ^ a t t l* 
tuoe wliich ib r ea l i ty explicable*2 
X. Al-Hai^mDarwaxa, T^^^f FdifiUfff y¥,?g^9" iA i r t t j 
ftfialvsis (New Uelhl, 1973), p , 6 l . 
2. Israel And the Aiao^ (England, 1968), p.68. 
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Th« league of Arab States or th€ Axao Le^ue, as i t 
i s popularly calleu, came Into existence? yi.th th«¥ signing 
of a p«ct at Cairo on Marci^ i 22* 1945. I t has vary daep roots. 
I t s genesis i s tj-aced uack to the aarly period cf the dav^lop-
ment of Arab nationalism nu the otoslaught of Brit ish imp«ria-> 
lism w:n ch cane in direct contact with the Ar^s durin < the 
First ^ r l d .^ ar. 
I t was after the ::»ecciiu «x>rld <«dr nad passed the midway 
naxk tnat tcrmal ef torts to est:^olish Arab Unity, \<vn ch wera 
due to culiflincte in ttie founding of the Leav^ ue of Mrab states , 
begtfi to mark themselves f e l t , 
Xti9 popular desire for Unity h-.d baan present and forcaful 
for two dacadas. The timing of the iidd-war efforts of Arab 
officialdom, however, was the result of many new circumstances. 
Sevan Arab countries had a t tune , an adequate measure of self 
ct«tai«ination ay the early 1940* a. I t i s true that, except 
for Saudi Araoia and Yemen, the emancipation of the otrter 
i ive other countries had remained incon^lete. Nevertheless, 
they had acbiovad a '-egree cf independence sufficient to 
•rsaole them to ccnouct th«lr relat ions with one another, 
i f not i t h tha rast of the (Morld, witnout ouch direct 
interference from Britain or Fxi^ce. 
Since the strugt^l^d tor unity nad b'^ e^n suspended, 
in the eoxly phases cf Post « r l d War I period. Pending 
the attairxnent of independence} and since the Arab nationa-
l i s t atovenent had consistently maintained that the ot>Jectivf> 
of unity be pursued iraaediately aftor the objective of self 
deterodnation had been achieved, there was a natural cotapul* 
sion in the early 1940* s to the pursuit of Unity, 
The Arab League not only Confirmed and respected the 
independence nd Sovereignty of i t s meaiber States, but i t 
also J aiddoivn the foundations of t ^ i r p o l i t i c a l , econonic 
and cultural/without interfearing in one another's system 
of Government, The precuraar of the Arab Leagu^ ^ wds Ar^ thony 
isden* s itatement in the House of Commons on 29 May 1941, 
in which h0 said. 
The Arab worlo ha« mtide great stri<iie since the 
settlement reached ^t the end of the l a s t war, 
tfid many A r ^ thinkers desire for the Arab peoples 
a greater decree of unity tn^n the now enjoy. In 
reaciuny cut towards this unity t tey hope tor our 
support. No such ^. .eal from our friends s^ tcu o go 
unansv^red. I t seems to be both natural anc ri^ht 
thcit the cultural sno econosdc t i e s between the 
Arab countries, ano the po l i t i ca l t i e s too should 
1, Faye& A, Sayegh, '^r^b Unity} Hooe and Fulfillment 
(New York, 1958) pp. I l l , 112. 
2, P.M.HAlt mothers (ed) , , o p . c i t . . pp. 982-583, 
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b« strengthened. *Hl8 M^ijusty's government for 
t h e i r part M i l l give t n e i r f u l l support to eny 
scheme that cosnioncis geCierel a^^proval*" 
I t i s tput that the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h pol icy to 
nainta: n/independence of the C t t o m ^ ismpire had a t r i p l e 
purpose. One was to use i t as a t^uffer dt te against the 
Southward expension of Rus^a, second was to use i t for 
the safguarding of the route of I n d i a , amd t h i r d was to 
na in ta in the oalance of pcwer i n Europe. By the laiddle 
o f the twent ieth century, th>^  protect ion of the vast o i l 
reserves of the Midole East, perhaps outweigMed a l l these 
considerations. LXiring i^ iOrld War I , Great S r i t a i n decided 
to continue i t s previous pol icy by replacing the defunet 
Ottoman Empire oy a United or federated Arab state i n the 
F e r t i l e Crescent. An agreemc^nt eariftodied i n the so ca l led 
Husain McMahon correspondence was a d i rec t resul t of such 
a po l icy . The Sykes-Picot aoreement and the Balfour D cla« 
r a t i o n , however, prevented the ioiplenentation of t n i s pol icy. 
Instead of a United or federated Arab States c^ae into being, 
excluding Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf bhaikhdoms. "^  
A number of t r e t i e s had been concluded auong the Arab 
states, anc had oemt t iai l u by Arab na t iona l i s ts as a taken 
of /a^ib orotheriiood and as portefits of future Unity, as 
Na j la Izzedoin States} 
1 . Yahya Amaj«r>l, £^>Ai^* , p« 343. 
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On the o f f i c i a l l*v«l , th« trend expressed i t s e l f 
in the fom of treat ies of friendship tfid good 
neighborlinets eoncluoed betwe^ ^n several Arab states . 
H ser ies of agreements set t l ing boundary disputes 
was rescheo oetween Saudi Arabia on tiie one hand and 
Ira^t Transjordtfi, and Ysia«n en the other. A Treaty 
of A a^b brocherhood and Allienc^ «vas signed in April 
1936 between Iraq and ;»«udi Arabia. I t eXr>ress«d the 
need for cooperation and outual understdi«ding, arran-
ged for the peaceful settlement for all diftexences, 
and provided for the excii<4ige of culture! and military 
odsalons. Adherence to t h i s Treaty, which Yaman joined 
in the following ye^r, was open to any independent 
Ar^ state . In Ikgy 1936, Ibn SMid ^ d Egypt becaiM 
parties to a treaty vwhich set t led cneir differences. 
Another document of interest and significance i s the 
Treaty of Taif, signed in May 1934, wnich ended tha 
h o s t i l i t i e s betwe n Saudi Ar^ia and Yanan. 1 
The advent of the second M»rlo naTt increased in ter -
Arab Cooperation. Under the pressuxe of •^ax, economic regio-
nalisffi made a hopeful beginning in the Art^ vibrld. War time 
regional economic cooperation was conductive to the ,.regrets 
of thinking, within the ranks of Arab officiadon, in terms 
of Coordination and Union. To quote Najla Ii^eddin ag^in: 
The necess i t i e of m^ a)m^elled the powers tc view 
the Middle Last as a unit. A region >1 orgtinization, 
the Middle East supply center, was established for 
the purpose of assuring the es ent ia ls of l i v e l i -
hood for the c iv i l ian population ot the area vdthin 
the fraBMwork of the requirements and axegincies of 
conducting a global war. Since i t was inperativa to 
stv*t •» mtch as potsibla, shipping ^ace , port 
e d a c i t y , and internal t r ^ ^ o r t a t i o n for wat suppl-
i e s material, the sriipm^tt of c iv i l ian goods nad to 
be drast ical ly reduced, aut as all the countries of 
the Mid l e bast depended heavily upon foreign im orts 
tn i s drastic reducxicn of imptrted sup.^lied threa-
teneci uhe area vJLth the serluus sncr tage. I t was 
1. The Arab World, Past. Present and Futurt^ (Chicago, 1953) 
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nec«'tary, ther«fox«, on th« one hand to develop 
as ful ly as possiale the local resources and to 
arrange fox their exchange between the varlcus 
s tates , en the other hand to survey th*:- essential 
needs w^dch could not be loca l ly supplied to pre vide 
the rec|uirec transport, anc t assure equitable d i s -
tribution. 
Thus the Middle cast supply Centre, creates by 
Great i^ritain in 1941 and coming under Joint Anglo-
Amarican control In the following year, had tc ccn-
sioer the Mid<'ile East as a sinyle wix>le in ascertain-
ing i t s needs and developing i t s po ten t ia l i t i e s . The 
Centre arranged for regional conferences on economic 
Problems in which the varicus govemniwits part ic i -
pated. 
Apart from the experiences and knovdedae pooled 
and exchan ad at these meetings, the cciiference showed 
tha need, and the poss ib i l i ty , of Organizing tha 
Middle Eastern countries on a regional d a ^ s . Froa , 
economic to po l i t i ca l regionalism was a short step. 1 
During the '«rld War II because of the defeat of Fiance 
Brit ish troops controlled all of the Ferti le Crescent as they 
had oone in 1917, As e .r ly as l«.3t, the dr i t i sh Government 
called a Conference on Palestine and for the f irr t time 
involved rSrresentatives of Ardb s tates . Cn May 29* 1941 
Anthony Eden, l irit ish foreign Secretary, tftn^ unced thei need 
for Arab unity and spoke of their dc^sire for a greHer degree 
of the unity then they now enjoy. 
The idea of Pan-Arabian was in the ascendency among the 
Arabic speaking peoples of the Fert i le Crescent, so that the 
remarks of Eden f e l l on receptive aars. In direct response 
1. iJBl^.t pp. 32D-321. 
to th i s invi tat ion , Nuri «l*Sal0 of Iraq in 1942 proposed 
• Unic>n cf Iraq* Palestine, Tr«nsjordan, Syria and possibly 
Lebanon, , i t h the poss ib i l i ty of other:-> joining later on, 
Tnis soundec very uAich l ike the 'Greater Syria* rooveffient 
unoer the Hashnitt. faa i ly and was itot acceptable Nahhas 
Pasha of tgypt, who had not previcusly shown enthusiasm for 
Pan-Arabism, He invited an Axao Uoverna nt for the consults^ 
t ions of an Arab Unity, The eonsultaticns ..Ikich lasi-ed more 
than a ye. r in wnich Syria and Iraq were for a federative 
scheffie, Fr nsjordan Chaicploncci Union twith Palestine, Syria 
and possibly Lebtfion vi,th a greater Arab Union, tfid Egypt, 
Leo anon, ^auui Areola, and Yantfi favored a Confederation 
of States, en Cctcaer 7, 1944the eight states signed a pro-
tocol of Alexandiria in whlca they agreed to form tfi Arab 
league, AS stated above the final fact of the league of 
the Arab states was signeci in Cairo on March 22, 1945. I t 
considered Palestine 'ItigalLy* an indcpenuent fTef!> State. 
By Che end oi the war, Arab nationalism lad for the f i r s t 
time a leagi?liy thouc,n/^constitudad oody to xepreserit i t 
against the Zionist natictialisro in Palest ine. 
*^i the Firit World ^'ai,* writes P.K.Hlttle, 
'served che Arab Con^onents of the OttomtfT) biapire 
an6 set thes) on tne way to ful or s^fldnation hood. 
Th« 3 cono ^ r l d ^at, coirtslneu with tha thre«.t po l i -
t i ca l Zicnisn . , . , Contributed to jriitging those 
partii closer toget'iar, Coairaon interest anc^  tha 
risiny f ttling of sol idarity founo, axprcftsion 
in th« pact of *i«<>9U« of Arab Stat«s*« ^gnad 
in Cairo, Marci% 194S,i 
In tha course of tha ansuing two yaars, Arab ofiicialdom 
in tha saven than*indapandant Ar^ statas wara activa in 
building tfia new Pan^Arab structura. Ttds activaly which 
culsoinatad on March 22, 1V^5, in tha proiaulgaUon of tha 
Pact of tha Laague of Arab statas, passad through fiva satags: 
Tha stag* consisted of a sarias of saparata bilateral 
ta lks oatwaen tha Pramiar cf iirgypt, on tha one hand, 
^ d tha Prasniar of each of tha six other Arab Statas, 
on tha other hand, Tnis staga iasta . from >ijuly, 1943 
until Fabruary, 1944. All participating Govainn.ants 
were represented oy their Prlmae Ministers, save for 
;^ audi Arabia and Yaman. 
At the second staga, tha Preparatory Coimiittee of 
the Pan Arab Conference held i t s f i r s t session, Mldeh 
lasted from Septentidei- 25 to October?, 1944, The Coand-
t tee was ccnvcsed of the Prime Ministers of the seven 
Arab states , ^ d a representative of tiM ArabsfPales-
t ine . At the eno of i t s session, the coEQuiittee procla* 
lined a Protocol containing tha resolution^ cf tha vro^p 
and calling for the as tabl i s i l ent of a Laagua of Arab 
s ta te s . Tois Protocol of October 7,1944, eonruaonly known 
as the Protocol of Alexandria,2 defined tne general 
purposes of tne proposed taagua, and tha principles of 
Inter-^ovamiaental Arab Cooperation. Tha drafting of 
the constitution of the Laayue was entrusted to a 
sub-co a»al t t ee« 
The session of the sub«comr:dttee coteprised the third 
stage in the Arab discussions. COnposed of the Foreign 
iitinisters of the seven signatories, and a represanta* 
t ive of Arabs cf Palastina, the sub-conmittaa convened 
frocQ Feumiry 14 to March 3, 1945, and prepared a 
Draft Pact for the League. 
1. mstory of tha Arab^ (London, 1964), p.750 
2. The un..ersiG|ned chiefs and liiembers of Arab deligations 
at the Preliminary Connittee of the General Arab Conference, 
stren then ^ d consolidate the t i e s ivtiich bin al l Arab count** 
r ias ana to direct tnieia toward the .welfare of the Ar^b world, 
to ist^^rove i t s conciiticns, insure i t s future, and real ize 
i t s hopes and aspirations. HMMB net at 9l9xsndixa from (Sept, 25, 1944 to October 7,1944} in the forsi of a l^reli-
minary comcdttee of General Arab Conference. 
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Th« proparatory Comadttaa then convened i t s 
second session in G«izo, fron M«rch 17 to X9, 1945. 
At t n i s ,.«nultimata stagei th« braft Pact was l e v i -
sad ano app c^ovad* 
Finally t-n March 12, 1945, the Ptapatory conunittae 
transformed i t s e l f into a Pan«>Arab Conference, and 
•P^.rovad and signed the Pact of the LeaQue of Arab 
St jtes,! 
At the rO-exandria Conference, as doriny the preparatory 
ta lks wrtich preceded i t , three forms of AxaO unity vwr© . ro-
posed* The d o s i s t form ot union under a central gcvemin«nt« 
was not consioered possible or d«sirav>la« /Viother proposal 
was/fttd«<(^ Gtl union vdth oi ding authGrity upon the conpon<iM 
states . But tn i s form also i»as considered inpsacticable 
under present conaitions. I t was f ina l ly decided to estab* 
l i s h , as a f ixs t step, a loose fom of union whose authority 
wOild be oinoing only upon those states which accepted i t s 
discussions ano resolutions. 
The prellndnary Conference drew up a document known as 
the Alexanorid Protocol v t^iich rovlded for the est^Dlishnient 
of a League of inoepen<.ent' Ar^ States for the purpose of 
strengthening the existing bonds and relations oetween then, 
consolidating their ef forts , and promoting closer cooperation 
on the p o l i t i c a l , ea)nofnic .md cultural l eve l s , th»s securing 
the ir well-being anc zotecting thr ir independence. 
1. fayez A.Sayegh, j2£AjSi^ *t PP« 120-121* 
2. Nejla l 2 edcin, o c . c i t . . pp. 322-3i3. 
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Th* m«jor responsibi l i ty for the loagu**s fai lure 
rests ndtn the ttfeinaej: tdtes over lihoBi the league has 
nc binding authority. These states , persisting in a co'jrse 
wiiich 9%ve priceoence to locel problems and con&ideraticnt 
ove. niore v i ta l mattexs of general Arsb concern, have lacked 
the vis ion an-^  the will ingness to develo^ on Axab policy 
diur^cted tuwaros the real ization oi the oroad ano u l t i ate 
in teres t s of the cntixe Arab nation. 
4 Unlike the Charter/^the United Nations, the Pact of the 
fiittio League does net clearly defint i t s p m c i p l e s in a 
separate ar t i c l e . The pact establishes the , rinciple of 
non-agv^ress^on, forbidding i»enu>er states to resort to force 
for the settlement of the ir deputes. This the Pact may 
be said to have laid down the following principles! 
1. Respect for sovereignty end t er i i t or ia l integrity . 
2. He^cct for the established form cf government. 
3 . Non-aggression and peaceful settlement cf dispates. 
The members are prohibited from resorting force, 
but co l lect ive security i s not autontdtic and the 
Arab League's jurisoicat ion witn regard to peaceful 
settlement of disputes i s not ooligatory. 
4 . Independence in foreign policy and right to con<A.ude 
agreements. 
5. Equality and unanimity. £ach member to have one vote 
and unanindty renulied in respect cf discussion to 
repulse aggression. Thus, the Arao Lea<^ ue may be 
said to hd'/e the*Veto system*. 
The ot»jects of the League may be sum...prized as followst 
1. To strengthen the relations bet we n the ':eio r states. 
2* To coordinate tneir po l i c i e s with a view to ac ieve 
close collaboration and the safeguard their indepen-
dence nd sovereignty. 
3 . To supervise, in a general way, the affairs and 
in teres t s of the Arab countries. 
4. To estal^lish clo « cooper^itlon a«tvv«en racinbcr 
s ta t t s vAth ou« r«9ard tc th« ozQanizatlcn and 
clrcUBtstanc«8 in tacti stata in tho econoadCf 
financial! social , culture! and oth r similar 
af fa irs . 1 
Th« functions ano organization ot the L«agu« v»«r« 
dofined in accordanc* vdth i t s ultimate purposes* 
According to ^irticle II of the Pact, the ^eague 
had three fold purposet "To strengthen the 
relations between the ir.enber ta tes cf the Leaguet 
to coordinate the po l i c i es of th«#e states , with 
a view to the realization of cooperation araong 
them and the safeguarding of their ind^endence 
and soveriegnty} and to coitsioer, in a general 
way* ^he aftldrs and int^^rests of Arab lands*,2 
Under the auspices of the Lsague, a measure of coopera* 
t ion was realized between the Arab States in the social , 
economic cultural, healtn and other f i e ld s . Twelve t i e a t i e s , 
•greeaents and conventions, furthering the objective of 
"coordination of po l i c i e s and measures anong meDaber<»states", 
have been concluded. 
dut t rea t i e s do net t e l l the wtKitle storyt nor .^n 
the amount of collaboration ancng the Ar^^ States b# 
be adequately measured oy t rea t i e s alone. An inte i -govem-
roental Arab community has been slowly energing, in w'dch 
the v i ta l functions of government exercised in each state 
i . Cited oy JA.I.Ansari, The Arab LenQUf (Ali9ar/»,i968>, 
pp. 3 7 - ^ -
2. Fayez A. Sayegh, o p . d t . . p. 134. 
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have b«en progressively •nB<2«h«d in tfi expanding net work 
of intrd*Axab xelotions. Inter^stdte in s t i tg t ions dnd bodies, 
diverse surveys and studic't, and sesdnars ^ d conferences 
of experts in anny f i e lds have been respectively created, 
inspired or convened under the Mispices of the Lea U9, 
The League council held i t s f i r s t extraordinary session 
at Cairo on June, 4 , 1V45 wiiich lasted a w«ek. In i t s f i r s t 
resolotion adopted on June 5, the council declared the League 
to i^ e an interested partyi* 
Any international conference called to solve the 
dispute between Syria and Lebanon tn the .ne hand 
&nd France on the other, snould include the league 
of Arab states in addition to the xepresentetives 
of Syria and Lebancn. I t should also be understood 
that every ncgotietion on the c^estion should be 
based on the recognition of complete independence 
and scverei ^nty of both these countries. 
peaking on March 22, 1958, on the cccassicn of the 
League's thirteenth Anniversary, Abdul Khalik Hassouna, 
the secreta:^y General of the League saidt^ 
The fact i s that the League has paved the way for the 
p o l i t i c a l , odlitary, economic and social unity of the 
Ar<.bs. The Pact ci the League, the convention of Arab 
co l l ec t ive security, the Arab Cultural Treaty, the 
many economic ^ d financial agreements w^Uch culndnated 
in the conclusion of the economic <»nvention bet«»een 
Arab states and in the project of the Arab Development 
Bank, end the continuous ser ies of conferences and 
sendnars w.iich were held during the l a s t tirdrteen 
years, all these 9f the support in which the founda** 
tion of our unity has oe»n bui l t . 
X. Ij2ii^., pp. 135, 136 
2. Fiesolution No.l dated June 5, 1945. 
3 . Fayed A.c>ayeya, €^^. tfjt.. p. 137 
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Writing in 1953 from a difter«nt p«rsp«ctive, howev r, 
N«JIa Izzedciiri writ«8i 
"Th« l«agu«, as i t has d«veIop*c, hat dissipated 
much of the hcpe that was placed on i t . Instead 
of working towards a oraat^r oofsolidation. cf Arab 
t i e s , the league has irenioolllzed the relations bet-
ween the Arab state at the staQ«' where i t found than. 
I t has proved, during these eight years of i t s ex i s -
tence, to be net the f i r s t step leading to a enore 
binding urdon out au instruiaent to «>nsecxate the 
states quo.! 
Duriny t .e f i r s t phase the League's greatest po l i t i ca l 
success may be said tc have takMi place in the case of 5yrla 
and Lebanon at a time when liritaln was herself interested 
in g e t t n g the French cut of the Levant and Frtnce had alto 
found herself in a t ight corner on accouiit of her own time 
recognition of i t s independence. 
Anglo-Egyptian t x e , t y negotiations ended in a deadlock 
in 1946 anc thez^eafter, be i t Yenan, Palestine or bgypt, the 
Axao league could no real ize what i t resolved because i t 
was up again t Britain, surveying the peiicd between 1945 
and 1950 ueorye KirK u i s l s ^ e s the League in the following 
wordst 
"Since the jreakdovO) of regotlations i t h Britain. 
however, Hgypt had been usin^ the Arab League (which 
she influenced through i t s Hyypt an ^cretary General 
Abdur-Rehman Azzam, and through the fact that Egypt 
1. Arab «oriU, ^.^i^skl't P» 324. 
pxovld«d 42 p«r c«nt cf th« funct of i t s secr«tar«it) 
«s «n in8tiu(»*nt of li«r anti«>aritish Policy"* 1 
t>Kc ttntor th«^ ^ secQno Phase oy 1950, which m^kk^ti a 
decisive change in the chaxacttir of the Arab Le&yue on th« 
conclusion of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Econcaic 
Cooper t ion. During t h i s perioo of At^Io-Egypti^ c o i d l i a * 
t icn no anti-Brit ish issue floxed up oefore the ieague. 
fhe greatest cuntrioution made by the league to tne 
cause of Arab unity, howev r, was the brin9ing-tog«<ther of 
al l sectors of the Arab worlo into cne Pan Arabfold, &ve 
though tne Leegue was fa^ from being a vessel for pol i t ica l 
unity, then i t has nevtz-theless lendered the service of 
proventiug the establishment of such conditions cf Pc l i t i ca l 
diver si f icdtion as n.ay have aoilitjited against the prospects 
cf Arab unity in the future*^ 
The fai lure cf the Ar^^ Le».ue does not signify the 
failure of the Arab nationalisn. Th^  ieagOe, as i t has been 
already stated, i s a league of Arab states , t^d8 i s i t s 
o f t i c i a l nane, as i t s developiaent has reflected the po l i c i es 
of th individual s tates . Thus the league i s i<ct idwit ieel 
with ATc^ b unity. I t i s a Phas^ of the ntovesient and a step 
1. -sjeorge Kirk, "ourv-sy sJ int«rjCLatii*fial Affairs" in 
Tftt ^M^ r-ifft. 1 9 4 ^ ^ , p. 144. 
2. Fayex A. Sayegh, o p . c i t . . p. 139. 
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along tli« p^th. Th« 9*ner«l inpatiene* oxpratsad at th« 
•lt»Mr)«i3 and inc^^tituda cf th* Laagu^ ^ ln(£Le tas tha popular 
urge toward SI unity. "^  
Ih« ATaO LaA9U« xtsftlf i% an IntaxnatiunaX be y wdth 
i t * owl) lnc«pandant statutory powars n^t genaral objactives. 
Tna la»iue of AioO batatas i s a voluntary association 
cf sovazeiyn Ar^ statas tiasigntd to strengtiien tna clcs« 
tif'S linking than <»nc to coo^ctinata th^ir po l ic ias and acti* 
v i l l a s Jid direct ther totvdrds th9 co»<Qon good of all tna 
Ar«b c«^untri'&. I t Mas fou> dad In tiarch i945. 
vtiila i t ii> prexaquasite that svi^ Ctbaxs ruist Da ,jrad statas 
thc>t ax* ful ly incapand^nt, tha .^ctiviti^s of th« laa>iua also 
c^6n includa ^rab ccuttrias which aia not ino«p«ndant. i^olostina 
i s considared an inuapandent sta^a* dn<^  thaxefora, & full 
nerno^r of tha La«^ua. Tna stgtvt cf Fale^tina «s a full nanbar 
of the Laatjue v.v^ s corfirmed at a fse^^tlng of the Arab League 
courtcil in ;i»aptf»fiibar 1976. 
1. Nejla Iizeddin, j^^UJ^^t P* 3 ^ * 
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vxn 
CUNaUSLONS 
In th* nin<^te«nta century vvh^ n th« Ottom^ iEn^ir* 
was ripidly declining, the • s t e m world w«s going through 
a gre< t^ tr^^sition and growing in military, po l i t i ca l and 
•concndc power as a r&sult ot revolutic nary developments 
in industrial cdpitr^liso^and in tiie prooreas of technology. 
Theie was also a process of secularization wnich had gained 
roomenturo in the social and govemoient ins t i tut ions of the 
western countries. Tliis had contributed greatly to the 
growth of ndlitant type «f nationalism. 
^hen the AXdbs came in actual contact vdth the ^ s t in 
their o\Ain {tandSt during and after the mid Uai I , i t was a 
• i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y powerful west. The Arabs in Egypt 
and Palestine had seen Napoleon I from 1798'->lt01. But the 
situation of twentieth century was (^ite different. The Arabs 
experienced a national awakening towards th« end of nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth centuriLes. Their nationalisn 
hcd been submerged by nearly four hundred years of Cttomtfi 
dcoanaticn. Throughout the four centuries of Cttoman rule 
the Arabs oic not forget their Itfnguage (Arabic}. Nationalisn 
had undex gone stsveral changes in rov^aning dur^nu the course 
cf i t s •volution in vaziout stat«t . From th« Arab point 
of view racial ly , culturally and tp ir i tua l ly Arab nat io-
n , l i sB i s one of the oldast nat i .nal i sns in th« Morld* 
The Arab ideologues traee the begining of Arab 
nationalism from the aovent of Is lan i t s o l f or even earl ier 
In the modem period Arab nationalism was bcm as an 'in^e* 
l l ec tual au^vcacnt* in l i t erary c irc les and secret soc ie t ies 
and especial ly through the fefry pcivers of fxalo pcets* The 
most ioiport nt t^ing ojuut Islam was that i t was revealed 
by an Araoian rrophet , in the Arabic langua e in Arabia. 
I s l ^ was the Prime creator of the naticngl l i f e and poli« 
t i ca l unity of the Muslim ATubs . v^hen Islam became the r e l i -
gion of such non Arabs as the Persians and the Indians, the 
Arab f e l t s t i l l more conscious of their Arabism *Urubah 
and continued tu ccnsider themselves superior to the non. 
Arao Muslins ^novii as c l i ents . As jurjiZaydan (d.l914) r l tes i 
The Arabsrr. believed themselves ot th i s time to 
be superiov tc all other nations, wheather c l i ents 
or member of torler -^^ te'J creeds. In Ids ov^ opinion, 
the Arab wae bcrn to rule, and everyone e l se to 
serve; whence, the comu^ncement of Islam, the Ar^ 
occupied themselves only .dth goveriny and .politics; 
^ d other occupations, especial ly 'vxts and crafts , 
were relinQjUisbed oy them to non-Arabs. An Arab ^ d 
a cl ient tiau a dispute in the i^resence cf 'Abdullah 
ibn Amir, governor of Iraq, when chx c l ient said 
to the Arab;C]Od give us fevv- Ixke thee* The Ar^ 
r«tort*di Qod f iv* Uf MJHV I Iks tht«! 3«in9 ask^d 
why tit i>l«t««<l In «ns«»r to th« oth«r*t curst, h« 
rtpl i tdt Do not t h t i t ptoplt sw««{^ur s t r t e t s , r/^  
^fttch our Bti •«, and wave our 9«xai«nts« 1 
As la ta as the ad dole cf tha ninataenth cantury, an 
•Crlantal Studant* observed thati 
•Danasois a>nsider thamsaXvas, en tha doubla ground 
of oaina Mo slims and Arabs, as the noolast race in 
the \Morld, anc that the <)ovainn«nt of tha sultan 
i s the f i r s t in rank, not bacausa ha i s Malsk-ar 
HofiKO, or aovaraign of tha Gradi fenpira, but tha 
Caliph,or successor of Itohanraad, Tna ttodem Syrian^. 
p. 202. 
Arao national consciousness suxvivad throuyhcut tha 
co^y^Dries. Tiiey never forget tneir naticnalisiB under tha 
rurks. After l9Ub, saparatistu was altntst forced ur^n soaa 
Vtus.itn Issuers Oy the shoxtsightadnass and chauvinistic Pan* 
Turanian policy adopted oy the young Turks« The dispetic 
policy of Ja&ial Pasha, ««h«n ha ordered the hanging of pro-
adnant Arabs in aeirut ^id uamascus, in 1915 smd 1916, 
widenao, s t i l l furthe. , the breach between the Arabs and 
tha Turks, i t greatly intens i f ied the Arab leaders dasira 
to dftaeh cospletely from the Ct ton^ Etupire. Finally tha 
proauses of the Al l i e s , during the First tiorld fiai, that 
they v)Ould l iberate the Arabs fron the Tuj^s ^ o qive then 
their independence l td to the Arabs Bevolt, which took palct 
1. TarJKh 4--Tenaddun f^  Is^yai. j ig . t r . by D.s.Margf 
l iouth under tha l i t t l e of Uaavvads and Aboasids |Gibb Mtmrial 
Series, vol . iV, London, 1907) pp. 71-72. 
in M«eca, tn 10 Jun* 1916, und^r th« leadership of Sharif 
Husain. 
'Po l i t i ca l nationalism taay ^ considerad as tht second 
sttge in the developwient of Arab nationalism* I t was actually 
the proauct of po l i t i ca l ^ d social conditions prevailing 
ijurlng the l a . t years ot Turkish rule in Arab lands. As that 
re l ig icn cculd net be separsted frotn /Xcb natlonalisn* The 
f i r s t leader of Areb po l i t i ca l n«tionalistn was Sharif Husoin 
of Mecca» who envisaged iibu-ediately befoxe and during tne 
First .x>rld Vkar, an Ar«^ State rlaing cut of the dessclution 
of tne Cttoman iinpire, bui l t around an Arab MUislin King. In 
a menorandum submitted tc the Peace Conference on January 1, 
1919 EiHir Faisal wrotei The country fro a l ine Alexandretta* 
i^ersia, southward tc Inditfi ucean i s inhabited 
by (Arabs-by wnich we n e ^ people of c losely 
related spastic stocks, a l l speaking the one 
language, Arabic*. The aim of tne Ar b natio-
na l i s t iGovements (of w ich my fathei became 
the leader in war after ccinbined appeal from 
the Syrian ano ii^esopot^an branches) i s to 
unit£ the Arabs eventually into one nat ion . . . 
And sqain in a secono meruorandua to the Peace Conference, on 
January 29, 19X9 the t::mlr wrotet As representing my father, 
who Dy reu.uest of Britain and France, led 
the Arab rebellion a9<>inst Turks, I have 
corae o^ ask th«t the Arabis-speaking -peoples 
of Asia, from the l ine Alexandratta-Oiarbekr 
south «rard en the Indian Lcean, t)e recognised 
as indepem tnt soveriiign peoples under the 
guarantee cf the League of UatiLns. . . ' 
1. U.ti.Miller, ft.v piarv at the Peace in ference of Parle. 
1^18-19 (ivev^  Yvrk, 192^), vol.IV. Uocument 250, pp.297-299. 
2. Ib id . . CJccui.Qnt, 251, p. 30C) 
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Th« Syk«*»PieDt AgrvaoMnt of May 16,19X6 was transfomtd 
into a sami colonial Mandate syttan by th« Alllad supramt 
Council naeting at :9on<-Hamo, fxoa April 19 to 25, 1920» 
consac^antly Ira<) and Syria ware raeognli^d as two indapan* 
dant countries undai the tut l laga of Britain from Iraq* 
and Franca fcr * Syria* as mandatory powers. The presence 
of the Mandatory powers intensi f ied the struggle for se l f -
determinatlcn and po l i t i ca l independence. I t gave birth to 
a nuiiO<ri of r o l l t l c a l parties and unified the opposition 
againot imi. eiicuisBi. Tne post-lJifar p riod I s a period of 
frustratlcn ano disappointment caused by the ..estam pro* 
taises uf indepeudence which the Ar. b leaders h^o, unfcrtu-
nutely, interpretec them l i t e r a l l y . This fact i s narked 
with a yreat odstrust and lack of confidence in the pol ic ies 
of the j^estem powers in ^vest-Asiar I t often lead even to 
h o s t i l i t y and open revolts against colcnial po l i c i e s . This 
post-War perico tray be considered an ioiportarit stage in 
the evaluation of Arab nationalitfiu 
^nce the Second i«>rld r^ ar and especial ly the l a s t 
decade may t>e considoi-ed a& a new s t a e in the evolution 
of Arab nationalism, wrdch a oomi>lex prccess of seculari* 
Sjition ano consolidation of regional naticnalism took place. 
1. Cf. Z.N.zeine, o^ . c i t . . p. 125. 
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During t h i s period, ld«al of Arab Unity has bat^ n maintained 
although the Arab League did not succeed in to establishing 
a federation oi the Arab countries. Several att«4)ts at the 
unification either fa i led to oiaterialize or did net l o s t very 
long. However, an isaportant developaant was triad herd to 
leplace the concept of Islaadc Utnah by thdtcf the jUrkJUtSL'' 
yyah a^-«ArabiYvah. By t h i s ne«v term JX ^^niMVYS^ fil *AyafrlYYah 
i s merit tcday not only Arab nationalism >ut <J.so Arab unity, 
dy the axponents cf Arab Unity the concept of u.av«DiyyAb i s 
an important weapon to fight against iP9>erialist uncroafih-
ment in the Azc>b world. 
I t i s true that Arab naticriallsK cAfies ^^y definitions 
as m slnqle definition can incluci« «ill Itc diverse and 
apparently contrsdictcry dq:>ect3. i t I s a fact that j^rab 
naticneilsQ i s bcth a po l i t i ca l isiovdntent and a rel igious 
reviVciU i t i e octh secular and theocratic. Hut as a progre-
ssive force i t aiffis at the iceal of uniting all the Arab 
lands aceiin? imperialist domination. 
I t i s a fact , thet Arab League has net been able 
to real ize the AraD unity in econcndc and pc l i t i ca l f i e lds . 
6\ii. th« failure cf thd Arab League, as N^jla lateddin 
writes, *iic.es not aiynify the fai lure c-f the Arab mcvenent. 
The League, a£ i t has been already stated, i s a League of 
-2aS-
AXdb stattK; t h i s i s i t s o f f ! d i d naia«» as i t s devftlop-
aant has r«flscted the p o l i c i e s of th« indlvickjol s tarts . 
Thus the league i s not identical vdth Arab Unity, I t i s 
a phase of the aovesrient and a a t ^ along the Path, The 
g^tneral importance expressed at the slotuness af\6 i n ^ t l t u d e 
of the i,e«ciue indlelites the popula urge towards unity. 
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